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Experience has taught us that wishing costs little, and so we generously present each other with the best and warmest wishes. Among these the one for a long life takes first place. The ambivalency of just this wish is discovered in a well-known oriental anecdote. A Sultan got two soothsayers to cast his horoscope. 'Happiness will be thine, Lord', said the one; 'it is written in the stars that thou shalt see all thy relatives die before thee'. This seer was executed. 'Happiness will be thine', said the other, too; 'for I read in the stars that thou wilt survive all thy relatives'. This one was richly rewarded. Both had given expression to the same wish-fulfilment.

In January 1926 it was my lot to write an obituary notice for our unforgettable friend, Karl Abraham. A few years before, in 1923, I could felicitate Sándor Ferenczi on completing his fiftieth year. To-day, a bare decade later, it pains me to learn that I have survived him too. In what I wrote in celebration of his birthday I might publicly praise his many-sidedness and originality, the wealth of his talents: discretion forbade a friend to speak of his lovable and benevolent personality, one that welcomed all in life that had significance.

Since the time when interest for the young science of psycho-analysis led him to me we had shared much with each other. I invited him to accompany me when I was called to Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1909, to lecture there during a Commemoration week. Every morning, before the hour of my

lecture, we would stroll together before the University buildings ; I would ask him to suggest what I should talk about that day and he would sketch out for me what I would then improvise half an hour later. This was his share in the ' Fünf Vorlesungen '. Soon after this, at the Nuremberg Congress in 1910, I got him to propose the organization of analysts into an International Association, as we had planned it together. This was accepted with minor modifications and still obtains. We spent together in Italy the summer holidays of several successive years, and a number of papers which appeared later under his or my name first took form there in our talks. When the World War broke out, put an end to our freedom of movement and also paralysed our analytical activities, he made use of the interval to begin his analysis with me ; this was then interrupted through his being called up for service, but was continued later. The sure feeling of belonging together which had grown between us during so many common experiences remained undisturbed when, unfortunately too late in life, he married the admirable wife who to-day mourns him.

A decade ago, when the *Internationaler Zeitschrift* and the *International Journal* dedicated a special number to Ferenczi's fiftieth birthday, most of the contributions which have made all analysts his pupils had already been published. But his most brilliant achievement, and the richest in thought, he had still kept in reserve. I knew of it and exhorted him at the end of my message of greeting to give it to us. In 1924 there then appeared his ' Versuch einer Genitaltheorie.' This booklet was a biological rather than a psycho-analytical study, an application to the biology of sexual processes—and beyond this to organic life in general—of the points of view and insight that psycho-analysis had co-ordinated ; it is perhaps the boldest application of analysis ever attempted. Its leading thought was the emphasis laid on the conservative nature of the instincts, which strive to restore every state surrendered through outer disturbances ; symbols were recognized to be signs of old connections ; it was shewn by impressive examples how psychical peculiarities retain the

traces of primeval changes in bodily substance. On reading those essays one felt that one understood numerous singularities of sexual life which one had never previously been able to survey in their connection, and one felt enriched by suggestions which promise far-reaching vistas over wide fields of biology. In vain we to-day try to divide what may be accepted as probable knowledge from what, by a sort of scientific fancy, seeks to divine future knowledge. One put aside the little book with the conclusion: That is almost too much for one time; I will read it again after a while. And this was not only my experience. In all probability there will some time really be a 'Bio-Analysis', as Ferenczi has proclaimed, and it will surely have recourse to the 'Versuch einer Genitaltheorie'.

After this peak in his achievements our friend slowly began to slide away from us. After returning from a season of work in America he seemed to withdraw himself more and more into working alone, he who till then had always taken the liveliest share in everything going on in analytical circles. We gathered that one problem alone absorbed his interest. The need to heal and to help had become imperious. Probably he had set himself aims that to-day are not to be reached with our therapeutic means. From affective sources, imperfectly drained, he was persuaded that we could accomplish far more with our patients if we gave them enough of the love they had longed for in childhood. He wanted to discover how that was to be put into practice within the boundaries of the psycho-analytic situation, and until he could succeed in this he kept apart, probably no longer sure of his accord with his friends. Where the path he had chosen would have led him we do not know, since he could not follow it to its end. Signs were gradually revealed of the severe organic process of destruction which had doubtless cast its shadow over his life for years past. It was a pernicious anæmia, to which he succumbed shortly before completing his sixtieth year. We cannot believe that the history of our science will ever forget him.

Sigm. Freud.

ORIGINAL PAPERS

THE PROBLEM OF THE DUPLICATED EXPRESSION OF PSYCHIC THEMES¹

BY

LUDWIG JEKELS

VIENNA

First of all I must draw your attention to one blemish in this paper ; its other shortcomings you will no doubt discover for yourselves. For reasons which you will presently gather, I have been obliged to incorporate in this essay an earlier study, supplementing it, to be sure, with such fresh conclusions as I have been able to reach. However, if you do happen to have read the former paper, you will certainly have forgotten it long ago and I must therefore repeat its outcome here.² You will at least account it to me for righteousness that I have tried to spare you as far as possible, i.e. to present my results as concisely and clearly as I can.

Now to our subject. What I mean by a duplicated expression of a psychic theme is this : that both in the familiar field of dreams, neurosis and repeated parapraxes, and also in that of dramatic creation (so much further removed from our usual interests) there prevails a tendency to give a twofold expression to any important, or, as we may say, central psychic constellation, so that it appears in consciousness in two guises, which are generally quite different from one another.

In the first three compromise-formations named above the regularity and the stress of this twofold elaboration vary considerably, so that it can be observed only occasionally or fragmentarily. In drama, on the other hand, it is, I believe, a universal rule, to which there is no exception and which shows itself in an unmistakable way.

This characteristic of the drama first attracted my attention a good many years ago, when I was engaged on a psycho-analytical study of *Macbeth*. Here the twofold expression of the same theme struck me so forcibly that, even at that stage, I ventured to suggest that 'this juxtaposition of both a disguised and a more direct presentation of the leading theme may be a fundamental phenomenon in dramatic production'. Some years later, after continuing my researches in this field, I stated : 'This phenomenon occurs so regularly that, after

¹ Read before the Twelfth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Wiesbaden, September 4, 1932.

² *Imago*, Bd. V, S.170 ff. Cf. Freud, *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 323.

further careful tests, I feel that I am quite safe in asserting the converse, namely, that anything which appears in a twofold guise in a drama is its fundamental theme'.

You see that, apart from the very cogent reason that a phenomenon is always most usefully examined in that field in which it appears most clearly and regularly, I also have, so to speak, an 'historical' motive for conducting you first into the realm of the drama and then proceeding, by such light as may be acquired there, to follow up the phenomenon of duplicated expression of a theme in the other spheres.

Once more I have chosen as the object of our inquiry Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, the contents of which, so far as it is necessary for our purpose, I will recall to your minds in half-a-dozen words. After the prophecy of the witches that he, Macbeth, will become king, while Banquo will be the father of kings, Macbeth murders King Duncan who is staying with him as his guest. Macbeth is then crowned king and becomes a ruthless tyrant who orders Banquo and his son, Fleance, to be assassinated; the latter, however, escapes the hand of the murderer. The plot against Macduff's life also miscarries, but his little son falls a victim to the tyrant. Macduff instigates a revolt against him and slays him, whereupon Malcolm, King Duncan's son, who has also escaped Macbeth's plots, is made king.

In my study I was able to demonstrate, as I think, convincingly that the fundamental idea underlying this drama is the tragic realization that a bad son is a bad father, so that he thus forfeits the blessings of posterity.

For you will recollect from my recapitulation that Macbeth, appears in a twofold rôle. In the first place he is the murderer of King Duncan—a bad son who commits parricide. But, secondly, he is himself the king, the father, and in this rôle he is the bloodthirsty persecutor of every son-figure. 'There's but one down; the son is fled', says the first of the murderers hired to assassinate Banquo and his son. 'We have lost best half of our affair', rejoins the second murderer.

Now precisely the same psychological situation—the closest possible connection between the two rôles of father and of son—is elaborated a second time in the play, namely, in the figure of Macduff. He too is a bad and rebellious son. Not only does he ostentatiously stay away from Macbeth's coronation, but he utters 'broad words' against him, abruptly rejects the king's invitation to the coronation-banquet and finally raises an armed insurrection against him and kills him.

But, as I have already said, Macduff's little son falls a victim to the father-hatred of his own father, who abandons him and takes to flight, thus leaving him to fall into the hands of the murderers.

I think you will agree with me when I repeat that here we have a perfectly clear instance of the twofold elaboration of a single theme. But the mode of expression employed in the two elaborations differs greatly. The figure of Macbeth with its sheer force, its absence of *nuances* and half-tones, is far more like something in a vision or a dream, whereas that of Macduff approaches more closely to the pre-conscious mode of conception and seems more like an ordinary man, more comprehensible to us.

Now in my former study I showed that there is a very special reason for this difference, and as well for the significant fact that, while in Holinshed's story (the source of his plot) the figure of Macduff is very meagrely portrayed, the poet took up this figure, singled it out and developed it into something far richer, placing it by the side of Macbeth—as if it were a concrete, special instance of the far more general theme embodied in the latter. I believe that the reason is this: that, just as Macduff seems compelled by the conflict with Macbeth to flee and abandon his family, Shakespeare too in his youth, after a grave quarrel with his father, left his wife and children as in flight, betaking himself to London. Accordingly, Lady Macduff's bitter accusation against her husband:

'. . . To leave his wife, to leave his babes,
 in a place
 From whence himself does fly? He loves us not;
 He wants the natural touch.'

is the poet's own bitter self-accusation.

Similarly, in the murder of Macduff's little son, which follows directly on this scene, we have the portrayal of the terrible self-reproach of Shakespeare who, while living his own life in London after his flight, in entire unconcern about his family, lost his only son, Hamnet, and with him the hope of the continuance of his line and the handing-on of his glorious name. Hence the cry:

'Sinful Macduff,
 They were all struck for thee! naught that I am,
 Not for their own demerits, but for mine,
 Fell slaughter on their souls.'

The significance of this second version now begins to dawn on us. It serves as an expression of the sense of guilt, any trace of which in the figure of Macbeth we seek for in vain and find entirely lacking.

We can easily discover, moreover, not merely the meaning but also the purpose of this second representation, the psychological significance of this special emphasis on the sense of guilt. For the history of the origin of this play, as well as our knowledge of the accompanying circumstances, give us the key.

We know for certain that it was written as an act of homage to King James on his accession to the throne—a very strange circumstance in the case of Shakespeare, who was so sparing of homage to the great Elizabeth, though he owed her so much.

When he wrote *Macbeth*, Shakespeare was profoundly affected by the death of the Queen, with whom, as I pointed out some years ago, he had many a bond of common feeling—above all, the shared punishment, as it were, of 'barrenness,' and their forfeiture of posterity.

Was it not inevitable that the strange dispensation by which the throne of Elizabeth passed to the son of Mary Stuart, a mother whom she had murdered, should be felt by the poet to be a liberating, nay redeeming act of justice?

Hence the homage of the play; hence, too, the solution it contains of the conflict: in faithful imitation of the actual development of events before Shakespeare's eyes he makes the son of the murdered Duncan ascend the throne.

It now seems clear that this high relief here given to the sense of guilt by the second transcription of the author's thoughts in the figure of Macduff, this process of having set it perfectly plainly before oneself, is the necessary condition by which the ego can come frankly to terms with it and being able to transmute it into the socially productive form of a sense of justice. Now let us apply what we have just learnt from the structure of drama to the investigation of kindred situations in *neurosis* and let us ask whether, there too, the tendency to a twofold elaboration, which is so plain in drama, exists and can be demonstrated? I believe that I can answer this question with an unequivocal 'Yes', pointing out that the tendency expresses itself clearly in the process of *reproduction* in the analyses of patients. By this I mean recollection and translation into behaviour. I am really not sure whether we are not being too schematic in our treatment of the subject if, as is generally done, we conceive of this reproducing process, as being *either* remembering *or* 'acting out'. My own

experience is such that I cannot but feel that it would be very much more accurate to say that, in general, the repressed theme is both psychically reproduced, i.e. remembered, and also receives motor resuscitation, i.e. is translated into behaviour. Reik seems to be of the same opinion when he says that 'there are various transitions from reproduction by description to reproduction in behaviour'. In order to illustrate my meaning by an example, I will borrow from Sachs, since at the moment my own experience does not supply me with so clear-cut a case. In a short communication, published in the *Zeitschrift*, he describes an episode in the analysis of a young married woman suffering from a strongly developed castration complex, which in her childhood had been aroused and maintained by her penis-envy directed to a brother two-and-a-half years younger than herself. Gradually and after strong and protracted resistance the theme of enuresis was opened up; recollections thereupon followed of how, when she was about four years old, she and her brother shared a bed, how he wetted it and she complained to their mother, who took off the soiled bedclothes. On returning home after this particular session the patient made a most unpleasant scene with her husband on account of what she called his 'messy way of gobbling his food and spilling stuff on the tablecloth'. At the end of his communication Sachs draws the just conclusion that the patient's tendency to belittle the male caused her to apply to her husband, by a process of oral displacement, the reproach which really had reference to the brother of her childhood days: he (the brother) was a dirty, inferior creature who, in spite of the advantage of a penis which he had as against her, could not even control his urination.

This seems to me a particularly good illustration of the twofold expression of a theme, its psychic and its motor reproduction.

Now, however, we must proceed here also to examine both modes of representation in the light of what we learnt from the drama, i.e. from the point of view of their relation to the sense of guilt.

It is obvious that both these processes are governed by the requirements of the super-ego. Now it may possibly be contended, as against this statement, that to conceive thus of the process of recollection involves a contradiction, seeing that, as we all know, it is on the contrary *repression* which takes place by order of the super-ego. I would reply to this objection by pointing out that this argument is based on a manifest misconception of the process of repression, an inadmissible confusion between repression and forgetting. For the

latter is quite distinct from repression in its essential nature ; it is merely *one* of the means of which repression makes use.

At the same time, I do not believe that the requirements of the super-ego constitute the sole factor by which the character of the process of reproduction is determined ; in my view it is also a question of the very variable degree of the ego's anxiety-reaction, and possibly this does not depend solely on the severity of the super-ego. If this reaction is excessive, the reproduction will take the form of a repetition of the act in question, i.e. of translation into behaviour. This, as we know, springs from the need for punishment and is thus essentially an expression of instinct striving after masochistic gratification. Hence, when repressed material is translated into behaviour, it seems that the ego, under the pressure of the super-ego, has passed completely under the domination of the id.

It is a very different matter when we come to remembering. It is, I believe, a prerequisite of recollection that the ego should be able somehow to master its anxiety and should feel itself free from the craving to suffer and the need for punishment, so that it is not obliged to evade its conscience (as it does in the case of ' acting out ') but can frankly face it and render account of itself.

You know that the ideal at which we aim in our therapeutic work is the formation of such a strong ego, and that this is why we try so hard to resolve the resistance which always underlies reproduction in action, so that, as far as possible, it may be prevented and remembering may take its place. Reflect now for a moment how closely the achievement of the analyst in such an ideal analysis corresponds to the creative work of dramatists.

Now let us turn to *dreams*. Here it seems as though the necessary conditions for the duplication of a theme were fulfilled in quite a special way, for we know that in any case two modes of expression are used in dreams : mental images and thoughts. And yet it is relatively seldom that dreams occur in which there is a double version of the theme. Why this is so we may learn from the following analysis of a dream in which it happens that such a duplication is very obvious :

A woman patient of about forty years old, whose castration complex had never been overcome and caused considerable disturbance of her sexual sensibility and who had a number of masculine characteristics, related the following dream : *She saw Joseph lying on the table ; the skin on his legs was ' bad ' (a rash) ; her friend Minna was there. Continuing : She took two thousand schillings from Willi ; he*

noticed that the money was gone, she was afraid of being found out and she tore up the notes into little bits and threw them away.

It is not difficult in any case to understand this dream, but the following occurrences, which preceded the dream and its interpretation, are important :—

(1) The patient, who was carrying on her analysis with me during the summer holidays, was greatly disappointed that, even when we were away, her contact with me was purely professional, whilst, in her childhood, the relation between her father and herself used to be specially intimate just when they were staying in the country during the summer.

(2) A day or two before the dream she was reading Wassermann's *Christian Wahnschaffe* and broke off abruptly and with a feeling of great disgust when she unexpectedly came to the place where a girl was found murdered—as a headless corpse.

(3) At the time when the dream occurred, the patient, who was generally very regular in her menstruation, had a period which began late, lasted for an unusually short time and was marked by a very scanty flow.

(4) The patient poured out a very detailed description of the character of her father, an old business man, in which she dwelt exclusively on his hardness and close-fisted character in money-matters, not only to his employees but to her, his daughter.

Willi, who had already often stood for the analyst in her dreams, was a young medical man who, to the patient's unbounded indignation, brutally deprived his rich wife of the free control of her own money. Joseph, his brother, was a gynæcological surgeon, with a great reputation in the town. In short, there was no doubt that this dream represented the condensation of a whole series of instinctual trends, aggressive, narcissistic, etc., and that in both scenes there was primarily a representation of the same theme, namely, the wish to castrate the father from motives of revenge. For, in the first scene, the surgeon was lying on the (operating) table ; his figure underwent distortion and became that of Minna, who in real life had a bad complexion, i.e. he was turned into a woman. The purport of the second scene was the same ; she deprived Willi of his money, just as he had deprived his wife and her own father had deprived her.

But what of the rest of the dream ? Why does the patient then give up the father's penis which she has stolen ? We find the answer in the text of the dream : out of dread of the father, because of the opposition

of the super-ego, that is to say, from a sense of guilt. In this anxiety-situation there were only two sources open to the ego—either to give up its pursuit of the coveted object or to renounce sleep, for otherwise anxiety would certainly wake it in terror. It decided for the first, thus banishing the anxiety and making continued sleep possible.

Now what exactly strikes us is that here again—in the case of a dream as in the drama of *Macbeth*—it is in the second version of the theme that the sense of guilt finds expression. The reaction of the ego, however, its attitude to the super-ego, is quite different, in fact diametrically opposite, in the two instances. In drama and in memory, as we have already seen, the ego frankly admits its guilt, whereas in dreams it refuses to have anything to do with it and flees in terror. For our patient's abandonment of the father's penis, after she had stolen it, and her obliteration of the traces of her deed are essentially a retreat, the avoidance of an explanation with the super-ego, i.e. a flight from the latter. In dreams this desire to escape from the super-ego—the ultimate source of anxiety—is tremendously strong, and the device to which it most frequently has recourse is that of waking the dreamer up, though it also has very many other ways of expressing itself. By way of illustration I may refer to certain dreams of one of the patients of O. Isakower, who has kindly allowed me to make use of them and to whom I am further indebted for a number of valuable suggestions. Each of these dreams consisted of a main scene, in most cases with an orgiastic content, and a kind of short epilogue. The peculiarity of these epilogues was that the patient was never certain whether they still belonged to the dream or to waking life. This uncertainty becomes intelligible when we learn that all these epilogues contained elements which can only be construed as menaces or warnings on the part of the super-ego: in most of them the analyst actually appeared in person. For example, the patient, in one such epilogue following upon an orgiastic dream, heard a voice calling to him: 'You may be sure the filthy things you do in your love-affairs will be found out'. In fact all these epilogues are in my view dreamt and the patient's uncertainty whether to place them still in the dream or already in the waking state is simply a betrayal of the vehemence of his desire not to hear the voice of the super-ego in his dreams but to escape from it.

I am unable to explain why we so much more rarely find in dreams that dread of the super-ego is converted into the wish which is its opposite and so allayed. The following dream, related to me by a

lady who was undergoing a training analysis, is one in which such a transformation occurs with great distinctness: 'Herr and Frau Dr. Bibring were talking to me and were very friendly'; this was accompanied by a feeling of great pleasure. The meaning of the dream will at once be plain to you when I tell you the analysand's association, which was that she and her friends had been joking about the name *Bibring* and turned it into *Biberich-Über-Ich*.

A word about those punishment-dreams which we regard as the expression of a wish of the super-ego: just because they represent a wish-fulfilment and also because they are incomparably less common than the dreams of which I have been speaking, they do not stand in contradiction to the view I have been putting before you—on the contrary, they are a standing proof of the hypothesis that in dreams the ego energetically resists the admission of its guilt, turns its back on it and flees from the super-ego.

What I have said about dreams is nothing new: rather it is a conclusion to which we are inevitably led by Freud's conception of the interplay of forces which determines the formation of dreams. The ego, when it succumbs to the narcissistic wish for sleep, refuses to grant any cathexis to the claims of the id, at most lending itself to them only with very considerable modifications; it is thus a mere matter of course that, except in very rare instances, its attitude towards the demands of the super-ego should be one of rigid repudiation.

If we now compare the results of our investigation of the three fields reviewed by us in this paper we find that the sense of guilt is variously dealt with as follows: (a) in drama it finds resigned recognition and this first enables it to be recast in a socially productive form; (b) in neurosis it is misused for purposes of instinctual gratification; (c) in dreams it is as far as possible ignored. Whilst in the last two the personality is cleft asunder, *drama, like an analysis which is correctly carried out, leads to its unification.*

That we have a very emphatic intuitive perception of this truth, obviously in an unconscious form, is reflected in the fact that in critiques of dramatic works stress is so often laid on *unity*, even though it is frequently displaced on to some detail or some more remote aspect of the whole. So, for instance, certain famous Shakespeare scholars like Gervinus and others (and, if I am not mistaken, Lessing before them) specially underline the poet's striving after moral unity in the creation of his characters. I even think it not altogether absurd to

suggest that we might consider in this light the unity of time, place and action, which is held to be the criterion of a good drama. A strange fact, which certainly does not contradict my supposition, is that for centuries Aristotle was erroneously credited with the notion of this triad, whereas actually, as we are now told, all that he demanded was unity of action, whilst (according to recent researches) the other two unities were first demanded by French writers of tragedy and æstheticians in the eighteenth century.

This, however, is merely by the way. Returning to our real theme, we now see from what has been said that drama and a proper analysis appear as the successful solution of a conflict, while neurosis and dreams represent an unsuccessful solution.

You see to what results our discussion has led us. Having started from quite a different angle, i.e. the consideration of certain phenomena of *form*, we have reached conclusions which, drawn from the study of *material content*, have long been reckoned amongst the most securely established in psycho-analysis. This seems to me a powerful argument in favour of my view.

Supposing that I am correct in assuming the existence of this tendency to give twofold expression to a psychic theme and that I am not trying to find a problem where none exists (a point which it is now for you to determine), we must be prepared for a number of questions which may arise. However, not merely because of considerations of space but also because I myself am not as yet ready to formulate these questions, I will confine myself to the most general, though not the most important of them: namely, to what category among the phenomena known to us is this tendency to duplicated expression to be assigned?

You will have noticed that I have endeavoured to derive this phenomenon from the structure of the personality and the relations between certain of its parts. The same point of view also enables us to answer the above question.

Accordingly this twofold expression would have to be assigned to the category first observed by Silberer and named by him 'auto-symbolism', and it may perhaps be placed side by side with the functional phenomenon (of which as yet we have so imperfect an understanding), though its scope is vastly wider than that of the latter. For, as you will remember, Silberer explained auto-symbolism also as the product of two antagonistic strivings within the personality: the wish for sleep and the inner constraint to think. Thus, in terms of structure, he derived it from the conflict between ego and super-ego.

PLAY, REALITY AND AGGRESSION

BY

M. N. SEARL

LONDON

I. PLAY AND REALITY

Freud goes to the heart of the matter, as usual. Discussing the psychology of the poet, he says 'We ought surely to look in the child for the first traces of imaginative activity. The child's best loved and most absorbing occupation is play. Perhaps we may say that every child at play behaves like an imaginative writer, in that he creates a world of his own or, more truly, rearranges the things of his world and orders it in a new way that pleases him better. It would be incorrect to think that he does not take this world seriously; on the contrary, he takes his play very seriously and expends a great deal of emotion on it. The opposite of play is not serious occupation but—reality. Notwithstanding the large affective cathexis of his play-world, the child distinguishes it perfectly from reality; only he likes to borrow the objects and circumstances that he imagines from the tangible and visible things of the real world. It is only this linking of it to reality that still distinguishes a child's "play" from "day-dreaming"'.¹

I myself think that when, as an outcome of his accurate and penetrating observation, Freud described 'this linking of it (play) to reality', he told us more than we, or possibly he himself, could at the time fully realize. Since he contrasts play with reality, it would be possible to condense the whole paragraph into a sentence, and say that 'play is that activity which, for the child, links non-reality with reality', or preferably, 'psychic with external reality'. This aspect of play seems to me to throw the most vivid light on its extremely important function in the life of the child. We can, at first glance, see how it can steer the child between two pitfalls—denial (or repression) of psychic reality, neurosis, and denial of external reality, psychosis. The child whose play activities are functioning healthily need sacrifice neither reality, but link one to the other. This fact at once substantiates all the emphasis which Melanie Klein has put upon the release of play from inhibitions by means of early analysis.²

¹ 'The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 173.

² 'Psychological Principles of Infant Analysis', this JOURNAL, Vol. VIII, pp. 30, 33, 35; and 'Personification in the Play of Children', *ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 193; etc.

This 'link with reality' is there, I believe, from very near the beginning of psychic development, in immediate succession to the 'magical hallucinatory wish-fulfilment' ³ not magical or hallucinatory either, in the first place. For, as long as the infant *is* satisfied and happy, we may be sure he is in possession of adequate warmth and comfort and nourishment, i.e. he really *is* in possession of the good things which, at that stage, are not by any possibility to be distinguished from their original source, the mother's body. As we know, there is a psychical effort to maintain this position by magical hallucination when the infant is neither happy nor comfortable nor satisfied. The first sharp distinction between possession and lack of possession—*wanting*—between 'me' and 'not me', sets in on the failure of this effort; and the fact, the temporary existence of an unfriendly external reality, has to be acknowledged.⁴ But the infant exerts all his psychic forces towards changing this situation. He seeks to externalize the inner lack, the discomfort, by violent limb movements and cries (motor discharge). The discomfort is, for the infant, as concretely derived from the absent mother or breast as were the original comfort and satisfaction along with the milk from the possessed breast. If cries and screams bring back this source of milk and satisfaction, all is well; the child is once more in possession of all that is good, and the lack, the discomfort, does not exist. If it is not so, further psychical

³ Freud: 'Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 14; *The Interpretation of Dreams*, General Section; etc. Ferenczi: 'Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality', *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*.

⁴ See Freud: 'Formulations regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning', *Collected Papers*, IV, p. 14. 'Whatever was thought of (desired) was simply imagined in an hallucinatory form, as still happens to-day with our dream-thoughts every night. This attempt at satisfaction by means of hallucination was abandoned only in consequence of the absence of the expected gratification, because of the disappointment experienced. Instead, the mental apparatus had to decide to form a conception of the real circumstances in the outer world and to exert itself to alter them. A new principle of mental functioning was thus introduced; what was conceived of was no longer that which was pleasant, but that which was real, even if it should be unpleasant. This institution of the *reality principle* proved a momentous step'. In his paper on 'Negation' (this JOURNAL, Vol. VI, p. 367) Freud points out that the 'First and immediate aim of the process of testing reality is . . . to *re-discover* a (desired) object'.

work is required ; the child's physical impotence is counterbalanced by magical, psychical omnipotence, and all the complicated work of projection and introjection is set in motion. That is, the infant endeavours to discharge (project) out of himself and into someone or something else all that gives rise to ' pain ', as in screaming, urinating, defæcating ; and to obtain and make his own (introject) from someone or something else all that gives rise to pleasure, as in sucking.⁵ This is obviously not a situation which provides contact with *reality* ; anything but it. It obviously entails psychical manipulation of both external and internal realities. Even the earlier ' institution of the reality principle ', the acknowledgment that there is some external unpossessed source of satisfaction, is not to be understood as the institution of a stable relation with reality. Far from it. The impatient, aggressive infant only finds it in order to demolish it.⁶ Impressed by the weight and insight of these formulations describing the *institution* of the reality *principle*, few of us have perhaps sufficiently distinguished it from the organization of a stable relation to *reality*. The former seems to imply the dawning recognition : ' One cannot always overcome " pain " by denying its existence ; unpleasant external reality must be allowed to exist ; but only in order to overcome unpleasant internal reality (" pain "). And in the process both are demolished '. While the latter, the stable relation to reality, seems to imply ' It is safe to allow it to exist and to persist whether pleasant or unpleasant '. There is, indeed, much in Freud's writings to support the view that a relation with reality can be founded on hate.⁷ I do not see how this can be

⁵ ' The objects presenting themselves, in so far as they are sources of pleasure, are absorbed by the ego into itself, " introjected " (according to an expression coined by Ferenczi) ; while, on the other hand, the ego thrusts forth upon the external world whatever within itself gives rise to pain '. Freud : ' Instincts and Their Vicissitudes ', *Collected Papers* Vol. IV, p. 78.

⁶ The openly expressed phantasy of a four-year-old boy that his mother took off her breasts with her dress proved to be founded not only on his own castration fears, but also on the phantasy of oral impatience of which these castration fears were the outcome—that he had completely demolished his mother's breasts at each sucking, like sweets. It is well known that this situation is the basis of cannibalistic phantasies in the unconscious.

⁷ See, e.g. ' Instincts and Their Vicissitudes ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV,

possible. The dynamics of impatience and hate are always directed towards the annihilation of the objects whose temporary existence they acknowledge for this purpose alone. No stably organised relation towards a coherent reality could be built on this foundation. The psyche can never be *dragooned* into any stable, satisfactory attitude to reality. The experience of every psycho-analyst impresses this fact upon him in every hour's analysis. Witness the unsatisfactory reactions to all harsh training, familiar to every one of us. It is difficult to see why the elusive mentality of the infant should be more amenable to external pressure than that of the older child or adult. *Only* a good relation to reality *already attained* can ensure a satisfactory reaction to external frustrations and compulsions. We must, then, look elsewhere than to these for the inception of this good relation to reality. And it is Freud who has provided the neglected hint. Play, he says, links the wish-life, psychic reality, with external reality. I think we can see the truth of this in the earliest infantile setting. Contrast with the movements and cries of the very impatient, hungry infant those of the desirous but not too impatient or hungry child as the mother bares her

p. 79. 'As we have heard, the ego's objects are presented to it from the outside world in the first instance by the instincts of self-preservation, and it is undeniable also that hate originally betokens the relation of the ego to the alien external world with its afflux of stimuli. Neutrality may be classified as a special case of hate or rejection, after having made its appearance first as the forerunner of hate'. (I would strongly contest the correctness of this classification.—M. N. S.). 'Thus at the very beginning, the external world, objects and that which was hated were one and the same thing. When later on an object manifests itself as a source of pleasure, it becomes loved, but also incorporated into the ego, so that for the purified pleasure-ego the object once again coincides with what is extraneous and hated'.

Ferenczi, in his paper 'The Problem of Acceptance of Unpleasant Ideas' (this JOURNAL, Vol. VII, p. 316) points out that 'We want simply to deny things which are and always have been hostile to us', and therefore love is as essential as hate for any recognition or testing of reality. He considers that 'when the mother's breast is regained' . . . 'after long waiting and screaming', . . . 'manifestations which we may quite well compare with expressions of rage in adults', . . . 'it (the mother's breast) certainly becomes at the same time, although no doubt very obscurely, the subject of a "concrete idea"'. I cannot myself see how an intellectual advance can be the direct outcome of acute emotional disturbance, at a time when instinctual satisfaction is all-important.

breast and approaches her nipple to the infant's mouth. Here there may also be energetic movements of the limbs, movements of the mouth, emission of sounds. But all have a totally different character; smiling and crowing, the baby may fix his eyes on the nipple; he will leave no doubt of his pleasure in it or of his desire for it. It is not yet his; it has some distinct 'not me' quality, even while 'for me', 'almost mine'. It can be allowed to exist as such for a few seconds and the relation all the time remain a pleasurable, playful one. To such and similar experiences we must, I am sure, look for the institution of a stably organised relation to reality, not to those where aggression and destruction are in the ascendant. In these there is a pleasure-link between 'my wish, me, mine' and 'my wish, not me, not yet quite mine'. Put in other words, the child discovers the mother's nipple as a safe external object when it *approaches* his not too impatient mouth, while yet he cannot quite reach it. It is productive of intense pleasure (the original *fore-pleasure*) even while not yet entirely his, as little his, or 'he', as, in the first weeks, the remoter parts of his own body, first his fingers, then his toes. The discovery of these as external sources of pleasure is, I am convinced, founded upon the possibility of pleasure in the approaching nipple or its substitute. In an unpublished paper I once tried to show, on the basis of analytical material of both children and adults, that the tooth-cutting infant felt as if he had at last managed to get nipple-toes permanently in his mouth—and now he could not get them out again even if they hurt! But it is to be observed that while play with fingers and toes (sucking of the former in particular) makes a *bridge* between the infant's wish for the nipple and the reality of toes and fingers, it retains the true quality of play⁸ in preserving the *difference* between the two. The fact of sensation derived from *both* mouth and fingers,⁹ or fingers and toes, must differentiate fingers and toes from the nipple, and provide the most important basis for the 'not me' judgements, and again on a pleasure basis. An external world built up only of what is 'thrust out' by the ego because it gives rise to pain would have proved far less susceptible to explanation than the unconscious of any one of us! That part of our knowledge of the external world which is stable is built up on the basis of pleasure and play, not of pain and anxiety.¹⁰

⁸ Cf. Freud., *loc. cit.*

⁹ Cf. Bernfeld: *The Psychology of the Infant*, p. 264.

¹⁰ Cf. Freud's description of the value of 'peep-bo' games for reconciling the child to the mother's disappearance. Also the description of

II. PLAY AND AGGRESSION

I now come to the second part of my paper—the connection between play and aggression. It is very difficult to say exactly where lies the line beyond which activity becomes aggression; neither, in considering play, is it necessary to do this. For obviously aggression is a most important element in many typical forms of play, e.g. “catch,” football, and it may be doubted whether it is altogether absent from any. We need rather to distinguish ‘playful’ aggression, or aggression in play, from other forms of its activity. I think we shall easily agree that this difference lies in the complete absence, in play, of aggressive hate or rage; or in the way in which hate is psychically bound by pleasure. Perhaps this is also the reason why play is so markedly narcissistic (team games have still this narcissistic quality): object-love is not far enough removed from hate and jealousy. Further, both these points are implicit in what I have said above on the origins of play and playful activity. While the approaching nipple is the forerunner of external objects, it is still an external part of the self, is only “not quite me or mine,” i.e. is narcissistically loved. Also there can be no ‘play’ attitude while there is overwhelming impatience or hate. This is indeed too obvious to need proof. The one situation which invariably breaks up all forms of play, in the ordinary world as in analytic treatment, is that of the emergence of hate. Repressed hate can, in fact, entirely cut out any possibility of play, as we usually understand it.

Eben, aged six, an only child, and a very severe obsessional neurotic, was not only so seriously inhibited intellectually that no form of school teaching was possible, but was also equally inhibited in speech and play. His one attainment was in musical expression and recognition. He could identify and name a Beethoven or Schubert symphony from a phrase or two, and could sing most charmingly. While he scarcely talked at all, except in gibberish, he could learn and remember the words of songs to a fairly normal degree. I am not prepared to say what part inherited aptitude played in Eben’s musical abilities. I only know that a very important factor was the ‘play’ aspect of music: the fact that it was a form of utterance (of bodily production) never connected with anger, severity, or reproach; that it formed the one relationship with his parents entirely free from hate. The further

the child’s game with reel and string in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 11 *et seq.*

important fact, that his gift earned him the approval and admiration of his parents and others, helped of course to maintain and develop it, but could obviously not have *produced* it. When his usual smiling stupidity threatened to break down into anger and active aggression, he could not sing. It was pitiful to see his struggles at such times to recapture the position of the 'singing boy'—the 'boy who sings Noël',¹¹ as he himself called it: the one position in which he could achieve any considerable feeling of a stable relation with his present external and internal world. Nearly all the rest was insecure. Only when he sang was he a 'boy' at all. At other times, with one exception to which I will return, he was, to the almost complete exclusion of his own personality, re-creating various non-human aspects of his parents or of their genitals. These ranged from inanimate objects, such as a piece of paper, a book, a wooden toy, through mechanical objects, a bus, an engine, to birds and the living active figure of a horse galloping across the room. But never, in this phase, was he a person. The one exception to which I have referred was the re-creation of an early happy period of his own life (he was a normal baby, though with retarded dentition, up to ten months) or, to phrase it differently, the regression to infancy. The clumsy, bulky boy of six years would lie on the couch on his back and wave feet and hands in the air, hands sometimes clutching at feet, he gurgling and crowing at them, the very incarnation of a happy baby of a few months. If he could do this, i.e. recapture the time of innocence, of non-aggression, of that freedom from hate to preserve which he had sacrificed so much of object-relation and reality, he could then get up and sing; once more becoming a 'boy', the 'boy who sings Noël'. Then, as mouth movements and isolated references to food shewed, he had, in phantasy, been fed by a good mother, a good breast, which fact of itself implied that there was no frustrating, hostile father. He was filled with good things, could find his own body good to him; could bear to have fingers and toes near his mouth without any need to deny their existence lest he demolish them. This infant rôle formed the one and only happy play-situation Eben could envisage; and it was accompanied by an amazing difference in his reality as a *person* com-

¹¹ 'Noël' was the first real melody he sang to me. My recognition of it, and of the object-relation with his father which it denoted, gave further value and potency to his mouth as a means of communication and an important link with reality.

pared with all other situations, even that of the 'boy who sings Noël'. The analysis of this boy, combined with direct observation of infants, proved to me conclusively that stable external reality, along with which goes reality of the self, of the ego, must be connected with pleasure, and not with displeasure. The contrasting situation began to be clearly indicated only after interpretation of the hate and aggression underlying Eben's habitual stolidity. After such an interpretation he one day turned his back to me and said 'I s'ant tell you anything'; the first indication, after three weeks' analysis, that he was capable of framing a complete sentence. A further interpretation of his refusal brought a still longer sentence, 'Daddy has gone to — to see —'. It was now clear that Eben's intelligence was unimpaired, and that the very serious hold-up was connected with hate and aggression centring round the Œdipus (and in particular, the inverted Œdipus) situation. A later proof of this and of the extent of his castration fear was furnished when he lay on the couch, and instead of the innocent baby play, made angry, impatient faces, gave vent to angry impatient words, among them quite a number of swear-words, actively masturbating and making coital movements the while. The only condition in which he could with his head re-create or externalize the angry faces and words of previously denied reality, was that of proof of pleasure, life, to be found in the other part of this body, his penis; or—with the object-relations always hidden beneath his narcissism—while he was bringing to life, only instantaneously to demolish, the angry moral parents, he was at the same time re-creating the sexual parents. (Seduction by a nursemaid at ten months—a fact deduced from his analysis and confirmed later by the mother's remembered observations—as well as primal scene stimulations, played a most important rôle here. Successful defiance of the parents prohibiting his sexual life, as he theirs, was the key-note). The same castration fear was indicated in the first day of his analysis, and at every subsequent attempt at ordinary play. He dug paints out of a paint-box and broke the brush-stick in doing so. He immediately put the figure of a little man inside the box, a substitute offering to the devouring mother, shut it up, put it in his drawer, and would not let the paint-box touch the rather stiff paper previously inside it, with which he now carried out extraordinary and apparently meaningless actions every day; he had not broken the paper, and paper could not break or hurt him. He ventured, several weeks later, to turn on the water-tap and fill the basin. Some overflowed. He then had an attack of nettle-

rash, to which he was liable, and on his return he most impressively uttered the two words '*Hot water*'. He had, according to his own feelings, been punished with painful hot water for his spilling of cold water in my room. After a second spilling, some weeks later, he was away with asthma and sickness. Only after interpretation of comparatively recent 'accident' situations, with their shame ('hot water'), and the earlier struggle with the words of an angry mother, could he venture to touch water again. He shewed great delight in a new sand-tray, and shook a toy spade in my face with much the same action as that which he frequently shook the paper at his own (the face of the mother shaken threateningly at him), but with joy, the first sign of it, instead of hate. He spilt some sand on table and floor, and would play with it no more for a long while. This fear of spoiling and dirtying, actually the fear of the hatred and aggression connected with them, almost completely barred him from play, in the ordinary sense of the term. It would be more correct to say 'completely barred him from any enjoyment in play;' for here we come across an apparent contradiction. If, as Freud says, play consists in expression of phantasy as distinct from reality, he was playing the whole time. Neither could one say that the reality of the objects he employed was entirely obliterated. His actions with regard to them shewed accurate recognition of their distinctive qualities as objects. Yet ordinary observation would have said that he was incapable of play. One illuminating piece of his analysis may help us to understand this apparent contradiction. Even very often—at one time, every day, and this not only in analysis, but long before he came to me—would take a piece of paper, wave it in front of his face, make ducking actions of his head towards it, and protrude his lips most queerly. Sometimes he would sing or croon to it when most happy and calm, at other times make all sorts of strange noises, all the time swaying ceaselessly from one leg to the other. One day he hummed the 'cuckoo' interval at it once, unvocalized, and I could at last understand. He was a cuckoo clock, his head the cuckoo, coming out of the opening and closing door, his legs the pendulum and the double weights. (He had often seemed to me to measure one leg against the other). I told him he must have broken, or felt as if he had broken, a cuckoo clock when he wanted to see how it worked; that he felt he could only have a good Mummy if he gave a good one back to her. He then made very loud threatening noises at the paper he held. I said it was to make the same angry noises at Mummy which she had made at him when he wanted to touch it.

For the first time for weeks he sat down quietly and easily on a chair.¹² Thus this type of 'play' was carried out under the compulsion of the super-ego. It seems to me a very important point, and one which I could easily confirm from other sources, that 'play' under the compulsion of the super-ego (in this case, Eben *must* do this in order to be safe) is without enjoyment and is to be distinguished from play in which expression of id-phantasy¹³ predominates, play that is in the service of obtaining pleasure rather than of avoiding pain or displeasure. It would not be difficult to demonstrate the presence of both types of phantasy in all play.¹⁴ In Eben's play, for example, he was also proving that his mother could not take the clock away from him: i.e. there was also an id-phantasy. But although I did not give him this interpretation at the time, the clock play practically disappeared. Therefore the super-ego phantasy was the dominant factor;

¹² I was sure of my conclusions, but thought it worth while, for the sake of evidence, to have the mother's confirmation. This was forthcoming, with the one exception that the incident represented a condensation of two Swiss clocks—one, without a cuckoo, in a house in which they were staying, which had had to be removed because Eben would not leave it alone; the other, a cuckoo clock broken by other children in a Montessori school to which his parents had tried to send him.

The connection with masturbation phantasies is very clear in this play. And, in general, I can fully confirm Melanie Klein's remarks on this subject (*loc. cit.*). Eben's parents, aware of the consequences of masturbation threats, had not interfered with his very open practice, dating from the end of his first year. Eben was more afraid of playing with his nose than of playing with his penis, to which fact the actual pinching of his nose by his mother, in wiping it, contributed not a little.

¹³ By 'id-phantasy' I mean one which is derived from the wish or pleasure trends; just as by 'super-ego phantasy' I mean one derived from the compulsive elements, i.e. the feeling of 'ought' or 'must in order to be safe from retaliation or punishment'.

Some recent work on the contrast between pleasure and compulsive trends has been done by Melitta Schmideberg in her paper on 'Some Unconscious Mechanisms in Pathological Sexuality', this JOURNAL, Vol. XIV, 1933, p. 255.

¹⁴ Cf. Melanie Klein's important point that the child gains relief in separating out, or expelling the different identifications by acting a part with others, thus dividing the rôles. 'The result of this expulsion is a sensation of relief which contributes in great measure to the pleasure derived from the game', this JOURNAL, VIII, p. 30.

and certainly there was very little which could be called 'enjoyment' connected with it. But the id-phantasy did provide a pleasure basis for the super-ego phantasy.

Thus we are in a position to say that :

(1) Where play is dictated mainly by a super-ego phantasy, as in compulsive play, it is rather in the service of avoiding anxiety than of procuring pleasure.

(2) A stable relation with reality can develop only from the possibility of a primary play-attitude to it.

(3) This play-attitude requires a sufficiently close connection of reality with an original source of pleasure, some love-object, to permit :

(a) a 'carry-over' from the latter to the former, first by symbolism, then by phantasy ;

(b) a preponderance of pleasure with a corresponding absence of aggressive hate.

(4) Play retains in its later forms a derivative of the original contrast contained in the play-relation to the mother's breast. 'This is almost but not quite mine', 'this is mine and yet not mine', later becomes, 'this is and yet this is not' the person, thing, situation desired—a contradiction contained and harmonized in play by its maintenance of the distinction between the play-world and the world of reality. Where this distinction is in danger of being obliterated there is either no reality for the child or no play. The success of play in providing this link between wish and reality explains, I think, Freud's observation that the child 'likes to borrow the objects and circumstances that he imagines from the tangible and visible things of the real world'.

(5) None the less it must always remain true that while too great tension leads to rage and tends to destruction of reality, some amount of deprivation with the corresponding wish-tension can alone lead to search for and recognition of reality. The completely satisfied infant would wish for nothing. Without unsatisfied desire there could be no outward movement of the psyche and no external world. We may here note the two extreme cases when, for the adult, too, there is momentarily no external world ; the height of a 'blind' rage and the height of an orgasm. While the child's compulsive play endeavours to hold rage and its dangers at bay, the adult's sexual play, fore-pleasure, precedes complete satisfaction.

NEW WAYS IN PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TECHNIQUE ¹

BY

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Although I have practised psycho-analysis for twenty years, this is the first time that I have made bold to address you on the subject of psycho-analytic technique. I have been deterred from any earlier venture into publicity by two personal idiosyncrasies. In the first place, I have a very marked incapacity for learning from the mistakes of others. No aphorism, no advice, no warning is of any use : if I am to learn anything from other people's errors I must first of all commit them myself. Having made them my own I may then perhaps rid myself of them. And besides this obstinate lack of mental pliancy I have another peculiarity : I am almost incapable of learning from my own mistakes until I have repeated them several times. Only occasionally, when I have been clumsy in certain minor points of technique, have I been able to avoid my error the second time I recognized it.

Having thus prefaced my remarks, I will pass on to the discussion of certain fundamental problems of analytic technique. Let us direct our attention especially to its heuristic significance. The therapeutic use of analytic technique is a special case of analysis in this its wider aspect. Therefore I do not propose to discuss the psychotherapeutic application of the conclusions at which we shall arrive. This will form the subject of a later, separate discussion. I must acknowledge from the outset that the fundamental features of the technique described here claim a *programmatic* character. Some of them are new, while others are here formulated, or expressed in scientific terms, for the first time ; all alike are derived from analytic practice and accordingly look to verification or criticism only from the standpoint of experience with the living psychological material which we are studying.

Let us begin with a provisional statement of the nature of our technique, which will be not so much a definition as a description. Psycho-analysis is a scientific method based on what survives of our belief in magical effects. As you know, the point in question is the belief in the magical effect of words. And here already I have to pause,

¹ Read before the Twelfth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Wiesbaden, September 6, 1932.

for these introductory remarks to our discussion threaten to turn into a discussion themselves. You are aware that some of our colleagues say that they cannot set so high a value upon words. But I am afraid they would be very much at a loss if you asked what psychological material, other than words, they had at their disposal. An occasional look, a gesture, a movement—otherwise nothing but words, words, words! what these say and what they leave unsaid.

The essence of the analytic process consists in the series of shocks experienced as the subject takes cognizance of his repressed processes, the effect of which makes itself felt for long afterwards. I have purposely used the word 'take cognizance' [*Kenntnisnahme*] and not 'apprehend' [*Erkenntnis*], because the former term implies something deeper and more comprehensive than a mere intellectual appreciation. In this connection there really is a confusion of idioms such as Ferenczi refers to. Else how could we so readily overlook the difference, for one example, between *telling* the analyst everything and *confiding* everything to him? We say light-heartedly that so-and-so has 'had' an analysis, but it makes a great difference whether anyone merely passes through an analysis or whether it is a living experience to him.

If I now try to determine what is the nature of the peculiar psychic shock which is specific to psycho-analysis, if I seek to define its particular character as generally and yet as precisely as possible, I should say that it is essentially a *surprise*.

I beg that you will defer your objections for the moment and allow me to explain my meaning by a reference to a theory which I tried to set out in 1926, in a book entitled *Der Schrecken*. I said there that the element of 'surprise' lies in the *encounter, at an unexpected moment or in unexpected circumstances, with a fact of which the expectation has become unconscious*.

This definition holds good of both external and internal perception, of material as well as psychological facts. In either case we can see that surprise is a defence-reaction, directed against the suggestion that we should disregard what we are accustomed to and re-discover in what is new something from our earliest past which is no longer recognized by us. In other words: *surprise is the expression of our struggle against any call upon us to acknowledge something long known to us which has become unconscious*. This means, when it relates to analysis: our struggle against recognizing a part of the ego, once known to us but now become unconscious. The affective manifestation of this attitude has become familiar to you in analysis as resistance. Naturally, the

surprise will be greatest when there is involved the confirmation or fulfilment of expectations which have been repressed.

In analytic practice, those pieces of new insight will be most effective which contains this element of surprise. The effect will be progressive, in proportion to the depth of the strata to which that insight penetrates, and it will be most lasting if the old expectation, to which the analysis has found its way, had been repressed. This effect can easily be accounted for psychologically if we consider not only the topographical change, so often discussed, but also the economic and dynamic characteristics of the process. The *economic* displacement depends on that saving in expenditure of energy on suppression or inhibition which results from the analyst's interpretation or reconstruction. A whole series of ideas and affects which we normally need as a kind of psychic transition is, as it were, cleared at a bound and becomes superfluous. The analysand experiences something of the pleasure which results from such an economy and resembles that of a person who hears a witticism. The *dynamic* effect arises in that through the analytical insight a piece of psychic reality which has been unconsciously repressed is seen to coincide with a piece of material reality. Let us take quite a simple example which you can observe every day in your work. Let us suppose that, in one of your patients, violent aggressive impulses against a near relative have emerged and have led to an unconscious wish to murder him. You have detected these processes from certain obsessional symptoms which represent the patient's defence against the murderous impulses and whose secret significance can perhaps be seen to be that of an expiatory ceremonial. What I am now trying to describe is the process set up in the patient's mind by your explanation of the latent meaning of his symptoms and their hidden connection with his unconscious murderous wish. By putting that secret significance into words you have brought a piece of psychic reality into contact with a piece of external reality and caused them to coincide in the most terrifying way. By uttering it aloud in words you have freed the unconscious process from its dumbness and oppressive weight. The unconscious has its own means of expression ; all that our explanation has done has been to exchange them for others, more familiar to us. We may say that we have translated something from the language of symptoms into that of words. Now it is this translation or transposition which signifies the coincidence—the concurrence—of psychic with material reality. Here we have one of the most instructive instances of the surprise so frequently and variously

repeated in the phenomenon of belief in the omnipotence of thought. Let me give you a commonplace instance of this belief, for comparison with those mental processes in the patient which I have already described, very different though they appear to be. Let us suppose that he tells you how often it happens that he has just been thinking hard about a certain acquaintance when he quite unexpectedly meets him. Such a coincidence between thought and external fact has given him a slight psychic shock. This situation is very similar to that which I have described as taking place during analysis: the patient's unconscious thoughts were occupied with the murder of his relative; suddenly that possibility which was merely a thought took bodily form and came to meet him as words from your lips. It is as though in the broad daylight of consciousness he had experienced a miracle which seemed to confirm his belief in the omnipotence of thought. It is not merely this trait of secret thoughts becoming vocal and turning into material reality which links the analytic 'translation' with the powerful impression made by such phenomena of omnipotence upon the obsessional neurotic. There is a second element of 'surprise' which establishes a bridge between these and the verbal grasp and expression of psychic processes in the analytic hour. You have doubtless discovered in many cases that at the bottom of this belief in omnipotence there were evil or grossly egoistic wishes and that every apparent confirmation of the belief suggested the possibility of their fulfilment, implied, in fact, that they were already fulfilled in thought. The conflict between his wishes and his counteracting tendencies very often explains the obsessional neurotic's peculiar behaviour: it is designed to ward off the least approach of the realization of his desires. He is struggling in this strenuous way against the possibility of his secret wishes becoming a reality. Strange as it may seem, however, when the analyst puts these repudiated wishes into words, this signifies a partial fulfilment of them: verbal reality has been conferred upon the patient's thoughts, and this is the nearest approach to a material realization of what he desired, yet repudiates. That is the second way in which analytic explanation resembles those phenomena which seem to confirm the belief in the omnipotence of thought: by means of embodiment in words it gives a certain measure of gratification to forbidden impulses. But this fulfilment connotes at the same time some degree of psychic mastery over instinct. Therefore in this function, too, analysis testifies to the magical influence of words.

The type of surprise experienced by the patient in analysis when

mental and material reality coincide is seen in its most natural and simple form when he says things which surprise himself. He did not know that he had such thoughts, cherished such feelings and harboured such impulses. In this situation, when the external perception of his own words forces inward perception upon him with a shock of surprise, when material reality is, so to speak, suddenly overpowered by psychic reality, we see most clearly that analytic insight represents the confirmation of a repressed expectation. We can check this fact when an erroneous interpretation or a faulty construction is offered. In such a case a psychic effect is certainly produced, but there is no surprise in our sense of the term, *i.e.* that of a reaction to the confirmation of an unconscious expectation.

If it be true that surprise presupposes an expectation which has become unconscious, we can see that there is a far-reaching psychological affinity between the technique of the analytic method of investigation and the technique of wit. I will take a quite elementary example from analytic practice. A patient dreams of a charlatan and her associations, when she tells the dream, point in a definite direction : her thoughts have been occupied with an acquaintance named Charles. Does not such an interpretation sound like a rather feeble pun ? Please do not reply that this is an isolated case, for this case of analytic interpretative technique follows the lines of thousands of other cases. In the discovery of the hidden meaning and the mechanisms of neurotic symptoms our technique will make use of the same means as are characteristic of the technique of wit : condensation, displacement, *double entendre*, omission, etc. And we shall use the same peculiar technique when we pass from single symptoms and particular psychological traits to the hidden purpose of a neurosis, the secret trend of the psychic forces underlying some special development or the determining psychic traits in a character. We are obliged to use this technique because otherwise we have no prospect of divining the latent psychic processes, just as in a foreign country we have to learn the language in order to understand what is said. Thus, one of the most important tasks of the analyst is to learn to guess the meaning of allusions, just as it is so necessary to do in the play of wit.

At this point you will no doubt all be thinking of the way in which Freud was led to investigate the technique of wit : he was told that his interpretations of dreams were so funny. However, in trying to formulate psychologically the similarity between the technique of wit and the analytic technique whereby we divine unconscious processes in

general I am not simply stressing this characteristic, I am saying a good deal more.

It is easy to point out the apparent silliness or absurdity of such an interpretation as that of the dream-element 'charlatan' and to go on to argue plausibly that analytic interpretation in general is of the nature of a pun. This sort of 'scientific' objection loftily ignores the fact that the interpretation is not left to the good pleasure of the analyst: that it simply reproduces what he has been able to divine from various intimations and allusions, and has to adapt itself, both as regards the thought it contains and its verbal expression, to the peculiarities of the unconscious and especially to its infantile character. The analyst can be held responsible for the apparent absurdity and silliness of his interpretation just as far, and with the same justice, as the Egyptologist for the contents of a piece of hieroglyphic script which he has deciphered. It is highly improbable that the Egyptologist himself believes in a goat-headed god named Chnumu, nor is it likely that he personally supposes that, if he prays to the goddess Hathor with her cow's head, he will be cured of his rheumatism.

With the exception of Freud, no one, so far as I am aware, has as yet recognized the importance for the evaluation of practical analytic technique of the investigation of the technique of wit. The same technique reveals the meaning of the unconscious in both cases and shows 'the poodle's kernel',² whether this makes us laugh or sympathize. I may make reference here to earlier studies in which I drew attention to the psychological significance of the factor of *surprise* in wit. Let me turn now to consider a serious objection which analysts in particular will very likely raise. They will point out that analytic technique does not consist simply in giving surprising interpretations and reconstructions: it includes, besides, logical explanations, dissections and other kinds of discussion. True, but I do not think that this in any way invalidates my theory about surprise: what this affirms is that in every case of analytic investigation the most important pieces of insight are of the nature of surprises. I am not describing one characteristic side by side with others; I am defining the essential nature of psycho-analytic technique. My theory is that analysis is essentially a series of confirmations of unconscious expectations. A house does not consist of bricks alone, but also of cement, iron, wood,

² [*Faust*.]

etc. Nevertheless bricks are the chief material in the building of a house.

If my thesis is correct, we may draw the following conclusion with regard to practical analytic technique : the analyst must approach the psychic material with a conscious openness of mind. I hold that this is a *sine qua non* of analytic research. Students of analysis cannot be too strongly warned against setting out to investigate the unconscious psychic processes with any definite ideas of what they will find, ideas probably derived from their conscious theoretical knowledge. No great harm would be done if it were merely ' ridiculous ' to interpret every association connected with an umbrella as the thought of a penis, or to ' unmask ' the returning Œdipus wish behind any friendly impulse on the part of an elderly lady ! If a man has not the courage to make himself ' ridiculous ' when a vital point is at stake, or has not sufficient intellectual independence to maintain what he has correctly recognized, in face of the laughter of the educated rabble, he had better look round for another profession than that of analyst. But such a schematic application of knowledge is wrong. In a large number of cases it might even conceivably be correct in point of content and yet wrong in point of technique. For an interpretation in itself correct might at that particular point be devoid of all significance. Here we have a specially clear instance of the crucial difference between the kind of analytic knowledge which I should call ' pigeon-hole ' knowledge and the *knowledge derived from one's own unconscious*. As in the smallest things, so in the greatest : such a misunderstanding, such a lack of understanding, of the essential nature of analytic insight will continue to make itself felt when it is no longer a question of interpreting a dream-element, an association or a symptomatic action but of grasping the most important unconscious purposes of a neurosis, and here it will lead to consequences even more unpleasant. As one looks back on one's own cases and listens to the account of other people's, how often one has the impression that, under the influence of such pigeon-hole knowledge, the gangway to reality has been hauled in much too soon and the ship has far too quickly put out into the ocean of theory. In practice, I generally find myself becoming the more confused the more I think of familiar analytic theory when I am treating a patient, and I find my bearings again only in the chaos of the living psychic processes.

I should have liked to work out in detail the comparison between analytic technique and the technical processes in wit, but this would

take us far beyond the scope of the present paper. There is just one other point to which I wish to refer ; it is specially apposite here. It arises here because, in our examination of the psychic processes on which our technique is based, we have passed unawares from a discussion of the situation of the analysand to that of the analyst. Strangely enough, the analyst does here seem to draw very close psychologically to somebody who produces a witty remark. However reluctant we may be to admit such a comparison, there is one vital point in which the psychic processes of these two persons coincide, very different though their aims be. In a witty person the process is as follows : an impression (or, it may be, more than one) is for a moment committed to the unconscious for elaboration and the product of this plunge into the unconscious is then seized upon by conscious apprehension. The mental process of the analyst is similar, different as are its conditions and its aims. To put it in a nutshell : I hold that the more important discoveries and insights in an analysis come as a surprise to analysand and analyst alike.

Here both the scientific and the non-scientific resistances to my "surprise" theory will probably become most clamorous. But it is just here that I am loth to concede any points, however many objections can be brought and must be brought against my thesis. These objections are easy to understand psychologically, for is it not actually maintained in this theory that the analytic method differs in its whole principle from other scientific methods ? This is in fact precisely what is maintained. It is true that even scientists in other fields are prepared to meet with surprises in the course of their investigations—or, at any rate, quickly accept this fact when they do so. But at least they know where they are going and are not throughout dependent scientifically upon unforeseen occurrences, even though on particular points they may meet with surprises, perhaps even great surprises. But is there any other method of research which, from the outset and by its very nature, counts on surprises ? Is there any other kind of diagnostic or heuristic enterprise so devoid of any fixed plan, so unsystematical, so lacking in foresight or care for what is to come ? Can such a method really be called scientific at all ? The psychologist, when he undertakes a piece of scientific investigation, will concentrate all his mental faculties on a definite, precisely delimited problem, and direct all his attention to that single point. The analyst, on the other hand, when he wishes to discover a psychological truth, behaves as strangely as if he were a pupil of the witch :

Who takes no thought,
 To him knowledge comes,
 Without a care he wins it.³

As I said, it is psychologically only too understandable that, in the face of such regrettably casual ways, a new tendency should appear, which expects and demands that psycho-analysis shall conduct its heuristic work systematically. This new tendency, which, curiously enough, originated from within analysis, may be said to demand that we should make an energetic attack on our patients' complexes, penetrate rapidly and vigorously to the central infantile conflict and march according to plan into the realm of the unconscious. The attitude of passive waiting is condemned; henceforth the divining of unconscious relationships is not to depend on the uncontrollable, so to speak 'intuitive' ideas which occur to the analyst. Under the new procedure chaotic situations will no longer arise. Such a programme not only promises to the budding analyst that his work will be systematic and assured: it also follows that it will be very considerably shortened. In fact, we may view the new programme as a kind of One Year Plan in our psychic economics.

This programme sounds excellent, but, when we examine it more closely, we shall begin to feel serious doubts as to whether there really exists a fixed route for the march into the unconscious. Personally, I think it most improbable that in carrying through an analysis we can avoid all chaotic situations, and I do not find it credible that, at all times and in every phase of the investigation, we can fully understand the structure of a neurosis. Such a view is informed by an unjustified optimism as to the extent and depth of our knowledge of man's psychic life, and fails to take into account that, in spite of all our researches, this is still the most obscure field of which we have any knowledge, more unknown and more difficult to penetrate than anything on earth, in heaven or under the earth. The systematic tactics proposed for our advance into this field may in themselves be admirable, but they are so grandiose that they proceed as if they can afford to ignore the nature of the ground on which the decisive battles are fought. It is easy to be energetic, less easy to know whither our energy is to be directed. In reality there is no material so unsuitable for this

³ [*Und wer nicht denkt,
 Dem wird sie geschenkt,
 Er hat sie ohne Sorge.—Faust.*]

vaunted incisive procedure as are the unconscious mental processes. In contrast to this systematic and militant kind of psycho-analysis—though indeed I doubt if it can still be correctly called psycho-analysis—let me commend the deliberate discarding of order and forced regulation in our technique, the lack of all system, the absence of every definite plan; let me be permitted to declare myself the opponent of any and every mechanization of analytic technique. This recommendation to introduce order into the things of the mind is very like the labour of many a housemaid who ruthlessly ‘tidies up’ everything on your writing-table, but in her systematic way stupidly and ignorantly mislays or destroys the fruit of years of arduous work.

The first thing we have to do in analysis is to trust ourselves to the unconscious and to recognize that the only fit governing principle for our technique is to allow ourselves to be surprised. Here he who does not seek, finds. One cannot too strongly recommend to students and to our young colleagues, who are conducting their first analyses, to discard conscious directing ideas in analytic work and to surrender themselves without resistance to the guidance of the unconscious. The one guide can find his way even in the dark: the other loses it in broad daylight. We must impress upon those who are training as analysts that their fundamental attitude in their heuristic work should not differ from that of the analysand and that they are no more at liberty than their patients to reject what occurs to them in connection with the material, even though their ideas seem futile, illogical, meaningless, irrelevant or of no importance. In fact one is sometimes inclined to feel that the analyst needs this warning even more than the patient, for it is made so much easier for the latter to give himself up to what comes into his mind without any sort of expectation, and he does not feel that he has to find an explanation for so much that is obscure in our psychic life. The temptation for the analyst in this situation to follow the laws of conscious thinking is the greater inasmuch as it is his purpose to understand and his business to recognize hidden connections and to explain apparently meaningless symptoms, thoughts, inhibitions, etc. Surely this is the very place for the exercise of intellect, and here intelligence, reason and perspicacity will certainly celebrate their triumphs? Or if not here, where everything turns on understanding, where else are these faculties in place? To this we must reply: even if they are in place everywhere else, they are most certainly out of place here, for intellect is a completely unsuitable

instrument for the investigation of the unconscious mental processes. Conscious intellectual effort is not the key to the realm of the dread mothers.⁴ Therefore our advice to the future analyst is not to cling to conscious thinking but, like the patient, to let associations occur to him. In the analytic process reflection amounts to an interruption of the activity of *seeking*, for the sake of checking and testing. 'To think is to lose one's thread', said a French poet (Paul Valéry). If the analyst remains deaf to this warning and pursues the train of his conscious thoughts, yielding prematurely to his craving for logical connections, while the associations are being given, it may well happen that he will force the patient artificially in a wrong direction; so too, if, instead of following his own unconscious, he looks for what his theoretical knowledge has taught him to expect and prefers 'pigeon-hole' information to living insight. The patient then often has difficulty in guiding the analyst, who is trying to bring him to reason, back to the only correct point of view, namely, that of free association. The situation is very like that which at times wrings a lament from the individual members of an orchestra: 'It is terribly hard', they sigh, 'to keep a conductor together'. The difficulty which the analyst has overcome in his own analysis confronts him again when he comes to analyse others. For a rational frame of mind it is much more difficult to leap in thought from 100 to 1000 than to pass from 100 to 101, thence to 102 and so on. To require such a peculiar and unwonted procedure, in which the censorship is eliminated, is something like expecting a sedate citizen to take his daily constitutional in a series of wild bounds instead of his usual measured pace.

One has constantly to emphasize the fact that here at once the way of analysis diverges from that of other methods of research. The first principle of these is that the investigator shall reflect, criticize, scrutinize, and concentrate rigorously on a clearly defined goal towards which his efforts are directed. The analyst's first principle, on the other hand, is that he must yield to free association, abandon the idea of a preconceived goal and only later, by way of a testing process, work over his material, ordering and scrutinizing it and arranging it in logical sequence. All other methods seek to exclude any intrusion of unconscious factors as detrimental to the investigation, while for analysis it is the intrusion of conscious factors which constitutes an impediment to its heuristic work.

⁴ [*Faust*, Part II.]

The basis of analysis is the establishment of an understanding between the unconscious of one person and that of another ; conscious thought and speech serve only to clarify this kind of wireless telegraphy, and indicate more often where the trouble lies than where are the forces which operate to produce it. This duologue between one unconscious and another goes on, as it were, as an accompaniment to the other ' official ' communications—a secret conversation, inaudible but genuinely recognizable and recognized. Such being the psychic conditions of analytic investigation, it follows that there will be a different kind of evidence for our results. Every other method primarily seeks for objective certainty ; psycho-analysis has to aim at a particular kind of subjective conviction. When our material leads us to a certain conjecture, we have to test this repeatedly and critically by what has gone before and what comes after, until we are so convinced of it that it is equivalent to an objective certainty. In psychological experiments a definite piece of knowledge is arrived at by means of strenuous intellectual work ; in analysis it is a question of making discoveries. There is indeed an inveterate scientific prejudice to the effect that discoveries come by chance. The fact is, however, that they merely come as a surprise. In analysis also psychic work is most certainly going on—work which makes peculiarly exacting demands on the heart and brain of the investigator—but it has no affinity with the strenuous exertions of conscious intelligence : it goes on in the unconscious. No conscious effort, no conscious application of knowledge, no theoretical reflection is of any use in dealing with this unique kind of material. If an analyst be interrogated as to the nature of his work, he may answer like a certain poet, to whom a lady remarked that it must be very difficult to write a poem : ' Either you do it very easily or you don't do it at all '. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the main part of the psychic work was done before the analysis of the patient began : it consisted in opening the way to the analyst's own unconscious.

It is, nevertheless, astonishing to see how often an analyst thinks it enough to follow with uniform attentiveness the associations of the analysand. But listening is not enough : the analyst must hear what the patient says, but, at the same time, he must hear what his own inner voice says, and he must have the courage to understand it, even if the connections do not become plain to him until much later. Of course, he need not say what comes into his mind nor surrender himself passively to it, but he must learn to pay attention to it and

keep hold of it. He must have the courage to understand ; but also he must have the courage not to understand what his own need for logical connections, his common sense and his conscious knowledge try to thrust upon him. He must have the courage not to understand, even when analytic theory suggests to him certain expectations, when he seems to be going upon conscious psychological knowledge. He must maintain an attitude of steadfast scepticism in the face of the lure of analytic thoughts which only too readily and willingly oppose themselves to the current of the unconscious. Many of the interpretations which throng into his mind from recollections of what he has read and heard, learnt and taught himself, are comparable to the unconscious derision so often present in the analytic interpretations offered by patients. We have reason to fear such analytic interpretations, presented, as it were, on a salver, as the seer of old feared the gifts of the Greeks. The analyst's attitude towards them, for all their specious pretensions, will be that of St. Joan in Bernard Shaw's play, when she is told that the Church prescribes this and that: 'But my voices do not tell me so'. The technique of analysis cannot be learnt in the abstract: it can only be won from living experience. The courage to understand and the courage not to understand—these are not intellectual qualities, but a matter of character, an expression of moral courage, an issue of inner sincerity—manifested in spite of and often in opposition to the ego.

Whence comes, then, that psychological insight with its element of surprise which we maintain to be the most important part of analytic technique? If it is not conscious knowledge, laboriously acquired by means of systematic work, it can only be a gift due to intuition. Can it be that our technique throws us back on this uncontrollable faculty, this will-o'-the-wisp, a mystic fount or a chimera whose nature we cannot discern? No; this insight has its source in knowledge which has become unconscious. The element of surprise derives from this very unconscious possession: we do not here need to find something new, but something we had lost; we do not discover, we remember. The source of that unconscious knowledge is in the reservoir of our own suffering, which thus bears fruit. That which comes into our mind when we listen to a patient rises from those psychic depths in which our personal suffering has learnt to understand that of others. I purposely use the word 'suffering'. Not misfortune, not mere calamity, nor yet disastrous or sad experience thus bears fruit. A

burnt child dreads the fire as a neurotic dreads the power of his instincts, but in the case of fire there are many things one can do besides burning oneself. It is true that the hurts which we sustain teach us caution, but suffering, consciously experienced and mastered, teaches us wisdom.

THE SUPER-EGO IN OUR JUDGEMENTS OF SEX

BY

FRITZ WITTELS

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On more than one occasion and almost, it would seem, a shade impatiently, the creator of psycho-analysis and its most fearless thinker has stated that for psychology the concepts 'masculine' and 'feminine' have but little significance. For the anatomist, the biologist or the legislator they present no problem, and we may say the same as regards ordinary speech and practical life. Psycho-analysis, however, finds itself for the present compelled to substitute for these concepts, as a rough approximation, the ideas of 'plus' and 'minus', or 'active' and 'passive'. Everything that thrusts and penetrates is, it says, masculine, and everything that receives and endures is feminine. Now the behaviour of real, living men and women does not correspond to this bald definition. In psycho-analysis, therefore, we invoke the law of bisexuality, exhibited in all living beings, and, in so doing, we relegate our own definition from the realm of reality to that of abstractions. We assume the existence of masculine and feminine tendencies which, like the radicals of organic chemistry, occur only in various degrees of combination. It is helpful in analysis to defuse each tendency and to examine them separately—the masculine as active and the feminine as passive. But our formulations threaten to prove inadequate precisely in that respect in which psycho-analysis has always been able to claim its highest achievements: in a living apprehension of our psychic life.

Even 'sound common sense' rebels against a mathematical definition of masculine and feminine in psychology. It is true that we can make short work of the authority of 'sound common sense'. It has often been shown by psycho-analysis to be neither sound nor sensible, but to be based solely on ignorance and on error transmitted from one generation to another. But we have learnt to distinguish between so-called sound common sense [*gesunder Menschenverstand*], which represents an instinctive and instinctual resistance against intelligent understanding [*Verstand*], and that unerring feeling which indicates the way to deeper insight. Our feeling that the mathematical definition of sex is inadequate may possibly lead to solutions of the problem, comparable in importance with the advances made by philosophy in

connection with the problem of the ego. The naturalistic philosophers (Mach, Nietzsche and others) had abolished the ego as a philosophic concept. Mach taught that it could not be saved, while Nietzsche declared that it was 'a snare set up by grammar'. As a disciple of Mach, I myself for a long time could not reconcile myself to the psychology of the ego. At the same time, other thinkers (e.g. Wundt and Haeckel) similarly dismissed the soul as a dynamic principle. In the second half of the nineteenth century a 'clean sweep' was made. Nothing was to be left of the romanticism of a former age, neither the fortifications of the towns nor yet the soul nor the ego. Doubtless at that time, too, the living feeling of human beings rebelled against this drastic eradication. Whilst, however, the beautiful gates and watch-towers of the old cities cannot be built up again, we have seen in our time the rehabilitation of the ego both in philosophy and in psychology. Perhaps the same thing will happen to the mathematical definition of sex, and our uneasiness about it may possibly lead us to an existential conception which recognizes the existence of a special experience of masculineness and a special experience of feminineness. Let us assume for the moment (*posito sed non concessio*) that these two kinds of experience stand in the same relation to the biological principle of bisexuality as the ego-experience to the *principium individuationis*. But just what is it that constitutes such an experience of masculineness and such an experience of feminineness?

We often speak of Asia as feminine when comparing it with Europe. Night, we say, is feminine and day masculine. Dreams are masculine, as contrasted with intoxication, which we call feminine. In each of these three examples it is the formative principle, that which is clearly determined, which is experienced as masculine, whilst that which is formless, limitless and obscure is felt to be feminine. The ideas of activity and passivity also enter in. Europe, and that child of Europe which has run wild, America, are enormously active and progressive compared with the continent on whose rivers boats go to and fro to-day such as the patriarch Abraham used when he journeyed down the Euphrates. But it is not upon activity and passivity that the experience turns. We should like to say that motherliness is the very essence of all feminineness and therefore forms the main content of our experience of the feminine, just as procreation is a masculine experience. It sounds well to talk of Mother Asia, or of the gentle, feminine moon and the masculine dream which disturbs the universal repose, or of relentless Helios with his fierce glare, and of formless intoxication striving

to resist him. All this is easy to say ; it runs trippingly from the pen. But, unfortunately, for all their blandishments, such ideas are refuted by the findings of biology as well as psycho-analysis. Nothing could be more rigidly determined in time or more relentless than pregnancy and parturition. Nor could anything be more active than the uterus, which increases its volume twentyfold and then expels the foetus with unequalled muscular energy. During pregnancy the higher animals and also the human female display a darker pigmentation and, for the time being, their hair grows more after the manner of the male. The most shy and cowardly creatures become courageous and aggressive when protecting their young. These facts of biology and animal psychology agree with certain psycho-analytic findings, which I hope to discuss in a later work on the basis of clinical material. At the moment I would only remind you of the familiar equation : child = penis. The link between biology and psychology is to be found in the breast with its active function of nutrition, the nipple which is inserted into a cavity in the child. In his masterly paper read before the Twelfth Psycho-Analytical Congress, Jones coins for this process the term : *mammalingus*. As psycho-analysis has convincingly shewn, the child experiences his mother as masculine, and we never rid ourselves of this experience of masculinity of our earliest years. To the mother, as psycho-analysis also shews, the birth of her baby is a 'masculine' experience, which enables her to overcome her penis-envy. Biologically, therefore, and in a hidden psychic stratum the mother is—why should we not boldly say it?—not feminine but masculine.

This strikes us as an almost intolerable paradox. Once, when I was in New York, there was a woman reporter who wanted me to say something novel about women. I routed her with this idea. I said to her that parturition must be regarded as a masculine achievement on the part of women, whereupon the lady fled in horror. But if we can get so far as to recognize the male component in this, as it seems, supremely female function, and especially if we can perceive that it has the value of a 'masculine' experience, it will not surprise us to discover a masculine component in feminine beauty, whether we call it 'sex appeal' or by some other name. The general opinion is that beauty is a woman's quality and, in men, it readily strikes us as effeminate. In England, people do not like to say of a man that he is *attractive* but simply that he is good-looking. Beauty is attractive, nay, compelling, and therefore on this ground alone we must regard it as active. It is

true that, in its essential nature, it is only involuntarily active. But in actual life we more often meet with conscious beauty which seeks to emphasize itself, or with sadistic beauty, than with the unconscious vision of loveliness. That unconscious activity which compels men to love is the counterpart to the activity of parturition, which is equally independent of conscious volition: in either case we have a passive activity. But even if we do not feel that we can recognize such an experience as that of 'passive activity', we must admit that the accentuations of feminine charm by means of artificial adornments—in general, self-display—is masculine and, indeed, something primally masculine. Do we not see that, amongst the higher animals, it is invariably the male which is decorated with a mane, gay colours, a comb, handsome tail-feathers and every sort of adornment? And even in the case of man, amongst primitive races it is the warriors who paint and bedeck themselves. Only at an advanced stage were women permitted to be, and to make themselves, beautiful, and finally this privilege has been so largely made over to them that if a man decks himself out with jewels, he is felt to be effeminate. Much the same is true of dress and fashion. In the East the women wear trousers and the men long robes. In China, till quite recently, the men wore pigtails. We now live in an age in which it seems as if smoking tended more and more to become a feminine rather than a masculine habit. Personally, I wish the time had already come when men will have given it up, as they have given up ear-rings, bracelets and lace ruffles. Anyhow I have known what it is to see a mother burst into tears because she caught her daughter smoking. She was afraid that her child had turned out to be an epicene monster.

Our concepts of 'masculine' and 'feminine' experience have, I think, led us into such inextricable confusion, both from the biological and the psycho-analytic standpoint, that I should have liked to substitute for them experiences of activity and passivity. But these also lead to contradictions every bit as difficult to reconcile. I think that a more helpful concept is that of the *experience of completion*. This is common to men and women alike, when they feel that they have attained to such completeness in their kind as appears possible at their time and place. There are biological forms of completion, e.g. the begetting or bearing of children, being and feeling in good health, loving and dying. And there are also logical, æsthetic or moral modes of completion, among which last we must include crime and a joy in the misfortunes of others as negative kinds. Whether any of these types

of completeness be experienced as masculine or feminine depends less on the biological substructure than on the sociological superstructure. The question is : What *counts as* masculine or feminine ? Biologically each one of us is, like all living creatures, at once masculine and feminine. In our instinctual life also we are bisexual. But as civilization develops, it demands of us more and more sharply and one might say in defiance of nature, that we shall decide for the one sex or for the other. After a long period during which we are maturing (a period disclosed and described in detail by psycho-analysis) we meet that demand by striving towards a type of experience which I would formulate as follows : *we experience as masculine or feminine that which at any given time and place is held to be such*. Hence the decision lies with the super-ego : it is socially conditioned. Behind both types of experience lies the bisexuality which we cannot escape. The super-ego ignores this. Just as it takes a hand in the testing of reality, so does the super-ego decide what is masculine and what is feminine. If it holds that a woman's place is by the hearth, then the best cook is and feels herself to be the most complete woman. When this is so, beauty is regarded as immodest and unwomanly. At other periods the sense of completed womanhood is by no means engendered by the bearing of many children, by cooking and knitting. The social code varies within very wide limits. Occasionally, when it departs too widely from the base lines of biology, revolution follows. As Freud has shown, there is a close relation between the super-ego and the deepest strata of the id, and so it sometimes happens that men and women who suffer from a pathological condition of the endocrine glands or other organs are unable to attain to an undisturbed sense of masculine or feminine completeness. For the super-ego in its turn is swayed by biological (constitutional) factors, which are represented psychically in the form of experiences.

* * * * *

The super-ego's attempt to prevail over bisexuality leads ultimately beyond the stage in which experience is ' masculine ' or ' feminine ' to the asexual. Eros, Logos and Thanatos are sexless and repudiate sex. Hence the song of Goethe's ' more perfect angels ' :

' Earth's residue to bear
Hath sorely pressed us ;
It were not pure and fair
Though 'twere asbestos.

When every element
The mind's high forces
Have seized, subdued and blent,
No Angel divorces
Twin natures singly grown
That inly mate them :
Eternal Love, alone,
Can separate them ' .¹

¹ [*Faust*, Part II. Translation by Bayard Taylor.]

THE JEWISH PHYLACTERIES AND OTHER JEWISH RITUAL OBSERVANCES ¹

BY
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LONDON

About two years ago, clinical material directed my attention to the study of Jewish ritual observances, particularly the phylacteries, praying shawl and door-post symbol. About the same time papers were published in the *Imago* (1930, Nos. 3/4) by Reik on The Praying Shawl and Phylacteries of the Jews and by Langer on The Jewish Phylacteries. This paper will deal with clinical material, with a summary of psycho-analytical views and with a reference to other literature in the following order :

- A. A descriptive account of the form and usages of :
 - (i.) The Phylacteries (Hebrew—tefillin).
 - (ii.) The small, four-cornered garment (Hebrew—tsitsith, tassels, fringe, or arba'kanfoth, four corners).
 - (iii.) The large, four-cornered praying shawl (talith, scarf).
 - (iv.) The door-post scroll (Hebrew—mezuzah, door-post).
- B. General Jewish religious opinion on the use and meaning of these ornaments.
- C. The views of some modern scholars which may be classified into (1) the Amulet, (2) the Phallic theory.
- D. Some clinical observations.
- E. Psycho-analytic theories—Abraham, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Marie Bonaparte, Georg Langer and Th. Reik.
- F. Conclusions.

Glover (1) in a recent lecture to the Royal Institute of Anthropology pointed out several ways in which anthropologists might work together for the advancement of knowledge, the analyst bringing his clinical material garnered from individual study and the anthropologist his field data that might or might not confirm the former. I believe that a study of Jewish ritual observances offers a field of research in this respect of exceptional value, because we can often combine the clinical

¹ Enlarged from a paper given to the British Psycho-Analytical Society, June 29, 1932. At Dr. Jones's suggestion I have given a full abstract of the papers by Reik and Langer published in *Imago*, 1930, Bd. XVI.

evidence with the study of primitive customs in the same individuals. I do not suggest, of course, that Jews are primitives in the technical connotation of the term, but the ritualistic observances which they still practise are of remote origin and largely unchanged, and Jews offer, of course, plenty of clinical material for the analyst.

A. (i.) The Jewish *Phylacteries* (from the Greek *phylassein*, to guard), are known to the Jews as the *tefillin* or ornaments, a word whose origin is obscure and will be considered later ; the phylacteries are leather straps or thongs, to which are attached leather cases which contain *four* paragraphs from the *Torah* or Law, written on parchment. The paragraphs are : Exodus xiii. 1-10 ; Exodus xiii. 11-16 ; Deuteronomy iv. 4-9 and xi. 13-21. The traditional way of carrying out the precepts is still observed :

The four paragraphs are written twice on parchment, once on one piece, and once on four pieces, each piece containing one paragraph. The two sets are put into two leather cases (*bayith*), each of which is divided into four compartments for the four separate strips of parchment and marked outside by the letter *shin* = the Almighty. Two sides of the case have the *shin* impressed on them, the right and the left ; on the right, the letter has three strokes *ש* (usual), on the left it has four strokes in order, it is said, to ensure the right order of the four paragraphs which the case (*bayith*) contains, from left to right. Through a loop attached to each case a leather thong is passed, the two parts of which are tied together in such a manner as to hold the case or *bayith* on the arm or on the head. On the arm that case is placed that contains the four paragraphs written on one piece, on the head, that which contains them written on four pieces. The former is called *tefillah shel yad*, 'tefillin of the hand,' the latter *tefillah shel rosh*, 'the tefillin of the head.'

The tefillin are put on in the following way :—(1) Head tefillin, *Tefillah shel rosh*. The case is placed in front, just over the forehead in the middle, and the knot of the thongs on the back of the head over the middle of the neck ; the rest of the two thongs hang down in front, one on each side. (2) Hand phylacteries, *Tefillah shel yad*. The case containing the parchment is placed on the inner side of the left upper arm, near the elbow ; the knot is kept near it, and the thong is twisted seven times round the arm and three times round the middle finger. The thongs must be laid on the bare flesh and the leather must be black on this side ; red is expressly forbidden.

Tefillah shel yad, of the hand, is put on first, being mentioned first

in the Bible. The reverse order is observed in taking off the tefillin. In modern times the tefillin are worn only during the morning prayer. In the evening it is said to be but natural that the small shawl and the tefillin should be laid aside, as the greater part of the night is devoted to sleep; the rule was therefore generally adopted: 'The night is not the proper time for laying tefillin.' The opposite principle, however: 'The night is likewise a suitable time for laying tefillin' had also its advocates among Rabbinical authorities.

The commandment of tefillin applies to all *male* persons from their thirteenth birthday; women are forbidden to use tefillin. With the completion of the thirteenth year a boy becomes of age as regards the fulfilment of all religious duties.

The tefillin are not worn on the Sabbath or on Festivals. The very days of rest are thus reminders of the truths of which the tefillin are 'a sign.'

It was formerly customary to wear the tefillin all day, only taking them off before eating, sleeping or performing the excretory functions. It is forbidden to take the tefillin to a lavatory or to the bathroom and coitus must not be performed whilst tefillin are exposed; should this take place, the hands must be washed before putting on tefillin. Tefillin are not worn so long as a dead body is in the house, nor is one permitted to approach a corpse or visit a cemetery whilst wearing the tefillin. The tefillin must be made of leather from a 'pure' skin, passed as such by the ecclesiastical authorities; the inscriptions are exactly defined both as to text and position; should a mistake be made in the writing a new parchment must be taken.

A. (ii.) Besides the tefillin, the orthodox Jew uses two other ritual garments: the small *tsitsith* and the large praying shawl. The *tsitsith* or fringes are enjoined by Deuteronomy xxii. 12. In obedience to this commandment, there are two kinds of four-cornered garments provided with 'fringes.' The one is small, and is worn under the upper garments the whole day; it is called *arba'kanfoth*, 'four corners,' or *talith katan*, 'small scarf.' The other and larger one is worn over the garments during prayers at morning and evening service. It is called simply *talith*, scarf, or *talith gadol*, 'large scarf.'

The *tsitsith* or fringe, which is appended to each of the four corners, consists of four long threads drawn through a small hole about an inch from the corner; the two parts of the threads are bound together by a double knot; the largest thread—called *shammash*, 'the servant'—is then wound seven, eight, eleven and thirteen times round the other

seven halves of the four threads, and after each set of windings a double knot is made. If one of the four fringes is imperfect, e.g. two of the threads being torn off, the *tsitsith* is called *pasul*, 'disqualified' and must not be worn until that fringe is replaced by a new one.

There is, however, 'an important element in this Divine commandment, which is now altogether neglected,' says Friedlander (2), viz. : 'And they shall put upon the fringe of the corner a thread of purple blue wool' (Numbers xv. 38). Tradition determined the exact shade of the purple blue indicated by the term *techeleth* in the Talmud where the various ways of its preparation are given. But the colour seems to have been rare, and Jews are warned against using imitations of *techeleth*. Regulations were also made providing for the cases where *techeleth* could not be obtained. The natural white colour was then substituted and no other colour was allowed. After the period which saw the Talmud concluded, doubts seem to have arisen as regards the exact shade of the purple blue demanded and thus the use of the thread of purple blue wool gradually ceased to form part of the *tsitsith*. (See p. 356.)

A. (iii.) The praying shawl or *talith* is only worn during morning prayers. It is a large, square shawl worn over the head with its freer ends hanging loose from the shoulders.

A. (iv.) The last of these ornaments to be mentioned here is the door-post scroll or *mezuzah*, a piece of parchment on which the two first paragraphs of Shema (Deuteronomy vi. 4-9, xi. 13-20) are written. The parchment is rolled together, put into a small case and fixed on the right-hand door-post of the house and of each room. A small opening is left in the case, where the word 'God' written on the back of the scroll is visible.

B. There are, besides, says Friedlander (3), on the back of the scroll, just behind the names of God in the first line, three words of a mystic character consisting of the letters following in the alphabet the letters of these divine names. The words have in themselves no meaning, and it may be that their object is simply to indicate from outside where the names of God are written, and to prevent a nail being driven through that part in fixing the *mezuzah* to the door-post. I return later to this.

The object of the *mezuzah* as commanded in Deuteronomy vi. 9 and xi. 20 is to remind the Jews of the Presence of God, of His Unity, Providence and Omnipotence, both on entering the home and on leaving it; of the all-seeing eye that watches us and of the Almighty who will one day call us to account for our deeds, words and

thoughts (4). On entering the house or room, the mezuzah is touched and kissed.

According to Maimonides (5) the duties connected with tefillin and mezuzah are to remind us continually of God. 'The performance of all these precepts inculcates into our heart useful lessons. All this is clear and further explanation is superfluous.'

Strebel (6) contends that the tefillin were not used till after the Babylonian captivity; the phylacteries referred to in Matthew xxiii. 5 are the tsitsith or fringed garment.

Modern enlightened orthodox opinion maintains that it is improbable that the commands as to tefillin were to be taken literally, but it is admitted that the phylacteries were very early used as protection against evil, although there was no foundation for this superstitious use in the Biblical texts. The same view is taken by some non-Jewish commentators: 'The command of writing and binding the law as a sign upon the hands . . . ought doubtless to be understood metaphorically' (7). Though enlightened Jewish opinion admits that the use of these ornaments goes back to heathen times, the view that the Biblical injunctions were based upon other than God's commandments is not accepted.

C. The opinion generally held by scholars is that these ornaments are amulets which the Jewish people, like other primitive peoples, adopted 'as the result of an internal urge which made him take steps to protect himself and to try to divine the future. There is no doubt that the *Tetaphoth* (phylacteries), Mezuzah and the Sisith were amulets, and that the use of them goes back into prehistoric times. Originally the tefillin were precious stones which invariably possessed the power of driving away evil spirits and therefore had no need of inscriptions' (6).

Wallis Budge considers that the Hebrews used amulets in Biblical times and 'it is tolerably certain that the pagan belief in the efficacy was tacitly and unofficially adopted by them'. He considers the Kabbalah, the book of Jewish mysticism, supplies ample evidence that all these inscribed amulets were magical charms; the inscriptions were also intended to cure sickness. In Wallis Budge's book (8) the evidence will be found for the view that the various ornaments were derived from Egyptian, Persian, Sumerian and Babylonian origins. He gives a good account of the amulets used by these peoples, as well as the importance that was ascribed to their colour, shape and form. Ridgway has pointed out that the use of jewellery owes its origin to magic;

they were amulets, and to enhance the natural powers of the stones various devices were cut on them (9).

The leather for the thongs of the phylacteries is a matter of careful selection—not any piece of leather may be used ; the leather thongs, like the fringes of the shawls, point to their being part of a whole coat or dress ; the Lord God, it is recorded in Genesis iii. 21, made coats of skin for Adam and his wife. Dress is, W. Robertson Smith (10) points out, a fixed part of social religion and is, itself, a charm and a means of divine protection. It is common practice, says Frazer (11), to sacrifice an animal and to cut the skin into straps and place the straps round the wrists or on the fingers of persons, to benefit them.

The phylactery worn upon the head has again the same meaning as the horns of honour—the horns as seen to-day in the bishop's mitre—'as protective amulets,' symbolical of the highest of the gods. The single horn—as represented in the head phylactery—is probably derived from the single horn which is intended to represent in human beings the pair of horns. The horns of Moses in the Michael Angelo statue are horns worn by Moses according to Exodus xxxiv. 29—'Moses wist not that the skin of his face sent forth horns' (12).

T. R. Campbell Thomson (13) has pointed out that to wear amulets on the person has always appealed to the savage mind and the word phylactery exactly expresses their use. From the blue beads plaited into horses' manes and tails and sewn into children's skull caps, up to the elaborate skin purses containing long charms written out by the bazaar scribe, they remain as much a perpetual charm to the Semites as the cross is to the Christian.

Leaving the phylacteries, there is evidence in Budge and other authorities that the praying shawls (large or small) were not only magical, but were part of the sacrificial life. The fringes or tassels of the small or praying shawls, W. Robertson Smith compares with the thongs of goat-skin which were worn by the Libyan women. It is also the dress of sacrificial life, describing a man's religion and his sacred kindred (14). When this dress ceased to be worn in ordinary life it was still retained in holy functions.

The sexual nature—male and female—of these Jewish amulets is suggested by Elworthy (15) and other writers and fully described by Hannay (16). According to Dr. Max Joseph (17) the coloured fringes served to distinguish the male from the otherwise very similar female dress.

In the priest's blessing, given on the Day of Atonement, the priests standing before the Ark or receptacle in which the Law is kept, envelop themselves completely in the praying shawl (talith) entirely covering their heads ; the hands are raised in prayer and whilst they are uplifted the fourth and fifth fingers must be separated from the other fingers and kept in this strained position during the ceremony. Elworthy (17a) explains that this position of the hand with the fourth and fifth separate fingers points to the close connection between it and the all-powerful horns of the sexual women goddesses—Ishtar, Isis, Hera, Diana, etc., whose help was supposed to be ready to protect their suppliants and whose horns the hands thus posed readily signify. Hannay, who is a very unreliable philologist, derives the word *phylactery* from *phallus*.

The mezuzah (door-post scroll) is a Babylonian word with the meaning of ' God's place '. Hastings (17b) gives the evidence for its widespread usage—among the Phoenicians it was often provided with a phallus. A similar custom is found to this day in Moslem countries. ' On the Mohammedan New Year every family—especially those of the towns—hangs a green branch on the door of the house.' This custom is also practised throughout Palestine upon the first entry of the bride into the house of the bridegroom, as well as during the erection of the wooden frame of a tiled roof and sometimes on completing an arch. In the case of the roof, an olive branch preferably is fastened to the top of the wooden frame. These customs are meant symbolically. The green branch of a living tree being the sign of prosperity and peace. It is for this same reason that a woman, a house or a mare, which is supposed to have brought good luck, is described as having ' green ' foot or hand—*idjirha hadra, idha hadra* (18).

Langer (19) describes with references similar ornaments (door-post) in use in ancient and modern times : Babylonian, Græco-Roman (phallus). It is found among the African negroes, the Melanesians, the South American Indians. A primitive form of the mezuzah is the stone pillar which Jacob erected and made into a living God by pouring oil upon it.

In the mezuzah, as I have pointed out, three words are written on the back of the scroll just behind the one word God—that is, four words are visible ; an indication again that, like the four-pronged *shin*, there is a union of the male and female, as is clear again from the position of the mezuzah, placed at the entrance of the door—the female symbol. The same redundancy and emphasis is seen in the horse-shoe, frequently

hung up for luck, over the front door, often found on the door of the church, to indicate, Hannay says (20) the female nature of the church. He adds that the female symbol had to be very sexual in the Hebrew practice, as the female was taboo in their religion.

D. Passing from the description of the ornaments, the religious explanations and the interpretations of scholars, I come to some clinical observations taken from Jewish patients.

PHYLACTERIES

On several occasions, when a patient—aged 34—was in some special hostile mood towards me, sadistic fantasies would occupy most of the session. These frequently took the form of injuring or mutilating the phylacteries he fantasied himself as wearing. ‘I am biting the case open and chewing up the contents—I don’t mind the pain it gives me—I am not afraid of a little belly ache. I have got rid of it now—Your beautiful penis is gone ; I now split it up (the case was meant as penis) from the entrance and dig a long needle into your inside—I am going to tear the straps into ribands—Yes, I am going to flay you alive. What have you done to me ? Yesterday I went to the telephone to answer R. who had phoned me up ; I had a pollution. I spit upon your tefillin—give me your hand and I will cut them off’.

The patient came to me for complete impotency. He had had many girl friends, but had never had sexual intercourse with women or men, although he had slept with women and experienced all varieties of fore-pleasure. Evidence of latent homosexuality—generally of a reactive character—came up in analysis. He had never masturbated to his knowledge, but had experienced nocturnal and diurnal pollutions since puberty. I had recommended him to practise masturbation and these phylacteric fantasies were produced after he had one night followed my suggestion. It was not uncommon for him to have an emission on leaving the room of a male friend—especially if the friend had not been seen.

He came from a small town abroad ; his mother was the dominant figure—ran the business and the house ; his father was a mild, inoffensive man, suffering from chronic indigestion. The family was orthodox and my patient, who had gone to the usual *cheder* or Jewish school and learnt the Talmud, began to put on the tefillin at the usual age of 13. He had later abandoned all religious beliefs and observances.

The fantasies express sufficiently clearly the patient’s desire to

castrate me by tearing or biting the tefillin which I was supposedly wearing.

He recalled childish memories of feelings of rage when he saw his father and brother (six years older) saying their prayers with the tefillin. Between the ages of 6-8 he was very envious of his elder brother being able to perform the tefillin laying which was not yet allowed him. On more than one occasion he had dropped the tefillin when sent to bring them to his father. The tefillin became a source of envy when his brother reached 13 and the special significance of the phylacteries to him as penis symbols dated from that time.

Similar fantasies have been expressed on many occasions by other patients. Sometimes the tefillin were wound round my penis ; on other occasions it was myself who was dragging the straps away from the patient ; in one instance I had wound the straps round the patient's penis and I had put the headpiece in my mouth and was thus strangling his organ ; sometimes it was wound round his neck. In another fantasy, the patient was suffering great pain from the tightness with which the straps were wound round his arm. He recalled having as a boy heard his father complain of the pain in his arm from having actually applied the phylacteries too tightly.

By other patients, ideas have been expressed that by my not using the phylacteries I shall be punished either by my death or by the deaths of my wife and children ; I add that none of these patients themselves used the ritual ornaments, although all had been brought up in their usage. Sometimes it was the patient's illness which was the result of his non-religious practices, but here it was not only the abandonment of the phylacteries and tsitsith that was in question, although this would come into the category of bad deeds.

In a dream fragment, the patient was chained to me by the arm upon which the phylactery was bound and the strap had to be cut before he could be free. This strap was here very suggestive of the umbilical cord. I was often a mother figure to this patient, but doubtfully so in this dream. I call your attention to the dream and its possible significance in connection with psycho-analytical views—mentioned later on—that the arm tefillin, the smaller case, signifies the female organ, whilst the head case, the larger, stands for the phallus originally and later perhaps for both phallus and female organ.

On another occasion when the thongs of the tefillin I was hallucinated as wearing were beating the patient's back and gluteal regions it seemed to him that my tefillined self was a dark or black god (Satan—

the enemy), and he appealed to me, the white God, to save him from the black God—the Satan. Black as representing darkness and the ill deeds seen and done during the nights ; the thongs of the black god's phylacteries led to the popular pictures of the devil with tail. The patient at the next session quoted from Job : ' So went Satan forth from the presence of the Lord and smote Job with sore boils from the sole of his foot unto his crown '. ' The doubling ' so well recognized in myth and folklore is displayed in this fantasy when the phylacteried analyst is Satan, the bad or hostile father, with the emblems of the Black God or Satan, whilst the friendly " good " father is the protecting God prohibiting the patient from his own projected aggressive or sadistic impulses.

THE TSITSITH OR SMALL GARMENT

The tsitsith is, as I have said, the small four-cornered fringed garment worn constantly under the coat by all males. Unlike the other ritual garments it is used from childhood—of course, only male children are allowed the privilege ; to leave off the garment is a sin. I do not know what penalties are imposed in the Talmud if the individual has forgotten it in his dressing, but the fantasies of my patients led to severe punishments for this omission. It is perhaps from childhood's association with the mother in dressing that led to frequent association between the tsitsith and woman, mother, sister and wife. So far as I know there is nothing wrong in the exposure of the tsitsith under the dress, but it was regarded by the patients as a matter of shame if any of the fringes hung down beneath the coat, very much as a boy might be ashamed if his shirt was hanging out and from the same motive : desire to expose the male organ and fear at the discovery of the desire, giving rise to the shame. But there is an additional motive in the shame which I was able to analyse in one case. A patient's early anger was relived as he recalled on one occasion his sister laughing at him because the corners of his tsitsith were hanging out back and front. He got into a rage, hit his sister and said he would make her wear the garment—it wasn't a man's dress at all, and when he was grown up he would put on tefillin. For him it was a girl's dress, because the head went between the two narrow bands. It wasn't a man's attire because it didn't show. This, to him, was an indication that the organ was a female symbol. The two ends, he said, were outside the head like the two legs of a woman were outside the male in coitus and again the tsitsith was concealed as were the female genitals,

not exposed like the tefillin and talith—male organs. It was small because he was only a boy and yet he was proud that his sister could not wear it—she had no penis.

Unlike the tsitsith, the talith or large praying shawl is worn only at prayers and again only by the male—its use does not begin till after confirmation at 13. The following 'talith dream' touches upon some other ritual practices.

TALITH DREAM

I dreamt I was going to the Club, the locality of which seemed in my native town. I saw Mr. A., an old friend, outside and as he is not a member I wanted to take him with me. To my surprise, he walked straight in. I was rather annoyed. The inside of the club seemed to me like the Beth-Hamidrash in my native town. I noticed that Mr. A. didn't have on his hat and then I saw that none had their hats on. I kept mine on. Presently it was the synagogue in my native town (the Beth-Hamidrash was part of the same building). Mr. A. and Mr. D.—both elderly men—were there and others, praying. I now saw they wore their hats and talithim. Mr. A. came up and said I should put on a talith. This made me furious and I tore off the talith both from Mr. A. and Mr. B. and knocked their hats off, which I kicked into a corner. There was a general hubbub.

The Beth-Hamidrash is the house of study adjoining the synagogue, used by adults for the study of the Bible, Talmud, etc. All males over 13 use it as a place of meeting, of theological discussion and study. The wearing of the hat is obligatory among orthodox Jews when reading any of the sacred books. Mr. A. and Mr. D. are friends of the dreamer who represent different aspects of his father. In the synagogue during prayers the hat is worn as also the talith. The aggressive act was one of impiety and sacrilege; here there was no difficulty in discovering the symbolic meaning: castration of father (and of God).

I may add that many homosexual fantasies are connected by the patient, who was a man of 45 years, with the Beth-Hamidrash. He had been brought up in the orthodox fashion in a small village in Russia and came for treatment on account of complete impotency among other troubles. At the age of 20 he married, to escape enlistment, the first girl available. She was the daughter of the local butcher; he was potent with her for the two years their marriage lasted, although he hated and despised his wife from the first night. To make this particular hatred understandable, I must enter a little into other Jewish

observances. Those animals which are allowed to be eaten by Jews must be killed in a particular way. This ritual killing—known as *Shechita*—is entrusted only to male persons possessing a knowledge of the rules and who are skilled and trustworthy. The chief rabbi or the ecclesiastical authority examines and licences the individual to become a ritual slaughterer—known as the *shochet*. The *shochet* has also to decide before and after killing whether the animal is fit for consumption; he must examine the lungs and so on to see that it was not diseased before death. In many small communities, the *shochet*—who, it will be seen, must be a person of some attainments, veterinary and ritual knowledge—acts as minister and teacher. A sharp distinction is drawn between the *shochet* (ritual slaughterer) and the butcher, whose business it is to cut up and sell the slaughtered beast. The *shochet* is a person of some importance in the community, whilst the butcher, who may be quite unlettered, a mere tradesman, is often regarded with contempt, the lowest of the tradesmen.

It may seem a little surprising that a slaughterer should ever administer or teach. It would certainly be astonishing if the local vicar were to act in this double capacity. But the *shochet* is engaged in a *ritual* slaughter, and I have no doubt he is the direct descendant of the priest who 'shall lay his hand upon the bullock's head and kill the bullock before the Lord'. The meaning of that sanctified killing I need not enter upon here. The *shochet* has, I have little doubt, greater claims to priestly recognition according to Jewish tradition than the Chief Rabbi and the ministers who appoint the *shochet*.

The dreamer's wife was the daughter of the most despised tradesman in the village—the butcher—and carried this contempt with her person. The dreamer had married much beneath him, but, with her, hating and despising her, he could have sexual relations. He left his wife after the second year and had since lived in many parts of the world and had served in the war. He had been impotent ever since he left his wife, although he had attempted intercourse with Jewesses and non-Jewesses in many countries, often living for months or years with a woman whom he liked.

To return from this digression to the main point—that is, the talith as representing the father, and, in particular, the father's penis. The symbol of the hat is well known. The orthodox never discard some head-covering—cap or hat—the reason advanced being that some of the words of the Holy Language might inadvertently be used. The explanation will be found in the symbolic meaning of the hat—no

castrated male must appear before his fellows—or his fathers—or his God. Indeed, none with any physical blemish might become a priest.

In other dreams the dreamer becomes greatly distressed at his inability to find his talith, or he is afraid that he has not taken it with him and that he will be asked questions about it. These dreams have, in general, the idea that without a talith he is not a complete man ; his friends will discover that his peculiarities are due to his being impotent.

A fantasy from the same patient :

I want to come and sit on your knees ; I want to kiss you and have your arms round me. I dare not come because you are saying your prayers with the tefillin.

Earlier memories justified such fears ; his father was very pious in the fulfilment of his ritual duties and would allow no one, not the beloved children, said the patient, to disturb him at those times, unlike so many even quite orthodox Jews who, perhaps feeling more at home, can carry on a pleasant gesture conversation whilst praying. Any advance on the part of the little child would be checked by his mother or frowned upon by his father who seemed a very stern and forbidding figure with the tefillin or when clothed in the talith. Analysis has shown that early childhood is much impressed by changes in the adult's dress as well as by changes in the furniture or being taken to a different room. Thus to my patient the stern, aggressive father became associated from earliest babyhood (? as suckling) with the tefillin and the kindly easy-going father with the absence of tefillin or praying shawl ; this father was again associated with the mother who never appeared in such a garb. When my patient desires close sexual relationship with me—sitting on my lap—examining my penis—intercourse with his mother and father—his super-ego rejects it in the name, so to say, of the tefillined father, the forbidding father, and thus he projects the tefillin on to my head and arms. I am at once mother and indulgent father, and at the same time, the aggressive, frustrating and castrating father.

The last ritual ornament for which I will offer clinical material is referred to in the following.

MEZUZAH DREAM

It was a large house, perhaps an Italian hotel, surrounded by beautiful gardens. In the grounds a procession of women going up a deep valley with trees all round ; the brook came tumbling down the valley. They wore light-coloured dresses—perhaps nightdresses. The

women were in a big courtyard. Many men were there—they had black beards. They were taking down the Mezuzoth and carrying them; I supposed they were leaving the house. The men were dancing with the mezuzoth in their hands—I said, ‘Oh chassidim’! The men and women were mixed up. Perhaps they were dancing together or were they all mad? I woke with a nasty feeling.

The dreamer, an English-born Jew of 24, who had discarded all religious observances but was very superstitious, had seen the previous evening *La Boutique Fantasque* in the company of his fiancée and his mother and sister. His father was dead, but there was a portrait of him about the house, as a youngish man with a beard. After his death, the family had moved to a new house; there were no mezuzoth in the new house—probably there were in the former house. The bearded men represent the patient’s father, who was of chassidic descent, with his penis (mezuzoth) in his hand, a masturbation permission. The women were those with the dreamer at the ballet, and others. The dream recalled his many fleeting love affairs. He knew that the engagement would not go through—he wearied of every girl after the first embrace or the first kiss. Further associations led to the dreamer’s memories of the primal scene; he slept in a room adjacent to the parents’ with the doors open. The chassid father took all the women—mother, sister, fiancées—the dreamer could not get one.

A full analysis of the dream would reveal the dreamer’s life troubles—I only bring it here on account of the mezuzoth figuring as the father’s male genital in the primal scene, where the case and its contents symbolize the female genital organs and its shape the male; another instance of that condensation in religious ritual ornaments to which Langer calls attention (see p. 367).

These hallucinations, fantasies, dreams, are a representative excerpt from clinical material gathered mainly during the last eight years, in course of analysis from male patients, who, whether born in Eastern Europe or elsewhere, were brought up in households where Jewish traditions obtained. In some cases the analysis was conducted in Yiddish or a mixture of Yiddish and German.

I have not included anything from Jewish women, because it would introduce further difficulties into the issues this paper is hoped to illustrate. Some of the patients had abandoned the practice of the traditional observances, some remained strictly observant, but all the former, as of course the latter, retained something that pertained to their religious upbringing. In some cases this something expressed

itself merely in such an apparent triviality as a distaste for other than Jewish cookery, perhaps accompanied by fierce denunciations of Jewish belief and ritual 'superstitions'. The retention of orthodox belief and practice or their abandonment certainly influenced the personality and had a bearing on the individual's choice of neurosis and on symptomatology but proved not relevant here.

By a condensation to which we are accustomed the phylacteries represent the aggressive and/or castrating father, the frustrating mother and parental intercourse; whilst the analyst is either part of the phylacteries or may figure as the helpful and kindly father, mother defending the patient (son) against the evil parents in the phylacteries. When the patient desires to kiss the phylacteries, talith or mezuzah there are ambivalent motivations.

The meaning of kissing the ritual ornaments so far as I have been able to work it out between the patients and myself (hallucinated as wearing the phylacteries or talith) represent different stages in development, varying with the analytic situation: The kiss is a love offering of himself to the phylactery (father imago); it may sometimes be accompanied by erotic sensations and even erection. The kiss is propitiatory, it is an attempt to allay anxiety arising out of the primal scene. It is here a surrender of himself to the phylacteries, representing the parental imagos. The analyst is often separated from the phylacteries and acts as intermediary between these ornaments (imagos) and the parents. The analyst is a benevolent father and oftentimes has the attributes and functions of the priest. The kiss may disguise an aggressive assault upon the phylacteries: the oral-sadistic stage which is usually indistinguishable, in practice, from the cannibalistic desires. In the patients cited, the aggression was attributed to the (father imago) phylacteries where the analyst was identified with the ego of the patient or to the tefillined analyst (analyst and tefillin being one). It is quite usual for the patient to consider he is defending himself against the aggressive or sadistic father² (phylacteries).

It may seem that the analytic situation where the analyst may figure as wearing the phylacteries and by them endowed with loving or hostile attributes, whilst at the same time the analyst may be divorced from the phylacteried analyst, makes the position much more

² In a preliminary communication (unpublished) to the British Psycho-Analytical Society I have discussed the clinical and historical aspects of 'The Animosity of the Father to the Son' (October 16, 1929).

complicated than it is in, say, the case of the Jew carrying out the religious ritual. But such evidence as I have—it is not conclusive—leads me to believe that the ritual ceremony may be fraught with equal complication; the evidence is from the reminiscences of patients—some have been given—observing their fathers or brothers at prayer and from memories of anxiety and panic in repeating their prayers. In general, of course, the anxiety is displaced and rationalized on to incidents of daily life.

E. Having now given the general description and interpretative accounts of these Jewish ritual observances with some clinical observations, I shall put before you certain psychoanalytic theories.

In a commentary on Reik's 'Ritual: Psychoanalytic Studies', Abraham (21) calls attention to the significance of the priestly gesture which I mentioned (p. 347) and to the complete cloaking of the priests with the talith. He regards the position of the hand as standing for the cloven hoofed animal, one of the rare four-footed beasts whose flesh is allowed to be eaten (Leviticus xi. 26), that is, the ram.

After showing that the ox and the ram are totem animals, Abraham comments on the remarkable fact that just those animals are permitted to be eaten which are also indicated as the only sacrificial four-footed animals. 'If we remind ourselves', he continues, 'that in many cults, the most solemn festivals consist in the priests' covering themselves with the skin of the totem and imitating the posture of the totem, the following deduction is pretty obvious: in the priestly benediction, the priests (cohenim) imitate by their gesture of the separated fingers the cloven hoof of the totem (ram). The praying shawl of white wool is a substitute for the ram's fell. The priests are, in the ceremony, equivalent with the totem and thus with God.³

Frieda Fromm-Reichmann considers that the opinion that a horned animal was the original Jewish totem animal is confirmed by the usage of the phylacteries. The leather straps, she contends, represent the animal's fell, in which the person praying is covered; the case

³ The thread of coloured wool, in Hebrew, *techeleth*, ordered upon the fringes is translated as 'purple blue'. The exact shade of the original colour is said to be unknown and the coloured fringe has been abandoned for what looks like a pseudo-rational ground. The snail from which the purple was obtained became rare and the colour too expensive. Purple is in the unconscious a substitute for red—the colour of blood, i.e. of the blood of the sacrificial animal (totem).

in the middle of the forehead stands for the one horn of the beast, and, by a simple displacement, the second case, that is, the second horn, is moved from the forehead to the upper arm. She considers that 'the complete identification with the animal by means of covering oneself with hide and horns can only reasonably refer to the totem animal, confirming the hypothesis that horned beasts were the original totem animals of the Jews.'

Marie Bonaparte (23), in her essay on the symbolism of head trophies has shown that the horn is a symbol of the castrated male organ.

Reik, starting off from the reproach to the Pharisees about the breadth of their phylacteries, concludes, after a very detailed examination of the literature, that the praying shawl is a substitute for the ram's skin, and that the phylacteries offer complete identification with the totem animal through its hide and horns.

ABSTRACT OF TH. REIK'S PAPER 'GEBETMANTEL UND
GEBETRIEMEN DER JUDEN' (*Imago*, xvi, 1930, pp. 388-434)

Beginning with a description of the use of the tefillin and talith in ancient and modern times, Reik proceeds to their religious significance. Religious literature gives a baffling wealth of proscriptions portraying the magical character of the tefillin. The explanations offered by authorities are often very suggestive, but usually insufficient.

Gottlieb Klein (24) considers that the tefillin or totaphot of the Old Testament was regarded as a physical mutilation, a branding on the forehead of the first-born son who was offered to God at the original Passover feast. This was entirely forgotten later and the texts were read as referring to amulets. Reik thinks that, although there is a modicum of truth in this theory, Klein has gone astray. It is probable that the totaphot had originally another meaning, and that it was later regarded as an amulet, but there must be some connection between the primary and later meanings; it is insufficient to conclude that the original meaning was altogether lost. Physical mutilation does not fit in either with the form or nature of the tefillin.

Bernhard Strade (25) pursues the same path; he attempts to establish a connection between the mark set upon Cain—a primitive tattooing—and the use of tefillin; in so far as this theory emphasises the character of tefillin as a ritual mark, it is more satisfactory than Klein's, but it does not explain how tattooing became a system of

cases and straps and does nothing to clear up the peculiar significance or the special ritual of tefillin.

Baentsch (26) likewise regards the totaphot as an amulet; an ancient tattooing cult sign—an amulet developed into the tefillin. Holzinger (27) likewise regards it as a tattooed Jahwe sign. Wellhausen (28) also regards the totaphot as amulets on the frontal straps. Robertson Smith (29) considers that 'the phylacteries are survivals of old superstition and their use in prayer may be taken as what the superstition was. They are appurtenances to make prayer more powerful'. In favour of the amulet theory are Grünbaum (30), Blau (31), Bousset (32), Emil Schürer (33), and many other authorities.⁴

It seems ever clearer, says Reik, 'that the Higher Criticism believes it has solved the problem when it concludes that the tefillin are amulets, mascots, and so on. Criticisms of this theory are listened to impatiently by the learned'. M. Friedländer (34), for example, regards the tefillin not as a genuine Jewish creation, but as a gnostic sign of the serpent. Gnostic signs pierced the Jewish masses, and, since they could not be suppressed, received sanction; Reik considers amidst much error there is a spark of truth in this view.

Emil G. Hirsch (35), Edward Mack (36), and A. R. S. Kennedy (37) consider that the Biblical commands are to be taken metaphorically.⁵

Although the Talmud maintains that Moses was taught to lay tefillin by God on Mt. Sinai there has been much discussion in recent years as to the period of its introduction. Wünsche (38) considers it to be pre-Christian; Klein (39) thinks it of Persian origin; Kennedy (40), by verbal comparisons, dates its introduction to about 300 B.C. Josephus (41) and his contemporaries regarded it as an old institution. Although it is uncertain when the Jews began to lay tefillin, the Mishna furnishes abundant information at the period after Christ's birth. In the eighth and tenth centuries A.D. the tefillin received scant respect (42). The wearing of the fringed garments (tsitsith) has been generally recognized as a very ancient custom. Similar ornaments were in use among the other Asiatic peoples—Persians, Babylonians. Kennedy (43) regards the fringes as originally amulets. The fringes, like the phylacteries, originally signified phylacteries or amulets. Robertson Smith's (44) hypothesis that the fell of certain animals was holy to ancient Semites, to which attention

⁴ Cp. pp. 345-6.

⁵ Cp. p. 345.

has already been directed (p. 346), is, in Dr. Reik's estimation, of much greater value than the views of the archæologists and other critics. 'His hint is of decided importance, but the explanations which he was able to give are too general to solve the riddle of the tsitsith.'

The Biblical command—Exodus xiii. 9—'And it shall be for a sign unto thee', etc., follows, without apparent connection, passages referring to the feast of Mazzoth and the dedication of the first-born. It is difficult to see what is the connecting link. Many commentators agree with Kennedy (45) that 'the feast of Mazzoth and the dedication of the first born shall alike serve as perpetual reminders of the Egyptian deliverance and of Jahwe's resulting claims upon them' and comes to the conclusion, already mentioned, that the tefillin is a metaphorical reminder of these claims. After an exegetical and philological critique, Reik concludes that the dedication of the first-born has something to do with a mysterious sign, a sign designated in three places by the word TOTAPHOT. The meaning of this word is obscure; its root undoubtedly means originally *to get about, to run about*.

Reik finds the position peculiar. On the one hand, religious tradition claims that the tefillin are to be used as reminders, that they were commands given by God to Moses on Mt. Sinai and are of the utmost religious significance. It is not known of what they are reminders, it is not believed that God actually did so command Moses and it is not understood what can be the significance in a combination of leather cases and leather thongs. Against tradition, commentators on the Old Testament maintain that it was a late discovery that had nothing to do with the original religion of Israel. A Biblical text which is to be understood purely metaphorically was many centuries later given a verbal rendering and so misunderstood. The tefillin are amulets to keep away evil spirits. The traditional view seems absurd whilst the theories of the commentators, though not free from contradictions, seem reasonable and logical. Rationally, the choice would not be difficult to make. But there is a hindrance to the acceptance of these rationalistic arguments, namely, the remarkable contradictions which are not removed by the rational considerations.

Reik proposes a new way—psychoanalysis—to solve these several riddles, but it is to be used as a heuristic method only, not making use of any psychoanalytic suppositions derived from the psycho-pathology of the neuroses.

His new point of departure for his analytic investigation is a book

by Johannes Lund (46), published in 1701, on *Old Jewish Relics*, etc., which gives an accurate description of the Jewish ritual and contains a section on tefillin. The parchment rolls, the author noticed, containing the Biblical verses, are bound by the hairs of a cow or calf, taken from the tail, which have been well grown and cleansed, 'purified'. The hairs are not tied together but are twisted together by the fingers, leaving a hair outside so that it can be seen from without. Lund noticed that in a certain Rabbi's tefillin a red hair about one and a half fingers' length hung out. He discovered that it was in memory of the red cow; they prayed to God that as the red cow bore their sins and purified them from uncleanness, God would also purify them from their sins—it reminded the devout of the golden calf to which they prayed in the Wilderness.

It is not a very far jump from this cow's hair to conclude that the head tefillin had to do with a piece of clothing. Reik's hypothesis is that the head tefillin is the survival of a dress which the Israelites wore on certain occasions. The hand tefillin and the leather thongs, the tsitsith and the talith likewise represent similar primitive practices. The hand tefillin stand for the hoof of the animal and the leather thongs for its skin. The four fringes are references to the four legs of the animal, the knots in the threads of the tassels standing for its joints. Originally the fringes hung down to the ground; a further point in proof of its resemblance to the animal's legs.

Anthropological research has shown us that most primitive people use such clothing for magical purposes. References are made to the works of Frazer (47), Lewis and Clarke (48), Robertson Smith (49), Spencer and Gillin (50). W. Robertson Smith has shown that amongst the Semites, the skin of the sacrificial animal had a particularly sacred character. It was the draping of the idol or sacred stone and likewise the dress of the worshippers. God, his worshippers and the sacrificial victim were akin. Smith adds that the thongs correspond to the fringes of the tsitsith. The Assyrian Dagon worshipper offered his sacrifice to the Fish-god draped in a fish-skin; the Cyprian wore a sheep-skin when sacrificing a sheep to the sheep-goddess. Like other peoples, the Hebrews clothed themselves in the skin of their totem animal, whether bull or ram, and so identified themselves with the sacred animal. Originally the whole skin was used, but gradually, as the totem religion lost its importance, and under the influence of other elements, the great changes to the later tefillin took place. What was originally the most important element—the totem animal—was

subsequently reduced to the minimum and just hinted at in the hair left without.

The change is gradual ; only some parts of the skin are used to indicate identification with the totem animal. What was most important is now reduced to the minimum ; what was formerly most important is now only hinted at. In the place of the natural parts of the animal, say, the horns of the ox, there are artificial substitutes. Their relationship with the old sign is only shown by similarity of material and of form. Their sacred character and their usage in ritual and in cult are demonstrated inasmuch as their former function remains.

If the tefillin had later the character of an amulet or charm it was because it originally represented the living God himself—through its substitute the totem animal. Though it may have but a metaphorical value in the intellectual Judaism of the day, analytical investigation shows that the pious Jew is nearer to the feelings and thoughts of his ancestors than the pseudo-scientific investigators, the Higher Critics, have ever understood.

Reik considers certain objections that may be made to his hypothesis. He has assumed, for instance, that the talith represents the rest of a sacred ram's skin. The tsitsith indicated the four legs of the animal. The fringes and knots hint at the muscles and limbs of the same animal. The objection that the threads cannot, on account of their position, be likened to the feet of an animal is met by the reminder that the shortness of the talith belongs to a later phase of development ; originally it was a long garment ; Lund says that the fringes of the rabbis reached to the ground.

The tefillin, originally a piece of the God himself, became an amulet, that is to say, whoever wears such a portion of the God stands under His special protection. This value is, of course, derived from the idea that the wearer of the tefillin originally became God himself and the gods need no amulets. The original import is again recognisable when, for instance, religious tradition maintains that the intertwining of the thongs of the head tefillin form the letters of the name of God. Is not the original nature of the tsitsith shown in the mystical explanation of the value of the numbers—the total giving at once JAHWE alone and at the same time the number of the religious commands ? Identification of the believer with his God whose garment he wears is really primitive religion, the essential command. The Lord himself wore tefillin—as seen when we consider the

original significance of the horn which ornamented the sacred animal. The explanation the Talmud gives of the prophecy that the peoples of the earth would be afeared before Israel is that the nations would be in fear of the head tefillin. Surely an allusion to its original meaning, the national totem on the head.

The objection that the talith is made of wool and represents the ram or sheep and not the ox is readily met by the reminder that in many tribes one totem animal was substituted for another and frequently the two animals remained for a long time the objects of worship.

Returning to his starting-point, Reik points out that the Pharisees, in wearing such broad phylacteries and enlarging their borders, were demonstrating the signs of the living God.

Religious usage justifies the direction that has been taken. The command to kiss the tefillin reminds us that the ancient Semites covered their religious symbols and idols with kisses. These holy stones, trees, etc., were originally the gods themselves. The Israelite kissing his tsitsith is carrying out the same reverential act as the Arab who kisses the Kaaba, or the pious Catholic who used to kiss the Pope's toe. It may be postulated that the talith is to be regarded as the original of that sacred piece of clothing which serves the Catholic in his repentance—the scapular. The wearing of the scapular is bound up with as many rites as the use of the talith. Klein's view that related the commands about tefillin with other ordinances now finds its place, Reik considers, in his own hypothesis.

It cannot be a matter of indifference that the ritual is mentioned in connection with the extremely ancient Passover festival and that the father informs his questioning son that the tefillin are a sign or a memory. The archaic nature of the festival is well substantiated; the command to eat the paschal lamb raw indicates an earlier custom—the consumption of the bleeding and still quivering flesh. Equally primitive is the sprinkling of the door-posts with blood, the ancient nomadic fashion, the warning to leave something of the sacrificial animal for use next day. There is no doubt that the slaughtered animal was originally the sacrificed God himself. Now we understand why the command about tefillin, which is derived from the skin of an animal, is linked with the great totem repast. The apparently irrelevant 'It' of Exodus xiii. 9, referred originally to that divine fell and not to the command which belongs to a later stage.

ABSTRACT OF GEORG LANGER'S PAPER: 'DIE JÜDISCHEN
GEBETRIEMEN'*(Imago, xvi, 1930, pp. 435-485)*

Langer begins his paper with a very detailed description of the tefillin (thongs and cases) and of their ritual usages; most of this has been already given on pp. 341-345, but I abstract from Langer some further descriptive material.

Both the cases are cubic; these are rather small among Western and much bigger among Eastern Jews. They must be made from the skin of any 'clean' animal. Any bag used to carry the tefillin must not be used for ordinary purposes. In former times—and occasionally even to-day—the pious and the learned wore tefillin all day, removing them only before sleep, at meals or for bodily needs. This constant usage caused in many cases a severe paralysis of the arm. A left-handed person lays the tefillin on the right hand as the torah commands that it shall be on the weaker limb. If a member of the family dies, the male relatives must not lay tefillin. They are laid again after the funeral. A bridegroom and his wedding associates are freed from tefillin through fear of an unbecoming light-heartedness. Should a woman wish to lay tefillin, she must be prevented. Yet tradition relates of some especially pious 'thorough' women who in Biblical times were allowed to use tefillin. The command about laying tefillin is so important that it is regarded as equal in itself to all the other 613 laws of the Torah. After usage the thongs are to be carefully rolled up and placed in a bag. Should anyone let the tefillin fall to the ground before being placed in the bag, he must fast. The cases are kissed at laying and laying off the tefillin. God wears tefillin according to the Talmud.

The two parts of the phylacteries, the cases with their parchment text and the leather thongs, require separate consideration. The binding of these thongs reminds us at first sight of a fettering, of a self-fettering in the full sense of the word. Such a view is in complete contradiction with the principles of Jewish religion, which demands a healthy state of all the bodily organs. The origin of such a fettering must be sought in some repressed wish to injure something other than the harmless left upper limb. Psycho-analysis recognizes fettering as a symbol of castration, in this case, of self-castration. This corresponds with the purpose of the tefillin, which, according to Jewish tradition, is to warn mankind against sin. Castration is the best protection against sin. The thongs have also in general a positive

erotic meaning. For instance, in the old Roman Lupercalia feast, the Luperci, clad in goat-skins, beat the women present with thongs of goat-skin, that they might become pregnant (51). In myth and saga, leather is symbolic of a death or castration wish (52), but has also an erotic meaning; the latter, partly motivated, probably, by the fact that fresh leather exercises a sexual effect upon the sense of smell (53), a sensation which would be experienced by the Jewish boy at puberty who joyously gets up at dawn to lay the tefillin, which are usually new, with the sharp smell of fresh leather.

In ancient China, two skins were part of the regulation wedding present (54). In the ecstatic tearing or sacrifice of the Dionysian animals, in the orgiastic bacchic Maenadic festivals, the clothing finishes with skins (55). The sacrificial father-animal is castrated, and the mystic, clearly by identification with the former, clothes himself in his skin. In the Dionysian festival, in the central part of the Satyr drama the players were clad in aprons of goat-skin and phallus (56). These ancient customs must have, as is especially clear from this last example, a content similar to those described by Zulliger (57) in the goat-skin masks of the 'Roichschäggeten' in the Lötschen-Tal.

Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's (58) explanation that the tefillin are a ceremonial identification with the father totem animal is confirmed by our material, but the complex tefillin problem must not be regarded as fully explained by this hypothesis. This material suggests two important considerations which have received scant attention; the tefillin fettering as a castration-substitute (self-castration and father castration) and the tefillin in its ambivalent Janus face of Life and Death.

J. Schuster (59), dealing with the wearing of long gloves and of cords around the head carried out by male algolagnics, concludes that gloves are to a certain extent fetters in which the hands are enveloped. The hand thongs of the phylacteries fulfil a similar function to the gloves of the algolagnics and the thongs of the head phylacteries correspond with these head-cords. Fettering as a castration symbol satisfies the masochistic component of instinctual life where God as sexual object is regarded as having sadistic tendencies.

The central point of the problem lies, however, not in the thongs, but rather in the cases. Cases (sometimes of an obviously phallic nature) strikingly similar to the head totaphot are found among African negroes, especially in their masks. At the same spot as the Jew places the case on the head, that is, in the middle of the hair

above the forehead—following Jewish tradition as against the Pentateuch—the negro mask has a cubical, empty body without any written content (60). Indian godheads wear a small horn on the forehead, clearly of the same origin. Bieber (61) gives illustrations of the head phallus of Abyssinian negroes. Among negroes, the head phallus is often replaced by a frontal tattooing. There are circular as well as modified square tattooings. Such tattoo markings correspond with the Biblical verses which enjoin that the cases shall be placed above the nose, that is, between the eyes. There are negro masks dating from the Biblical period which are ornamented with the characteristic circular drawings.

This kind of tattooing partly recalls the Israelitic *korhah* mentioned in Deuteronomy xiv. 1. Reik (62) recognizes the connection between the *korhah* and the Jewish head tefillin. The Talmud seems to have suspected the connection of the tefillin with Africa.

Egyptian kings (63) wore the magic serpent hair ornaments at the same places where the Jews placed their head tefillin and the negroes their head phalli. The Romans replaced the phallus by a symbolic horn (64). In earlier Talmudic times the totaphoth were either cubical or cylindrical. The cylindrical form was only later fully replaced by the cubical. The Talmud describes the 'round' form of totaphoth as a danger. Obviously the danger was to belief rather than to anything physical. In other places in the Talmud, the cubical shape of the head case is the only proper shape; it was so verbally given to Moses on Mt. Sinai. But verbal commands by God do not require any explanation. The 'danger' which the Mishnah feared was only present in one instance—namely, when the round totaphoth was nut-shaped. The nut often found in ancient graves was dedicated to the moon (65); its cultural usage can be followed right up to modern times. The nut has an intimate connection with wedding and birth feasts. It is more especially a symbol of the maternal womb.

The replacement of the original cylindrical shape of the totaphoth by its cubical 'house' shape (similarly among the negroes) has a deeper meaning. The house is a female genital symbol. There is plainly a process of concealment in the symbol formation, the striking appearance of the too obvious phallic shape is softened by connecting it with a female symbol, which at the same time symbolizes coitus. In an article on the function of the Jewish doorpost scrolls (65). Langer gave some examples of the change of male into female attire and connected this with the change in the social system from gynocracy

to patriarchy. Malinowski recognizes the problem when he states : ' What is the nature of the influence of the nuclear complex on the formation of myth, legend and fairy tale ; on certain types of savage and barbarous customs, forms of social organization and achievements of material culture ? This problem has been clearly recognized by the psycho-analytic writers who have been applying their principles to the study of myth, religion and culture. But the theory of how the social mechanism influences culture and society through the forces of the nuclear complex, has not been worked out correctly. Most of the views bearing on this second problem need a thorough revision from the sociological point of view.' Langer accepts this with certain reservations.

This change of attire plays an important rôle in the phylacteric emblems, and Langer records a number of such instances among Egyptians, Jews (68) and Moslems (69), Nandi and other Hamitic races (70), Indian girls in S.W. North America (71) from the travels of Leo Frobenius (72). From these observations confirming his own work Langer concludes that the tendency to transvestism in religious symbol formation betrays a permanent wish of the unconscious. The painful representation of the father figure is softened by the addition of the symbolic mother attributes and at the same time coitus is displayed.


Whilst the totaphoth were obviously worn on the forehead for display, their original phallic shape became modified in favour of a cubical shape, a very concealed female symbol ; the case of the hand tefillin, at least among Oriental Jews, maintained almost fully its phallic shape.

Originally the hand and head cases like the amulets of many other cults (73), represented the phalli. It was only in Talmudic times that the phallic form of the head box gave place to the female cubical " house " form ; the European Jews then repressed the phallic shape of the head box by covering it with a cloth.

Referring to the bird-like shape of the head tefillin in legend and usage and to the well-known meaning of the bird in folk-lore, Langer points out that it, the head tefillin, has an obvious resemblance to the male organs ; the testicles represented by the loose ends of the thongs, the scrotum by the thongs drawn through the base of the case and the prominent case itself would correspond to the penis *in statu erectionis*. The tefillin bag must be likewise equated to a scrotum ; after use the two tefillin rolled together must be placed in the bag,

not one on top of the other, but next to one another, recalling the position of the testicles in the scrotum. In fact, the Eastern Jews call the scrotum, in vulgar parlance, the tefillin bag.

The Pentateuch recommends that the words of the Torah should be borne *between the eyes*, which was carried out by writing them on the head cases. Traditionally, the cases were placed above the forehead at the juncture of the hair and exactly in the middle. This forms with the two eyes a triangle—an erotic symbol; among the Greeks it was known as a female symbol and in the Hindoo religion the triangle is a symbol of God. Other sources are referred to by Langer, showing that the triangle as well as the eye can be either a male or female symbol. The eye in the centre of a triangle, common in the mystic symbolism of the church, was originally a symbol of

the union of male and female. The 'Shield of David'  was a symbol of both creative principles, known as such also to the Babylonians, Etruscans, and South American Indians. The Shield of David is by preference sketched or drawn on the bag for the tefillin, and Spiez (74) has proved the phallic meaning of the triangle. Langer gives various sources for the phallic meaning of three, in connection with the bindings of the hand thongs thrice round the middle, i.e. on the third and longest finger. The hand tefillin are wound seven times round the upper arm; this number, found in religion, myth and folk-lore, is closely connected on one side with death motives, and on the other with libidinal and creative desires. The hand in mythology represents the phallus, confirming the view that the hand tefillin are related both with castration and with increased phallic power.

The prohibitions against coitus, etc., in the presence of the phylacteries are to lessen anxiety in the presence of the totem-father-phallus. The phylacteries are an apotropaic defence against demons who select just such places as the closet.

The thongs have an ambivalent Janus face, as have, in general, ritual clothing, masks and especially the skin. In the horned phylacteries which have been shown to be a kind of mask, the ambivalent content of the skin, the mask and the thongs are condensed.

These phylacteries condense in themselves the elements of eros, death (or castration), bound together with the displacement of a male symbol to a castrated, disguised male-female emblem forming

a classical example of the kind of combinations common in 'concealed' religious symbols.

The connection eros-death seems here to be an extension of the Œdipus complex where Eros seems to take the place of the Mother imago and death (castration; self-castration) the introjected father in the ego or the subsequent unconscious feelings of guilt. In this enormous work of condensation there is, as ever, the tendency of the unconscious to bring together in one single expression a great variety of contradictory ideas, together with the tendency of the resistance to make the real meaning unrecognizable.

Langer has three appendices: (1) The relationship of the tefillin with African cultural; (2) fire; (3) the serpent, dealing especially with the phallic nature of the serpent and adding a further meaning to the snake-like thongs of the phylacteries.

It is of interest to know the opinion of Jewish scholarship upon these psycho-analytical studies. *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, edited by a distinguished Jewish scholar, gives a few lines to reviews of Reik's and Langer's works:

Reik: 'A psychoanalytic study of the Tallith and Tephillin leading to the bizarre conclusion that these ritual objects are substitutes for certain parts of the animal skin in which the ancient Israelites dressed themselves in order to identify themselves with their totemistic god'.

Langer: 'With overwhelming ingenuity and with the aid of psycho-analysis, the author advances a theory that the Tephillin or phylacteries are nothing but erotic symbols of primitive times' (75).⁶

CONCLUSION

The Jewish and Christian orthodox view of these ritual ornaments and practices is that they are God's ordinances given to Moses on Mt. Sinai. Enlightened opinion, which attempts to rationalize whatever it finds obscure, asserts that the Biblical texts are meant metaphorically only.

An examination of the practices shows the meticulous precision devoted to every detail of the practice—both in the making of the article and in its ceremonial usage.

⁶ Abraham Cronbach: 'The psychoanalytic Study of Judaism,' *Hebrew Union College Annual*, Vol. viii-ix, pp. 605-740. A detailed review and critique of the subject has been received whilst correcting the proofs of this paper.

The researches of scholars—like Wallis Budge, Kennedy and others—have understood that the ornaments are magical charms or amulets in use the world over ; but their investigation has in general stopped at that point.

Only one or two researches have gone a step farther : W. Robertson Smith has seen the connection of the phylacteries and the shawls with sacrificial animals ; Elworthy in the gestures and horns. J. B. Hannay ⁷ recognized the full import of the sexual symbolism of all these ornaments (as well as of all ritual usages).

Material derived from Jewish male patients exemplify the sexual symbolic nature of the ornaments and practices—fantasies, dreams of which I have only given an excerpt, demonstrate that the ornaments in question are not regarded merely as phallic or cunnic but are connected closely with the father and mother imago, with castration ideas, with the primal scene, with the content of the Œdipus situation in its fullest sense.

It will be recalled that the phylacteries and talith are to be worn by every male from the thirteenth year, when he becomes a son of the covenant (Barmitzvah). In remote times, among the Hebrews, circumcision took place at puberty (76) ; in the fifteenth century A.D. a curious rite was performed at the ceremony connected with cutting the barmitzvah boy's hair (77). The symbolic meaning of hair-cutting as castration is well known and needs no elaboration here.

The patients tend to separate the wearer of the phylacteries or talith from the ornaments themselves. The phylacteries, etc., become, identified with the stern, cruel and aggressive father and mother, whilst the wearer is the indulgent or kind father-mother imago. The phylacteries thus become projections of the introjected ' bad ' father and mother imagos and the patient (or wearer) propitiates his own

⁷ He has attempted to show by a philological study (a great deal of which is pure fantasy) and by comparative study, the nature of the Hebrew gods ; that the Hebrew religions like all other religions, were born in hot-beds of savage sorcery. He has pointed out the force of the phallic symbols and the more concealed female symbols—as evidence, he says (p. 334) that ' when the old matriarchy became extinct and male rule or patriarchy took its place, the writers were still imbued with the idea of the female being the impelling force '. Unfortunately, though his conclusions are often pretty correct, he arrives at them by guesswork and a crude philology of his own.

aggressive desires or archaic fantasied deeds by acts of propitiation : great care in the usage of the phylacteries, reverence shown to the ornaments, kissing them, which may have many different meanings, dependent not on the patient's situation but on object cathexes that correspond to emotional attitudes extending chronologically from the suckling to the adolescent.

The tefillin and talith are found to be representative of the aggressive father who is ready to castrate and devour the son and against whom the son invokes the protection of the untefillined father, usually by not accepting this fantasy of the devouring father, or the son seeks to propitiate the 'bad' father by offering himself (kiss ; reverent gesture) and/or by prayer.

The understanding of the material I have adduced is, however, carried much further, by the investigations of psycho-analysts—Abraham, Marie Bonaparte, Reik, Langer. The ornaments are last remnants of the totem animal once worshipped by the Hebrews and containing traces of an earlier cult.

The analysis of my patients points to the psychological if not to the historical truth of the law forbidding the Jews to let their seed pass through to Moloch. The mezuzah dreams and fantasies show the psychological truth of the blood spilling that the elders of Israel were commanded to strike upon the lintels and the left side posts of their houses : in Exodus xxii. and xxiii. the blood colour is derived from a bunch of hyssop and is a protection against the slaughter of the Hebrews' first-born, whilst the first-born of the enemy—the Egyptians—are to be sacrificed. Purple so frequently stands for blood in the unconscious that one cannot help suspecting that techeleth, the thread of purple blue wool, is a reference to the slaughtered totem animal ; Abraham and others have shown that the woollen praying shawl is a substitute for the ram's fell (see p. 356).

We now see that the motives for the sadistic fantasies of my patients are primeval. In attacking the father in the tefillin they are attacking the totem animal—the whole ritual of sacrifice detailed in Leviticus is a study of the murder and eating of the Urvater, the primeval great father

whose mortal taste

Brought *gods* into the world and all our woe.

Having traced back the phylacteries, praying shawl and door-post symbol to their primitive origin, it remains to discover the historical sequence from primal Father to primal God and the substituted

totem animal ; how the totem animal gradually lost almost all its recognizable qualities, so that finally, as Reik says, we have but a single hair left whereby to discover the totem animal in the phylacteries. These changes are the historical records of thousands of generations and the records are too imperfect to enable us at present to trace the sequence step by step. However, our study of contemporary minds such as those of the persons whose analysis, so far as it is germane to the problem, I have set out here, enables us to throw light on the functions of the phylacteries and other ornaments ; and thus enables us to understand what purpose was served by the modifications.

When the analyst is hallucinated as wearing the tefillin and when the analyst's person is doubled, the patient has made something that may be compared with the analysis of a complicated chemical compound ; he has resolved, partially or wholly, his parental imago into its primary elements. In this case the elements are the aggressive or sadistic parents and the indulgent, loving parents. The parent who has been hallucinatively introjected (the sacrificial totem animal in history, the living father in the individual) has become a source of pain, of discomfort and is ejected and projected in the form of the phylacteries, talith, mezuzah.

Under the ordinary conditions of the religious Jew the projected imago becomes an object of reverence, of worship. The father (penis or whole father) has not been castrated or annihilated—here he is, daily to be seen, touched and kissed ; to be treated with an extravagant and exaggerated respect or love to prove how false was the individual's unconscious sense of guilt in regard to the father (mother) imago.

The function of the phylacteries is to resolve the need of punishment by setting up an image of the living god. True the Hebrews are warned, 'Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, nor any likeness of anything that is in heaven above or that is in the earth', but the phylacteries appear to the conscious self as little to transgress this commandment as do the paintings of the cubists and vorticists. The function of the phylacteries and ritual ornaments is to preserve the balance between id impulses and superego demands in the Œdipus situation allowing the ego to act more or less harmoniously.

The ritual procedure works in this way so long as the nature of the objects of ritual worship, though unconscious, are recognized, so long, that is to say, as the unconscious idea that the phylacteries have a symbolic nature is appreciated though the exact meaning of the

symbols remain unconscious. It is under these conditions, as anthropologists are now attempting to make colonial and home governments aware, by the understanding and application of the 'contact of cultures', that cultural 'problems' will be solved. 'It is no use trying to substitute one culture for another by an act of compulsion' writes Driberg (78).

There are many forms of compulsion, and sociologists have recently drawn attention to the results in their studies of racial minorities in immigrating to new environments—in their studies of the 'sacred-stranger'. The 'sacred-stranger', under the pressure of an alien environment, tends to lose his traditions; the ego becomes heterogeneous; when this takes place there is such repression of the unconscious ideas expressed in the phylacteries and talith that these lose all symbolic meaning—lose, if you like, their magic virtue—; are no longer superstitiously revered; but the phylacteries, no longer felt to be symbols, in any way, of the living god or of father-imago, have entirely lost their function and the superego has no way of tension-release except by guilt, desire of punishment and so on—the neurotic way. The symbols have become metaphors and Biblical commentators correctly recognize the ornaments as mere metaphors—that is, no longer subserving any need of the individual; no longer related to the individual unconscious.

But this path from symbol to metaphor, from appeasement of the unconscious feeling of guilt by a symbolic representation to the attempt to appease it by rationalization (metaphor) approaches no nearer to reality; an outer compulsion has led to these steps and therewith to the disappearance of the original virtue without substituting anything acceptable to the ego. Religion has lost its content and is replaced by rationalization and dogma.

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PSYCHOANALYTIC ASPECTS OF SUICIDE ¹

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It is logical to expect that a better understanding of how and why man destroys himself would prove of the utmost practical importance. The facile explanations for suicide which are offered daily in the drama and in the newspaper may leave us with an easy satisfaction which of itself should make us suspicious. In real life there is no such evident justice or such naïve simplicity in the workings of fate and retribution. Scientific study of suicide generally falls back upon barren statistical analyses ; the general medical literature ignores suicide as if it were scarcely entitled to recognition as a cause of death.

We have reason to expect a clarification of the motives for this phenomenon from an understanding of the unconscious motives, i.e. from psycho-analysis. Yet not since June, 1910, has suicide been a prominent subject of discussion even before psycho-analytical bodies.

It is easy to jump to the generalization that suicide represents in simple form an expression of the instincts toward self-destruction which we now consider as standing opposed to the life instinct. To do so, however, would leave entirely unexplained the extraordinary circumstance that so powerful and universal a principle should come to complete fruition in such a relatively small number of instances. It would also leave unanswered the question of how far external forces and events determine the suicide, a question which in the popular mind admits of answers implying the most astonishing naïveté. If one is to judge by the explanations to be read with monotonous invariability in daily newspaper accounts, life insurance reports, death certificates and statistical surveys, suicide is the logical consequence of circumstances, particularly ill-health, discouragement, financial reverses, humiliation, frustration and unrequited love.

To the psycho-analyst, what is most significant is not that these simple explanations are continually offered in a world where science and everyday experience alike confirm the untrustworthiness of the obvious, but that they are so patiently and unquestioningly accepted. No such lack of curiosity exists, for example, with reference to the

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motives for murder. The contrast becomes striking if one contemplates the fact that in the mystery and detective stories which are being turned off by the thousand it is rarely the explanation of a *suicide* which is sought but of a murder. Professional indifference in the matter has been equally great. Surely no other mysterious phenomenon of human activity has excited so little scientific investigation.

The conception of self-destruction as a flight from reality, from ill-health, disgrace, poverty and the like, is seductive because of its simplicity. It lends itself to the drawing of parallels between suicide and other regressions such as the taking of vacations, celebrating of holidays, falling asleep, delirium, delusions, drunkenness. Its essential fallacy is one of incompleteness ; it lies in the implied assumption that the forces impelling the regression come wholly from without. From the standpoint of analytical psychology the push is more important than the pull, i.e. the ego is driven by more powerful forces than external reality. The paramount factors in determining behaviour are the impulses from within, the motives originating in the individual which express his attempt at adjustment to reality. Innumerable illustrations in history and science could be marshalled to show that for some persons *no* reality can prove unbearable.

For we know that the individual always, in a measure, creates his own environment, and thus the suicidal person must help to create the very thing from which, in suicide, he takes flight. If we are to explain the act dynamically, therefore, we are compelled to seek an explanation for the wish to put oneself in a predicament from which one cannot, except by suicide, escape. In other words if, for one's own unconscious purposes, one brings about an apparent justification in external reality for self-destruction, the unconscious purposes are of more significance in understanding suicide than the apparently simple, inevitable external realities.

This, of course, disposes of those naïve judgements of suicide as either ' brave ' (if it seems ' justified ' by external circumstances) or ' irrational ' (if it does not) and of all such causal explanations as appear in statistical summaries and the like. Psychologically suicide is a very complex act, and not a simple, incidental, isolated act of impulsion, either logical or inexplicable.

THREE ELEMENTS IN THE SUICIDAL WISH

It is not difficult to discover in the act of suicide the existence of various elements. In the German language it is literally a murder of

the self (*Selbstmord*). But it is also a murder *by* the self. It is a death in which are combined in one person the murderer and the murdered. We know that the motives for murder vary greatly—and no less the motives for wishing to be murdered, which is quite another matter. For since in suicide there is a self that submits to the murder and would appear to be desirous of doing so, we must seek the motives of this submission.

In many suicides it is quite apparent that one of these elements is stronger than the other. One sees people who want to die but cannot take the step against themselves; they fling themselves in front of trains, or, like King Saul and Brutus, they beseech armour bearers to slay them. Paradoxically, also, it would seem that many suicidal persons, in spite of the violence of the attack upon themselves, do not seem to be very eager to die.

We must think of suicide, then, as a peculiar kind of death which entails three elements: the element of dying, the element of killing, and the element of being killed. Each element requires separate analysis. Each is an act for which there exist motives, unconscious and conscious. The latter are usually evident enough; the unconscious motives are now our chief consideration.

I. THE WISH TO KILL

Throughout the universe, of which we are a part, there appear to exist in constant cojacent conflict and opposition the two forces of creation and destruction. Whether this universality of the principle is an inherent property of matter, a subtle adaptation of language or a psychological-philosophical concept to which we are blindly chained by the curious astigmatic limitations of our human mind it is beyond our present powers and purposes to determine.

We can only point to the not unexpected parallel in the findings of depth psychology as to the purposes of the human Unconscious. To create and to destroy, to build up and to tear down, these are the anabolism and katabolism of the psyche no less than of the cells and the corpuscles—the two directions in which the same energies exert themselves.

And just as in the sexual embrace we recognize the concurrence of physical, chemical and psychological forces in the supreme act of creation so we see in murder its direct antithesis, the supreme act of destruction. Psycho-analytic investigations have established beyond any question the murderous destructive wishes which arise in earliest

infancy (Klein) and wax and wane repeatedly in the successive periods of childhood. In line with the theory of the death instinct, these destructive tendencies are turned outward from their original engagement or neutralization within the personality. They emerge from the ego and are directed toward an external object in response to stimuli of thwarting or a threat which arouses envy and fear and, therefore, hate.

We know, also, however, the curious propensity of the erotic elements, the sexual element of the life instinct for making the best of a bad situation and of endowing every object relationship with some of its saving grace. Hence in any attack upon an enemy, however strong the wish to kill, we must expect to find in varying quantities an admixture of erotic satisfactions. These act in a dual and contradictory fashion, however; in the erotizing of the cruel sadistic elements they strengthen the murder motif, but at the same time, investing the object of the attack in the form of sympathy, pity, and more especially because of passive dependence upon the powerful rival, they mitigate the severity of the aggression. What the net effect of the erotic component will be varies according to circumstances, i.e. depending upon the relative degree to which the object excites sublimated or unsublimated sexuality in the aggressor.

INTROJECTION

This component of destructive aggression may seem for the moment far afield from the topic of suicide. How is it that these drives in the interests of self-preservation can actually be turned upon the self? The answer is to be found in the phenomenon of *introjection with displacement*, i.e. identification. It is almost axiomatic in psycho-analysis that an object of love or hate which is lost or escapes beyond the reach of the ego can be regained and retained by the process of introjection with the displacement of the emotions appropriate to the original object on to the introjected object, that is, the person within the person. Hence a person unconsciously hated may be destroyed by identifying oneself with that person, or more accurately, identifying that person with the self, and destroying the self.

We must now consider what happens when the attack made by the destructive impulses directed toward an external object are thwarted, and introjection and displacement become necessary. Thwarting may occur under several circumstances: (1) the resistance offered by reality may be too great; (2) the object instead of being overwhelming may be merely elusive; (3) the attack may be inhibited

by various internal circumstances, chiefly fear and the sense of guilt ; (4) failure of the attack may occur through an undue weakening of its force by the admixture of adventitious erotic elements. This happens regularly in some neurotics, and derives from the failure to make a useful distinction between friend and foe. The result is that the hostility cannot be sublimated by the erotism. The ego consequently must take toward such individuals an oscillating or ambivalent attitude such that the love and hate have alternate expression, or else the hate must be displaced as in the first case.

(5) The exact opposite of (4) occurs when the erotic elements of object relationship are suddenly withdrawn, as for example, by the death of the object. A de-fusion of the instincts takes place, the erotic components are dispersed and the hostile component, since it would otherwise have to be directed against the whole world, is turned inward upon the self.

It is this last-named mechanism which is most commonly observed in melancholia, the condition in which suicide most often happens. The mechanisms of melancholia have been fairly well worked out by Freud, Abraham and others to be schematically as follows : having lost the love object in one way or another the patient is left with uninvested hostilities deeply covered and disguised by the love which is now also uninvested. The destructive or hostile elements acting as the pathfinder, as Freud has suggested, now turn back upon the ego where the beloved object becomes incorporated. The bitter reproaches and attacks unconsciously felt toward the former love object are now consciously directed toward this same object incorporated and disguised within the ego. But now the erotic elements formerly directed toward the love object follow the lead of the hostile tendencies, and one sees the great increase in narcissism which is characteristic of melancholia in paradoxical association with the most extreme self-condemnation. Appropriately, the patient loses all interest in the outside world and until the fires of simultaneous self-love and self-hate have subsided, transferences or any other form of object love are impossible. Were it not for the protection of the narcissism every melancholiac would be determined to commit suicide.

Psycho-analytical literature is replete with illustrations of the phenomena of oral incorporation, introjection and displacement in melancholia, but the following case is so diagrammatic an instance that it may be inserted as a paradigm in this consideration of suicide motivation.

A woman of thirty-five, of unusual capabilities, had manifested all her life tendencies indicative of strong oral-erotic cravings. This cannot be better summarized than in the words of her own sister, who wrote her at one time during her analysis: "You must realise, my dear sister, that you frighten your lovers away by loving so much. Your love is simply engulfing, devouring. You cannot eat your lover like a cake, you know. At least, if you do, you can't expect to go on having him!"

As is so often the case with such individuals, the poor woman had a propensity for selecting lovers whom circumstances made it quite impossible for her ever to possess. One of these, with whom she was deeply in love during a portion of her analysis, had a surname something like Allendorf and was usually referred to as "Al." Shortly after her separation from him (at his instigation) this patient attempted suicide by taking an overdose of the drug allonal. As she later told me, just before the attempt she had had a dream in which she and a group of men which represented the analyst, the lover Allendorf, her father, her brother of whom she was very jealous, and some others were in a car which was wrecked, and all killed except her.

'Yes,' she said, quite offhand, 'they were killed, *Al and all*.' Spoken rapidly in English 'Al and all' sounds exactly like allonal. It was immediately apparent that in attempting to kill herself with the drug allonal she was also carrying out the devouring of her lover and the other disappointing males, which was so apparent in all her actions that even her naïve sister had detected it. Thus she obtained Al, in spite of his flight, by oral incorporation and simultaneously destroyed him by the same method, and *pari passu* she attempted to destroy him in that she had made a destructive attack upon herself in whom Al had been (was being) incorporated.

Gratification of the hostile aggressive wish by introjection is made the more easy by the fact that it seems to the ego to be less dangerous to attack an object of phantasy than an object of reality. But when the object of phantasy is identified with the self, i.e. when the hated-loved person is identified with the ego, the aggression serves two ends, the primary purpose and the secondary one of atonement, to be discussed later. Hence this reflection of the (self) destructive impulses back upon the self appears to be accomplished with an increase in strength, so that the life instincts can no longer hold them in check except by reaction formation (symptoms). If this cannot be accomplished, actual destruction of the self results.

INDIRECT AGGRESSION

The hostile or destructive aggression against the hated-loved person may be carried out, as is well known, in many ways other than by direct attack. A brief consideration should be given here to these indirect methods of aggression.

The attack upon the hated-loved object is sometimes made, for example, through the destruction of something held dear by the person who is the real object of the attack. It is the greatest torture to a mother to see her child being tortured or killed. In suicide such an aggression can be carried out against the parents by the simple process of self attack ; hence, the overwhelming power of the revenge taken by the child who, piqued at some reproach or denial, takes his own life, takes it as it were from his parents. He robs them of their dearest possession knowing that no other injury could possibly be so painful to them.

To a less intense degree the act of suicide is an aggression against those who may in some way be related to the life of the person who kills himself. It may be taken as a reproach against certain individuals or against society as a whole and actually does serve in many instances as an embarrassment or humiliation. Every experienced analyst has been able to observe in the suicidal threats of his patients an intention to alarm the analyst or discredit the analysis. This same motive is undoubtedly active in situations other than the analytic one.

This, then, is an analysis of the *aggressive* component of the suicidal impulse ; *it originates in the ego and is reflected upon the ego.*

2. THE WISH TO BE KILLED

We come now to the second element in suicide, the obverse of the killing motive, namely, the wish to be killed. Why, indeed, does anyone wish, not to die or to kill, necessarily, but *to be killed* ?

Obviously, being killed is the extreme form of submission, just as killing is the extreme form of aggression. And the enjoyment of submission, pain, defeat, and in the end, death, is the essence of masochism. But it would be a misleading over-simplification to let it go at that. We must understand why satisfactions may be achieved by punishment, that extraordinary phenomenon which we see occurring on all sides, from the persons who enjoy ill-health to those who deliberately put themselves in predicaments in which they suffer.

The result of indulgence in acts of aggression (dictated as we have seen by hate inspired by fear, envy and the desire for revenge) is to

bring about a sense of guilt with a corresponding feeling of need for punishment.

It is scarcely necessary, except for purposes of completeness, to point out that a sense of guilt may arise from other than actual aggression; in the unconscious, a wish to destroy is quite equivalent to the actual destruction. One who nourishes murderous wishes must also feel a need for punishment for that sin of a similar sort. From this we see the truth of that statement made by Freud many years ago that *many suicides are disguised murders*, not only, therefore, because of the introjection, which we have discussed above, but for the reason that murder alone justifies in the unconscious the death penalty. Suicide is, therefore, *the death penalty self inflicted*.

In the analysis of compulsion neurotics especially, the tyrannical primitive severity of the super-ego is made manifest. Every analyst could supply scores of illustrations of this phenomenon. One must always remember, however, how the compulsion neurotic disguises the import of his acts and thoughts by the formula of *reductio ad absurdum*. One of my patients, for example, would alternately amuse himself by torturing small animals and then—without any conscious connection—indulge in mutilating, humiliating, abasing or reproaching himself. Sometimes the treatment of the animals and of himself was precisely the same; for example, he would scorch a cat with a burning match, and that afternoon would singe his own hair with a taper. Of course, this did not cause him immediate pain as it did the animals, and he rationalized it by saying that it was done in order to promote the growth of his hair, but as a matter of fact he scorched his hair so irregularly that he gave himself a ridiculous appearance which he knew brought upon him the contempt of his associates. All of this takes on a different aspect if one knows that his dreams and associations made it unmistakable that the animals which he killed were symbolic representations of the analyst and also, of course, of his father. By cutting his hair he gave himself the appearance of a prison convict, as if to act out his phantasies of punishment for his murderous wishes toward me.

Another illustration which might be added is that of a thirty-five-year-old son of a travelling salesman, whose parents had taken him in early childhood on many railroad trips and permitted him to sleep with them in the berth. Riding on the train has always had for him a great fascination and no doubt gratified some incest phantasies in association with the above memories, and also the satisfaction of father identification, his father having made his living by travelling.

At a time when his analysis was in reality progressing very favourably, he one day had the feeling, suddenly, as he rode on the suburban train, that it was senseless, unnecessary, futile, and there came a strong impulse to kill himself, 'because my unconscious plays such tricks on me; I just thought, "Hell! I'll show it! I'll jump out of the train"'. The analytical material of the next few days became chiefly lament and self-reproach for the feeling 'that I have so constantly—*of course* unintentionally—deceived the analyst and tried to fool him and play tricks upon him, all of which reacts only, of course, to my own harm'.

One can see in this impulse to jump from the train, first of all a direct aggressive threat toward the analyst and toward the father whom the analyst represented. Jumping from the train meant the end of the analysis, not only symbolically, but in reality. It was also casting the father out of the train, an obvious symbolic parricide.

The reasons alleged for his contemplated suicide are equally significant. His conscious thought was that his unconscious had played tricks upon him and he would take revenge on his unconscious. Obviously his 'unconscious' was the analyst; he was justifying his attack upon the analyst by charging him with having played tricks. As a matter of fact, however, such an allegation had no basis in reality and was an inverted charge, a charge against himself that he had projected upon the analyst. He had indeed played tricks upon the analyst, as he well knew, and felt guilty about it. He was anxious to shew that these tricks had harmed him and the need for punishment is also fulfilled in the jumping from the train. 'Punishment of the unconscious' represented punishment of himself.

But one can also infer from this (as was clearly brought out in the patient's subsequent material) that he actually wanted the analyst to play these said tricks on him. By playing tricks on him he had unconscious reference, of course, to the erotic motive, i.e. the wish to be homosexually attacked. But against this wish by way of defence (dictated by the super-ego), and against the indignity of the attack (directed by the ego), there arose the outwardly directed destructive tendencies of projection. Thus, 'It is not I who play tricks upon the analyst, it is he who plays tricks upon me. He attacks me. Therefore I hate him, I want to kill him, I do kill him. But for killing him I also feel guilty and must suffer a like fate myself'.²

² Cf. Freud: 'The Schreber Case', *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, p. 388.

In other words, this man feels guilty for (1) this parricidal wish, (2) his hostile wishes against the analyst, (3) his deception or attempted deception of the analyst, and (4) his homosexual wishes. The guilt for all of these demands punishment of a similar sort, namely, an attack directed against himself. Hence the suicidal impulse.

THE PROBLEM OF HEREDITY IN SUICIDE

The question of suicide in families is one which has received almost no competent scientific investigation. Newspaper accounts indicate that in the popular mind the suicidal tendency is hereditary. In my own studies I have come upon several families in which it would certainly appear to be so. For example, one patient came to us at sixty-one on account of strong suicidal propensities which she had several times attempted to gratify. Three of the patient's sisters had killed themselves in an identical manner; the patient's mother, and the patient's mother's mother had also killed themselves in the same way. Moreover, the patient's mother was a twin and the twin brother had also killed himself!

In another instance, a highly regarded family contained five sons and two daughters; the oldest son killed himself at thirty-five; the youngest developed a depression and attempted suicide several times, but finally died of other causes at thirty; a third brother killed himself in a manner similar to that of his oldest brother; still another brother shot himself to death; the oldest daughter took poison successfully at a party. Only two children remain living of the entire family.

I have also on file numerous instances where sisters or brothers have killed themselves. In one instance, three sisters killed themselves simultaneously.

Striking as these illustrations may be, there is no convincing scientific evidence that the suicidal impulse is hereditary, and there is much psycho-analytic evidence to show that these cases of numerous suicides in one family may be explained on a psychological basis. Superficially there is the element of suggestion, but deeper than this is the well-known fact that unconscious death wishes reach their highest development toward members of the family, and when a member of the family dies or kills himself these death wishes are unexpectedly gratified; this produces a sudden and overpoweringly strong wave of guilt feelings which replace the death wish which has been gratified. This wave may be so great and so overwhelming as to make it necessary for

the culprit to be punished by death. Sometimes this is done, as every psycho-analyst knows, by dreams of being executed, hanged, killed in some other way, or sentenced to life imprisonment. In other instances, the element of suggestion points the way for the actual self-infliction of the death sentence.

METHODS USED IN SUICIDE

A psycho-analytic study of suicide would be incomplete were not some attention given to the unconscious significance of the particular technique selected for the act. That this is strongly determined and over-determined by the unconscious trends of the victim we have good reason to believe on two scores: first, by analogy with similar acts in other patients with less serious outcome; in other words, the established 'general' significance of certain acts; secondly, the much more definite evidence in frustrated suicidal attempts in patients who then, or later, undergo psycho-analytic treatment and study.

A full exposition of this latter evidence would require the inclusion of many individual case studies which the limits both of space and of my experience prohibit. One example is cited above; others have appeared in the literature incidental to the discussion of more general themes.

More general inferences we may readily gain from reading even the daily Press. It is well established statistically, for example, that men more frequently choose shooting and women drowning or the taking of poison or gas. These modes are obviously and clearly related to the masculine and feminine rôles in sexual life.

Extremely suggestive also are such exceptional but authenticated cases as that of suicide by thrusting a red-hot poker down the throat (i.e. fellatio acted out violently and punished with corresponding violence); or that of suicide by lying down before trucks and steam rollers (passive erotic submission); or that of plunging into molten glass, vats of soap, the craters of volcanoes, tanks of blood in packing houses, etc., (the significance of drowning phantasies is one of the earliest of psycho-analytic discoveries); or that of self-crucifixion (Messianic identification). One of my own patients calmly drank raw hydrochloric acid; it was vomited, of course; he tried repeatedly thereafter to accomplish suicide with this agent, diluting it with ginger ale. Finally, after a long period of surgical treatment for oesophageal stricture resulting from the acid burns, and much other treatment (he refused psycho-analysis), he re-established his home and

business, and then, about a year later, committed suicide successfully by eating fire-crackers.

Just what these methods may have meant in full detail to these individuals we shall never know, but their similarity to neurotic phantasies and dreams with which we are very familiar in analysis leaves little doubt as to their general significance and reinforces what we have said as to the motives of suicide, viz. that it represents in one act a murder and a propitiation, both of which are erotized. This erotization is conspicuous in the technique of the act.

3. THE WISH TO DIE

Anyone who has sat by the bedside of a patient dying from a self-inflicted wound and listened to pleadings that the physician save a life which only a few hours or minutes before had been attempted, must be impressed by the paradox that one who has wished to kill himself does not wish to die. The popular assumption is that, having yielded to a sudden impulse, the patient has changed his mind. It leaves unanswered why the act should have brought about this change. The pain is usually not great. The prospects of death are actually less than they were before the attempt since 'where there is life there is hope'. One gets the impression that for such people the suicidal act is sometimes a kind of insincere play acting and that their capacity for dealing with reality is so poorly developed that they proceed as if they could actually kill themselves and not die. We have reason to believe that a child has some such conception of death: that it is a going away and that for such goings away there is often a returning. Indeed the concept of a future life which is so real to many people is probably based upon this identification of death and going away.

One must distinguish also between the conscious wish and the unconscious wish to die or not to die, the latter being, as we have seen, the resultant of co-operating and conflicting factors. One sees this unconscious wish not to die in the very frequent attempts at suicide which turn out unsuccessfully because of faulty technique. Many poets and philosophers, including all the pessimists from Schopenhauer down, have been convinced of the desirability of death; yet, being impelled by neither of the other two motives, cannot escape the necessity of living on.

This, to a considerable degree, is perhaps true of many intellectual patients. Oftentimes melancholiac patients of superior intelligence and milder grade of affliction, will marshal unanswerable arguments

for the desirability of dying. They will point out with a passionate eloquence and with flawless logic that life is hard, bitter, futile and hopeless ; that it entails more pain than pleasure ; that there is no profit or purpose in it for them and no conceivable justification for their living on. Of such patients Freud has said : " . . . he has a keener eye for the truth. . . . When in his exacerbation of self-criticism he describes himself as petty, egoistic, dishonest, lacking in independence, one whose sole aim has been to hide the weaknesses of his own nature, for all we know it may be that he has come very near to self-knowledge ; we can only wonder why a man must become ill before he can discover truth of this kind ' .³

The question for us to consider here is to what extent we may associate this conscious wish for death with the death instinct conception. Freud's postulate specifically states that the self-destruction instinct never appears undisguised. Yet, as Alexander points out, nothing else can so well explain the pleasure in exposing one's self unnecessarily to great dangers—as do the mountain climbers, automobile racers, building scalers, or the popular interest in the antics of such movie actors as Harold Lloyd on the sides and tops of skyscrapers, etc. ' The narcissistic gratification derived from one's powers of achievement may indeed play a part here, but no one will fail to see the impulse, completely independent of this . . . to play with death, to expose one's life to serious risks . . . something like a forepleasure . . . to the (ultimate gratification of) the death instinct ' .⁴

It is my own view that we may also interpret as some evidence for the activity of the death instinct the observation that the physiological body processes appear to be capable of acting either for or against the personality as a whole. The phenomenon designated by Freud as somatic compliance we may think of as a kind of biological acceptance or rejection of the Id tendencies as modified by the psyche. One frequently sees such a thing as is well illustrated by a case studied by Dr. Catherine Bacon of Chicago. This patient's conscious self-destructive activities went only so far as scratching herself with the deliberate intent of causing a skin infection, with the expressed hope of death. This is common in malingering. But what determines

³ Freud : ' Mourning and Melancholia ' , *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 156.

⁴ Alexander, Franz : ' The Need for Punishment and the Death Instinct ' , this JOURNAL, 1929, Vol. X, p. 256.

whether or not these infections shall prove fatal? Can we assume with the bacteriologists that it is entirely a matter of quantitative relationships between virulence and resistance, or, in other words, mere chance? Clinical experience certainly leads us to suspect that such infections become serious in just those cases where there are other evidences of strongly active self-destructive tendencies. It is possible that the available strength of the death instinct determines this biological acceptance of the extraneous opportunities for self-destruction.

There is another straw in the wind I wish to mention. It has been suggested that the wish for death may be only another disguise for the frequently observed phenomena commonly interpreted as birth fantasies, or, more accurately, a desire to return to the womb. Suicide by drowning is supposed to be particularly clear in its symbolic suggestion of this tendency. It is not impossible, however, that this interpretation is an exact inversion and that birth fantasies and the various phenomena suggesting a desire to return to the peace of the womb may be only pictorial representations of the unconscious wish for death.

We have seen that the aggressive elements in suicide originate in the ego and the submissive elements in the super-ego; it would conform with Freud's postulate to find that the unconscious wish to die implicit in the death instinct originates in the Id.

To advance this hypothesis, however, we can offer only negative data as I have suggested above. We can show that many individuals in whom the aggressive and submissive elements of self-destruction are strongly operative fail of a successful suicide because of some unwillingness to die, which, while capable of many explanations, certainly lends some support to the view that in such individuals the life instincts are able to maintain their ascendancy over the death instincts. Alexander in a personal communication states that he does not believe that clear psychological representations of the death instinct can be demonstrated. I agree that they have not been, but I do not see why it is *a priori* impossible that they may not be. I think we must recognize, however, that as yet the theory of the death instinct and therefore 'the wish to die' element in suicide is only an hypothesis in contrast to the demonstrated facts of the existence of the other two elements.

RECAPITULATION

So far we have presented the thesis that suicide is a gratification of self-destructive tendencies which upon analysis appear to be composed

of at least two elements—an aggressive element—the wish to kill—and a submissive element—the wish to be killed. In addition, it is postulated that a wish to die may be present to a variable degree for which, however, no definite psychological evidence can be offered.

The three components are derived respectively from the ego, the super-ego and the Id. It can be recognized from the clinical phenomena studied that the proportionate strength of these three components varies considerably in various instances, so that in one case the motivation comes most powerfully from the ego, in another from the super-ego, and in still another (perhaps) from the Id.

PARTIAL SUICIDE

This leads us directly to a consideration of those incomplete forms of suicide which deductions and analysis alike show to be directly related to the more successful efforts at self-destruction which we ordinarily call suicide. Self-destruction is, as we shall see, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly accomplished, sometimes completely and sometimes incompletely. We may well speak of *chronic suicides* as well as *acute suicides*; it is probably not too wide an extension of theory to say that many diseases, both those ordinarily called organic as well as those called functional, may be regarded as various forms of self-destruction—*chronic, indirect* suicide.

For, just as neurotic symptoms may be localized, as in conversion hysteria, or generalized as in major hysteria, so self-destruction may be focalized or generalized. Neurotic syndromes and neurotic character manifestations are similarly focal or generalized. It is not impossible that we may some day be able to show that conversion hysteria and some forms of organic disease represent chronic *focal* self-destructive attacks while ascetism and martyrdom represent chronic *generalized* self-destruction. The ordinary forms of suicide must stand as prototypes of *acute generalized total self-destruction*.

SHORT COMMUNICATION

A NOTE ON SYMBOLS AND EARLY INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY

My preliminary remarks are one or two comments on Ernest Jones' paper on the 'Theory of Symbolism'.¹ Dr. Jones there reminds us that symbols in the strict psycho-analytical sense of the word have lost their link with the object symbolized. I suggest that this fact preserves the original psychical situation of symbol *formation*: i.e. the substitution of a new object for one lost: and so that we need not discuss whether symbols can exist before the unconscious proper is formed, even if we agree that subsequently symbols are symbols only where the link is unconscious.

Dr. Jones says further that 'all symbolism betokens a relative incapacity for either apprehension or presentation, primarily the former. This may be either affective or intellectual in origin, the first of these two factors being by far the more important'. He lays stress on the standpoint familiar to psychologists and philosophers the world over; that knowledge proceeds from the known to the unknown, that apprehension of differences implies a more advanced mental activity than apprehension of the familiar; but also shews that there is some evidence that the primitive mind, both infantile and savage, may shew greater discrimination or perception of differences than a more highly developed mind. He cites the facts of certain primitive languages; for example, 'the Arabs are said to have over five hundred words to designate lions in various aspects, but no word for lion; five thousand seven hundred and forty-four for camels, but none for a camel'. Dr. Jones shows that the determining factor is interest. We certainly know that the smallest infant possesses high powers of discrimination in at least one direction, i.e. he will refuse all milk not exactly to his taste. I suggest that the drive towards acute discrimination in the infantile or primitive mind is developed in the service of the self-preservative functions; and that where anxiety is merely the signal of the ego to summon to its aid the pleasure principle,² early discrimination, sense of differences, can be very acute. But this only happens

¹ Ernest Jones: 'The Theory of Symbolism', *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, 1923, p. 179.

² Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom u. Angst.*, 1926, s. 14.

when anxiety is not too overwhelming to defeat its own ends ; where the ego is strong enough to direct the forces it summons. These are the situations which Melanie Klein has depicted in her paper on 'Symbol Formation in Ego Development',³ and in her recent book.⁴ As I have said elsewhere,⁵ I think a permanent and stable relation to reality and hence also a reliable power of discrimination can only come about as the result of unsatisfied desire *which is not too intense in quality or quantity*, but is just sufficiently intense to call the ego to the help of the id, and to help which is within the capacity of the ego. This is not the same thing as anxiety, by means of which the ego summons to its help the forces of the id. I do not think that we should confound *interest*, which contains the factor of unsatisfied desire, with *anxiety*. It does not seem that the infant's discriminatory powers of taste are in the first place based on anxiety, but that anxiety develops when these are disregarded or unsatisfied. The discriminatory powers of the primitive mind run amok when driven by anxiety in addition to interest. The Arabs gain nothing by their five thousand seven hundred and forty-four words for camels.

I propose in this short note to disregard the situation of acute temporary discrimination under the drive of acute anxiety and to re-state the more general position in this form : A new situation to be apprehended at all must be apprehended in part in terms of the already familiar, but *only in part*. We might say that the feeling of familiarity, of the not altogether unknown, is the part played by intuition ; the main rôle of intelligence is in the apprehension of *difference*, that which adds to the feeling 'this is in my me-world', 'this is familiar', or 'this I can at once take into me', the feeling 'this is also different', there is a 'not-at-once mine or me feeling', 'there is some work to be done before I can make this wholly mine'. Perhaps these two processes are the mental counter-parts of differing physical processes—in the first place easy, in comparison with difficult, sucking ; later, sucking in contrast with biting and chewing. We are very familiar with the fact that the intellectual processes cannot function effectively in the outer world where they are engaged in too heavy a struggle with, or are submerged by, emotional processes. That is, in strongly

³ Melanie Klein : 'Symbol Formation in Ego Development', this JOURNAL, 1930, Vol. XI., p. 3.

⁴ Melanie Klein : *The Psycho-Analysis of Children*, 1932.

⁵ M. N. Searl : 'Play, Reality and Aggression', this JOURNAL, p. 310.

affective situations the intelligence plays a much lessened part in the recognition of them as in any sense *new* situations, and recognition is much more fully determined by the affect, non-intellectually, i.e. in terms of something already familiar. Compare the transference situation in analysis. We may say that any new situation is thus an old situation plus x , a quantity unknown at first, which is the difference between them; and that x will seem to vary according to the preponderance of affective motivation; while x itself, to become a known instead of an unknown quantity, must be subjected to further sifting by the work of intelligence. The apperception of new *objects* is, of course, a special case of a new situation; and the quality or quantity of affect determines whether the stress in the apperception of any new object is on the familiarity or the difference. Also before mental organization becomes stable an already familiar object will vary from one time to another in similarity to or difference from a desired object according to the affective quality of the situation of which they form part. This, of course, is only to say that the infant's apperception of new objects as symbols, that is, as really *being* the most important and familiar parts of his already known world, will depend upon the affective situation of the moment: also that the same factor will determine the variation of the *type* of interest accorded to a given object at different moments: whether it is approached as a puzzle, as something requiring mental work to be done upon it for a new kind of satisfaction, or whether as a familiar object promising already familiar satisfaction. It is interesting to remark the path of developing intellectual activity in the very seriously inhibited boy of seven to whom I have referred in recent papers.⁶ Until recently his highest verbal recognition of a new object had taken a negative form, e.g. 'This isn't a lemonade bottle, is it?' or, to anyone else than myself whom he saw in the house, 'This isn't Miss Searl, is it?' That is, he was searching to annul the new object of whose difference he was aware, while yet feeling incapable of further mental work on the difference itself. Now he can definitely say, 'This is a lemonade bottle, isn't it?' It occurs to me to wonder whether our way of combining some negative with assertion in one form of questioning, 'This is, is it not?' may not have the same origin, i.e. the unreadiness of one part

⁶ M. N. Searl: 'The Psychology of Screaming', this JOURNAL, Vol. XIV., p. 193; 'Play, Reality and Aggression', this JOURNAL, p. 315.

of the mind to recognize anything but similarity. We naturally come by this route very near Freud's important formulations with regard to negation⁷ in which he shews that the first re-acceptance of previously denied ideas often contains both processes at once, as in the first reality testings—a taking in and a spitting out.

It may be pardonable to suggest that there is some tendency in most of us to treat symbols themselves in the very way in which symbols originate, and to take rest on the feeling of familiarity and freedom from the necessity of further work which they can bring us. Unfortunately that tends also to bring a feeling of staleness, and I myself have found it of such value to re-question every symbol and only accept it fully when I have re-established the mental processes of its origin, that I venture to think I may help some others in the same direction. It seems to me that the child's relation to his objects, even those of the quite little child, are more complex intellectually as well as libidinally than we always remember. To give an example in the child's understanding of, or relation to, that mysterious object, a book.⁸ Do we always realize *what* a mysterious object it must be to a little child, how often his sense of wonder is awakened? Long before a child can take any personal interest in books as such he will have encountered them as objects which other people take up and put down, are absorbed in for quite long periods of time. It is more than probable that the first direct affective connection between a child and a book, as differentiated from other objects, will have consisted in the alternation of attention of a grown-up from one to the other—one put down as the other is taken up, one paid attention to—exclusive attention—in lieu of the other, etc. In this case 'book' is alternative to, or a substitute for, 'child', and when the book receives attention in spite of the child's re-iterated demands, the jealous affective link tends to bring disregard of all differences, and the book *becomes* another child, also crying for attention. When the action of intelligence is less obscured, differences between the book and the child will be more apparent: first, the mere fact of difference, the 'not-the-same'-ness, then something of the nature of the difference, for example, that the book lies where it is put, does not cry for attention, is easily opened as compared with the taking

⁷ Freud: 'Negation,' this JOURNAL, Vol. VI., p. 367.

⁸ James Strachey has thrown much light on the symbolic activities gratified in reading in his paper 'Some Unconscious Factors in Reading', this JOURNAL, 1930, Vol. XI., p. 322.

off of the child's clothes, etc., and is from this point of view a 'good' child. On some such basis as this does the book become a symbol of a child, good or bad according to the stress of the affective situation. Increasing differentiation in periods of intelligent activity will liken the book to other objects already familiar to the child, e.g. boxes, though again with differences: contents are not to be taken out; opening and shutting is on the whole an easier process. This opening and shutting is nearly always an important point—I have already compared it with the dragging off of the child's clothes—and the greater ease, which from this aspect it shares with boxes, doors, etc., assimilates it more nearly to the opening and closing of the mother's dress in suckling, and the opening and closing of the child's mouth in the same setting. Where oral *desire* for what the mother or nurse possesses is in the ascendant the book will represent the mother's breast or the bottle, and in proportion to the strength of this affective link will differences be eliminated. When these can remain, i.e. when intelligence can work even while this affective link of similarity remains, there will be approximations to *substitutes* for the mother's breast, those objects which have already retained the 'like and yet not quite like' quality; those objects with which you try to satisfy yourself when you are alone, just as the father, mother or nurse does with a book when he or she is 'alone' from the child. Then the book may be most closely approximated to a rattle; yet there is still a difference: those grown-ups are so strange, they do not want to shake their rattles about, and they do not want to make a noise with them—perhaps because they can so easily get out what is inside. Lucky people! Or—but this is always 'and' as well as 'or'—there is approximation to the child's own genitals, in which indeed for gratification it can become absorbed, which do not make noises, which, on the contrary, on account of the satisfaction obtained from them, can *prevent* the child from making noises—the earliest formed connection between reading and masturbation. Yet when a child handles a book, in so far as his intelligence is free to work, his sense of touch, no less than his sense of sight, tells him how different is a book from a body unless the cover is in cloth and he can believe the body is inside the clothing. It is easy to see how leather bindings to our books can help to diminish this sense of difference.

To return to the jealousy situation for a moment. There will be a link here not only between the book and the child, but between the book and other people—big children, who have absorbed the attention

desired by the child. This link again connects, of course, with the intensity of previous jealousy situations.

Now all the reality sense of the child, all his intelligence, must insist on the difference between the book and the adult, probably the father, while yet the *affective* link is saying 'the same.' It is here that I think the secondary use of partial objects is important, not only because of the self-preservative need to direct jealousy towards an object smaller than the child himself, but also because it goes some way towards reduction of this big difference between intelligent awareness and emotional drive. Not only *may* the hidden genitals be of any shape—intelligence can less easily disprove the approximation—but they actually *are* much nearer the size of the book than is the whole of the adult body. Also the affective link holds most strongly for those parts of the body in which desire is focussed, e.g. mouth, genitals. In some such way does the body and genital symbolism of books originate.

One cannot consider here in detail the phantasies or symbolism respecting the contents of the book, but would suggest the postulate that symbols are miniature phantasies. When a child first appreciates the fact that actual words, speech in some form, can be obtained from inside the book, he has a very difficult problem to solve. Hitherto, apart from still more intricate problems, gramophones and wireless, words at least have come from people only. 'Where does it come from?' is an ever-reappearing question. Those mysterious black marks on the white paper—do these *speak* to people silently? Why not to the child? Are they bits of people still talking? They are very like bits of flies pulled to pieces, yet so ordered and kept in place; a little less like nose-bogies of different shape and size. Again this strange contrast of order and disorder—still less like those precursors of interest in nose-bogies on a light surface—faecal marks in a chamber or on a white sheet or white body. Thus we reach, *via* a chain with several links, the most primitive symbols, but with many attempts on the way to solve the problem more intellectually, with awareness of differences. It is perhaps here that pictures in books form a special problem of their own, and adults seem to reverse the whole process. Here one seems to be recognized as intelligent when one ignores differences and appreciates only similarities. One says 'that *is* a dog', 'this *is* a cat', even though there are many puzzling differences from any known dogs or cats. Yet it is true that this main difference of their keeping so still and not moving is in line with the already appreciated difference in that attempted approximation of the book itself to a live body.

You will see that the main purpose of this note is to emphasize the very complex nature of even the very small child's relation to objects, and the amount of intellectual activity involved in it ; and to suggest that we should never be content to represent that relationship in terms of primitive symbolism alone. I shall not forget the effect on an intelligent little girl of five, struggling with the problem of the power of dirt and badness, when, after dealing with it in terms of her own past experience as well as in symbolic form, I suddenly understood the immediate setting of it. From the table at which we were then sitting were removed each day all coloured marks of paints and chalks—the prettier marks. What remained all the time, and were therefore stronger than I, were the scratches ; just ugly black marks on the white surface ; ugliness and dirt thus proved to possess the greatest power. Suddenly to see the table with the child's eyes was an experience for me too, and my recognition of the truth of her comparison not only increased her confidence in me, but increased her confidence in, as compared with her fear of, her own powers of acute discrimination. A similar example is that of the puzzling fact that urine in pots looks yellow, while on material it makes black or grey marks. The recognition of such observations shews the child that we can see the world with his eyes of intelligence as well as with his affective symbolism ; that we take into account his fresh vision and acute perceptions ; that we understand his ego as well as his id. And the importance of this does not lie only with children. It is, of course, equally important in understanding the child in the adult to give any links with reality which will remove the feeling of arbitrariness and remoteness from our symbolic interpretations.

M. N. Searl
(London).

ABSTRACTS

GENERAL

Edward Glover. 'Medico-Psychological Aspects of Normality.'
British Journal of Psychology, 1932, Vol. XXIII, p. 152.

With the development of psychological medicine the old organic standards of normality went by the board. The psycho-analyst, in particular, as a result of his investigation of anomalous, incapacitated cases without even well-defined psychological 'symptoms', found it was no longer possible to exclude a capacity for personal happiness and peace of mind from the professional categories of normality. 'A normal individual is anyone who is free from symptoms, unhampered by mental conflict, who shows satisfactory working capacity, and who is able to love someone apart from himself.' The flaw in this tentative definition is that it does not follow that anyone who does not come to consultation is sufficiently well adapted to be called normal. Systematic examination of the clinical, structural and economic aspects of normality, and of adaptation factors and anxiety, leads to the following generalizations. Normality can be subdivided into a number of reaction systems, each appropriate to a particular phase of instinct mastery. These systems are in the first place (infancy) psychotic, later neurotic and in adult life characterological. They represent ramparts created under the stimulus of anxiety. The most obvious normal rampart is adult character, a series of reactions promoting mainly by means of displacement a stable equilibrium between instinctual demands and gratification in reality. A broader view is that normality implies simultaneous yet harmonious function of a number of mechanisms (of which repression is the most incalculable) (*a*) for controlling instinct, and (*b*) for securing direct (or substitute) gratification, with the ego acting as a compensating balance. Normality may be described as a harmonious confluence of the reality principle with the primitive pleasure principle; it is possibly an overlapping of psychotic and objective reality testing. An alternative view is that normally the anxiety precautions evoked by reality are sufficient to cope with co-existing psychotic and neurotic (unreal) anxiety systems. 'Normality may be a form of madness which goes unrecognised because it happens to be a good adaptation to reality.' 'A normal person must shew some capacity for anxiety tolerance.' By absolute standards, normality is non-existent. Interest in establishing an absolute standard is an instance of a seemingly normal mental compulsion.

M. Brierley.

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M. D. Eder. 'The Myth of Progress.' *The British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1932, Vol. XII, p. 1.

This paper adds another contribution to Sociology from the pen of a psycho-analyst.

Mankind has always found refuge from his unhappiness in myth creation. The myth is represented as a struggle between man and the forces of obstruction in which man is assured of ultimate victory. The history of civilization is largely the narrative of these myths. The myth of progress states that civilization has moved, is moving, and will move in a desirable direction. Progress is inevitable. The myth in its origin coincides with the gradual decline in the Christian belief in heaven and hell. According to the Christian myth man is only saved from damnation by Divine intervention. The great strides recently made in scientific discovery and invention have encouraged man in the belief that the millennium is not far distant. Science has become god. Philosophers, men of science and politicians have accepted the idea of the inevitability of progress. But the hopes built on science are proving as illusory as those built on religion and other myths. Indeed, recent events would seem to indicate that science is making man more unhappy and even threatening his destruction. Many theories and explanations for this state of affairs are forthcoming. The present writer offers one based on psycho-analytic investigation. He says that the genesis of the myth of progress is to be found in the happy delusion of omnipotence of the infant. Mankind unconsciously longs to return to this condition of megalomania. Thwarted by the external world he turns to his imagination to alleviate his unhappiness, the wishes he fulfils there are then projected more or less modified into the external world as political theories and philosophical systems. Further, the omnipotent child can brook no denial of its wishes and frustration can only come from a hostile mother; so the adult sees in the failure of his hopes the hand of a hostile force. He understands no more than the infant does that the hostile force is his own projected aggression. To obtain freedom man must recognize and accept his own unconscious aggressive impulses, he must further realize that these cannot be adequately controlled by repressive measures. Is man capable of the heroic discipline necessary to find and travel the path to freedom?

D. Matthews.

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Gustav Bychowski: 'Aktivität und Realität.' *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1933, Bd. XIX, S. 152-169.

The author seeks to elucidate the first origins and psychic foundations of activity as such. He describes the first forms of activity—i.e. unco-ordinated motor and oral activity—which have their roots in the id-instincts and contain the first potentiality of inhibition and rejection of reality.

The clinical bearing of this proposition becomes apparent in the oral nature of such rejection as seen in various psycho-neurotic disturbances. A further contribution to the development of activity is made by primary narcissism. Future development is mainly regulated by the impact of reality on this narcissism, but at the same time inhibition of activity may very possibly result, such as manifests itself (especially) in various psycho-neurotic abnormalities of character. This is the true basis of the characteristic reactions of the immature ego: discouragement, impatience, intolerance of tension and its whole peculiar relation to time. Illustrations from the analyses of schizoid characters.

The first stirrings of activity in relation to reality are destructive and negative. This is due to the conflict between the original 'omnipotence' and the resistance of reality and is borne out by clinical experience of different types of cases. Among recent analytic findings reference is here made to the analysis of depersonalization. This shews the importance of the destructive instinctual tendencies, which bring about a partial denial of reality, and at the same time a persistence of fixations in earlier phases of development, in which the full validity of external reality was not yet admitted.

These first inhibitions in the development of the relation of the ego to reality are the source of later idiosyncrasies of character and of the earliest inhibitions of activity. They may also be the starting-point of neurotic regression. Of special importance are the oscillation between narcissistic omnipotence and absolute powerlessness and also the equation of the subject's own thoughts with reality.

The inexorable resistance of reality forms the basis of the earliest projection, by means of which the subject's own destructive instinct is attributed to the outside world. The powerful persons who bring up the child seem predestined to embody these projected tendencies. Infantile anxiety springs from aggression projected into reality.

The principle of 'all or nothing' and 'now or never' governs volition, which is conditioned by instinct alone: it represents the most primitive, incompletely mastered form of activity.

The original projection is succeeded by processes of introjection, which reincorporate the sadistically cathected objects. This introjection not only forms the first basis of super-ego formation but also initiates a tragic dissociation within the infantile ego. This dissociation is the pre-Œdipal source of inhibitions of activity which crystallize out at the time of the passing of the Œdipus complex. The component instincts which are directed towards objects add their quota to the original activity, but they may lead to special inhibitions by way of repression. The earliest energy-sources of activity at the same time contain elements of the utmost danger.

Rage and withdrawal, two important reactions of the immature ego

to novel and disagreeable processes in the outside world, are seen to be prefigured in the subject's development. The universality of the fixations conditioning these reactions amply accounts for their importance in the psychology not only of individuals but of civilisation.

In conclusion, the author shews our modern world as informed by the instinct of destruction, both primary and projected.

Author's Abstract.

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CLINICAL

Therese Benedek. 'The Psychical Mechanisms in Basedow's-Psychosis.' *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1933, Bd. XIX, S. 203-505.

Observing two cases whose clinical type changed from melancholic (identification) to paranoid (projection) and then to obsessional (displacement) the author argued that the various defence mechanisms correspond to different degrees of ego-cathexis, the greater the aggression and anxiety the weaker the ego, weakest in the identification phase, strongest in the obsessional-displacement phase; the particular defence employed by the ego against the aggression of the super-ego depending both on the intensity of the free-floating anxiety to be mastered and on the libidinal tension within the organism.

A new theory of Grave's disease hypothecates a weakening of the gonad endocrine as well as hyperfunction of thyroid, witness the frigidity, anxiety and psychical manifestations of bisexuality; these two cases also shew that the anxiety caused by direct organic stimulus evokes in the mind the manifestations of the aggressive impulse, but which is primary, anxiety or aggression, is not shewn. In brief, the anxiety and aggression released by the thyreotoxin is worked over in the mind, the liberated aggression increasing the severity of the super-ego bringing about depression.

J. Rickman.

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Sandor Radó. 'The Psychoanalysis of Pharmacothymia.' *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1933, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 1-23.

Drug addictions are psychically determined, artificially induced illnesses. All types are varieties of one single disease. Certain drugs happen to be 'elatypes' which either generate pleasure or prevent pain and afford the way out of a psychic situation which is characteristic of addiction. This is the 'tense depression' which is a special type of emotional alteration resulting from frustration. The drug then causes an elevation of mood and a sharp rise in self-esteem which causes a recrudescence of primitive narcissism. Interest in reality gradually vanishes. A cyclic course is the usual sequence. The transitoriness of the elation determines the return of the depression, the latter the renewed craving for the elation. The ego

now has to maintain its self-regard by an artificial technique. There is a change from a realistic to a pharmacothymic régime. But this is subject to the law of diminishing returns.

Crucial alterations now occur in the sexual sphere. Genital pleasure is disregarded and pharmacogenic pleasure effect comes to be the dominant aim. Thus an artificial sexual organization is established which is auto-erotic and patterned after infantile masturbation. The ego responds to this devaluation with castration anxiety which is perceived as fear of pharmacogenic failure. By withdrawing itself from social and sexual activities, the ego has delivered itself over to masochism until finally no elation can conquer the misery of the depression. This is the pharmacothymic crisis from which there are three exits—flight into a free interval, suicide or psychosis. The withdrawal of the drug deprives the ego of its protection against masochism and usually fails. Suicide is the result of self-destructive masochism. The psychotic episode has been chiefly studied in the alcohol deliria. These are characterized by anxiety over castration or sexual attack, wishes which gratify latent masochistic tendencies and are transformed into manifest ego terror phantasies.

Deep insight into the dynamics of homosexuality can be gained through a study of masochism in pharmacothymia. Erotism is driven from its active positions. In men the result of the combination of the genital aim of painless pleasure with the passive goal of masochism is a homosexual object choice. For homosexuality is more acceptable to the ego than masochism. Its advantage rests in its denial of castration for even the sexual partner possesses a penis. It represents an attempt at autotherapy *via* a return to the realistic régime with a new genital aim. Subsequently a further step toward masculinity is taken by progression from a passive homosexual to an active homosexual attitude. It is possible for the pharmacothymic to preserve some heterosexuality through other compromise formations. He may become passively oriented to women who are endowed with a penis and elevated to the rôle of the phallic mother. Or a surge of sadism may attempt to dispel castration anxiety. This results in a counterpart to the sadistic perversion characterized by unprovoked outbursts of hate or rage against women alternating with states of tender mollification. The former are the pharmacothymic's substitute for potency.

Leonard Rothschild.

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Symposium on 'Phobias.' *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1932, Vol. XI, p. 295.

Dr. Redfern gave the individual psychological explanation of phobia formation. He stated that no clear distinction was to be recognized between phobias, compulsions and hysteria. In his case history he

shewed how fears and anxieties arose at critical periods in the patient's life as safety devices, brought into action to keep the ego ideal intact.

Psycho-analytic approach to phobia formation was presented by Dr. Yates. She shewed in her case history how a phobia arose as one solution of the intra-psychic conflict produced by sadism which was aroused by frustration by a loved object. Fears and feelings which were intolerable could be worked out by symbolic disguise in the form of a phobia. The mechanism shewed how unconscious aggression against a loved person was transferred so as to emanate from the symbolic representation of the latter. Thus the patient's guilt feelings were allayed in that he became the victim of the phobia.

Dr. Young put forward the view, derived from the study of many phobic cases, that a certain arrest of psychological development, usually associated with marked organic defects, was common to all phobiques. A resulting impoverishment of life was also a striking feature in all phobiques whose phobia itself seemed to give them, in a negative kind of way, the stimulus which they lacked.

Sybille Yates.

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SEXUALITY

Ilse Charles Odier. 'Mother-Fixation in Women.' *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1932, Bd. XVIII, S. 429-449.

Analysis of a number of young girls and women has led me to the increasingly firm conviction that it is impossible to attach too much importance to mother fixation in women.

Note, first, how passionate and uncompromising is the craving of little children for their mother's love, without which they can no more thrive than without food. When experience teaches them that that love can be forfeited, that at times they are deprived of it in favour of someone else and even that the 'good' mother may turn into the 'bad' mother, they will do their utmost to avert these dangers.

The impression I have derived from observation is that, although the normal Œdipus complex could undoubtedly be demonstrated in my female patients, it was renounced owing to the dread of losing the mother's love, the infantile object receiving regressively a libidinal cathexis, the intensity of which was the greater in proportion as a greater mass of libido had been mobilized in the heterosexual object-choice. The woman's infantile, narcissistic fixation to her mother has a decisive effect on the whole of her subsequent life, only a small portion of libido, apparently, remaining available for heterosexual ties.

As the child develops, the dread of losing her mother's love turns into dread of the infantile super-ego, which represents the introjection of the mother who forbids and punishes. The nucleus of the super-ego in women

is the sexual prohibition, and perhaps their sexual inhibitions are more general, stronger and more unyielding than those of men just because the *first impulses* of the female reproductive instinct threaten to separate the little girl from her mother.

Two specially marked clinical cases illustrate these points. In the first patient, Anna, we have a particularly good example of a situation which probably occurs in the unconscious of many women. It may be compared to a 'pact' between mother and daughter: 'If the little girl renounces her father's love in order to give her whole heart to her mother, the latter must do likewise and love the child exclusively.' In other words, the gist of the pact is: 'If I have not got my father, my mother is not to have him either and then at least I shall have her to myself.' If the mother does not yield to this tyrannical demand but breaks the 'pact', the forbidden incestuous and heterosexual instincts immediately emerge from repression and the hate of the rival awakes in full force—once more ambivalence asserts its power.

In the deeply neurotic mother of the second patient, Klara, the incarnation of the infantile feminine super-ego was seen as it is frequently fantasied by women whose mothers are not at all above the average. This mother 'queened it' in her family circle: everything remotely related to sexuality was strictly forbidden and repudiated as 'dirty'. The future of the daughter was mapped out for her: she was not to become a wife and mother but was to follow a masculine calling. The mother was as jealous of Klara's love for her father as of his for the child. The little girl was forbidden the fulfilment of her womanhood. Masculinity was forced upon her, but a masculinity like that of her father, subject to and dominated by the phallic mother.

The peculiar situation in the family of both patients—the dominance of the mother and the weakness of the father—probably tends strongly to foster the hypertrophy of the mother-complex. Even if a girl so situated identifies herself with the weak father, she remains in passive, masochistic subjection to her mother, her active expression of instinct deriving its sustenance from identification with the phallic mother.

Both these patients displayed another mechanism typical of women with a strong mother-fixation: their sexuality inevitably assumed the guise of humiliation and punishment in order to maintain itself in the face of the mother super-ego and to compensate for the evasion of the maternal prohibition. This is a well-known phenomenon; possibly, in looking for its cause, we have not sufficiently considered the mother-fixation.

Dreams which have come under my notice indicate that even in normal women with a happy sexual life the same complexes come into play: we always encounter this need for reconciliation with the mother. I believe

that the difference between normal and abnormal women in this respect is merely quantitative, not qualitative. Since the first object-love of every human being is given to the mother, love in a woman's unconscious always retains this peculiar homosexual tinge: she, no less than the man, will invariably look for something of the mother in the love-object. For her femininity to realize itself the little girl is obliged to identify herself with her mother, her father's wife and sexual object, whilst, in direct opposition to this mechanism, the introjection of the mother in the super-ego prohibits her fulfilling her womanhood.

Author's Abstract.

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J. Hárník. 'The First Post-natal Stage of Development of the Libido.' *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1933, Bd. XIX, S. 147-151.

Many years ago Simmel ascribed a specific importance to an intestinal libidinal cathexis, attempting to adduce the evidence from deep analyses, from states of excitement over the whole length of gut and from theory. The author going further postulates a pre-oral respiratory-intestinal stage of libido development beginning at birth, accounting for the anxiety of suffocation and the pleasure in this anxiety which may sometimes occur. Fenichel and Külövesi worked on the notion of respiratory introjection shewing its rôle in the development of object relationships and in regression, anxiety about death and suffocation being a transposition from oral introjection to respiratory. The conversion phenomena of this phase are asthma and mucous colitis (called by v. Bergman 'bowel asthma'). The last third of the paper ends 'bio-analytically' with reference to Ferenczi's 'Genitaltheorie'.

J. Rickman.

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Ives Hendrick. 'Pregenital Anxiety in a Passive Feminine Character.' *The Psycho-analytic Quarterly*, 1933, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 68-93.

A case is presented which serves to apply Freud's postulates of the importance of pre-œdipal sexuality in women to a certain type of male characterized by oral passivity to objects, narcissism and genital impotence that is refractory to psycho-analysis. The patient came for treatment because of chronic invalidism, complete inhibition of initiative and marked erotic dysfunction. Little evidence was found that real genitality had ever existed, and all the pregenital drives seemed all almost on a par. Apparently there had never been a complete fusion of pregenital desires into genital aims. The typical Œdipus phantasy brought out was a desire to urinate like his father. This was the one erotized form of aggressive instinct.

The problem of the analysis had to do with the inhibition of aggression. This was not solved by the conversion of the somatic complaints back into

conscious anxiety again, for this proved to be on an oral basis (fear of father eating his penis). It was not until a group of unconscious phantasies concerned with hostility to the mother were worked through that castration fear became manifest in the conscious fear of the female genital and especially of something within it. The phantasies were of beating his mother's buttocks with a symbolic penis and were derived from biting impulses displaced from the breast as well as an attack on the pregnant abdomen. The nucleus of the neurosis was expressed according to the formula: 'I wish to kill with my penis in mother's vagina, I am afraid my penis will be eaten by the penis in there'. The aggressive component is actively present in the id, but inhibited as a defence against use of the penis as an instrument of destructive, largely oral, satisfaction. This is in agreement with the views of Melanie Klein as to the importance of a pre-œdipal phallic attitude to the mother.

The close identity of this patient's reaction to both father and mother is the source of the difference between this reaction and the homosexual solution to a fully cathected Œdipus situation. There did not seem to be a feature in the father reaction which was not quantitatively equated in the previous reaction to the mother. But this is one of the two ontogenetic features which Freud found to be characteristic of normal female development. The other, the pre-œdipal determination of character, is also present and is based on a persistent oral cathexis of the phallus which must be used passively because he dare not use it aggressively, leading in the end to a lasting defect in masculine identification.

Leonard Rothschild.



CHILDHOOD

Sybillic Yates. 'Some Problems of Adolescence.' *The Lancet*, April 29th, 1933, p. 939.

This article is taken from a lecture given to the Medical Women's Federation. Dr. Yates starts by emphasizing the general nature of these problems apart from the mere existence of conscious difficulties. The core of the problem is that the adolescent is neither a child nor an adult, and lives in a little world of his own. He develops adult physical powers and has little sphere of adult action possessing adult obligations without privileges. Commenting on the rich nature of adolescent phantasy and dream life the author reviews the unreal nature of the world we ask our adolescents to live in. They are allowed so little contact with family labour or politics. They have all the qualities of omnipotence divorced from the thwarting facts of reality. Particularly difficult is the lot of the young person suddenly transferred by the gain of a scholarship from a working-class family to the University. The later reaction during a possible life of office drudgery may be severe. Some parents do not want their children to grow up and others

who do, prevent their growth by demands of obedience and dependence. Society has no place for the adolescent. The lot of adolescents in primitive tribes is compared with a result rather to their advantage. Then follows a rapid and elementary review of development emphasizing the importance of infantile life, the latency period and puberty. The child compensates for his many frustrations and finds his excretory products possess a magical power with which he can fight the adult. Similar magical power ideas related to excretion are found in the beliefs of primitive people. At a later stage of development conflict occurs in relation to seminal emissions and menstruation, the early unconscious wishes being revived and these products again acting as magical weapons. It is pointed out that sexual enlightenment of children does more harm than good when it is done by halves and the important subject of pleasurable sensation is omitted. Emphasis is laid on the importance of guilt and fears in connection with masturbation. The accompanying phantasies of ambition, envy and power are gained at the expense of the parents because they appear to enjoy exclusive pleasures. Masturbatory guilt is often associated with growth changes in the sexual organs. During adolescence an exhibitionistic revival occurs and is associated with clothes, jewellery, make-up, etc. The most intense unconscious fears are probably connected with the adult functioning of sexual intercourse associated with being hurt or hurting the sexual partner. A preconscious fear of marriage may often be based on parental marital unhappiness.

Although there is no satisfactory solution for the problem something can be done in a general way towards diminishing the importance of phantasy rather than reinforcing it. Let us encourage our adolescents to co-operate and not to compete with us. They should not be excluded from work and social responsibility. Youth should be made to feel itself necessary, this will open up the natural altruistic side, for adolescence is really one of the most altruistic of ages. Examples of what might be done towards the furtherance of this project are given. Criticism of the general adult attitude towards sex follows and is emphasized in connection with the scholastic proneness to condemn homosexual tendencies, examples being given. In conclusion it is pointed out that in a case of severe conflict the adult attitude will not count for much, but that psychotherapy will.

Robert M. Riggall.

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Melitta Schmideberg. 'The Psycho-analytic Treatment of Asocial Children.' *The New Era*, March, 1933, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 87.

This article deals mainly with the inner causes of asocial behaviour illustrated by the cases of children ranging from 8½ to 12½ years of age who have been treated psycho-analytically with success. Their apparent lack

of moral sense was found to be due to excessive anxiety and the abnormally strong repression of aggressive impulses, which had had a variety of complicated results.

All the children had suffered a lack of parental love at an early age, and this deprivation seems to have been an important factor in the production of intolerable quantities of anxiety and hate.

H. Sheehan-Dare.



Edmund Bergler. 'The Problem of Pseudo-Imbecility'. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1932, Bd. XVIII, S. 528-538.

The problem of pseudo-imbecility has not so far been worked out analytically; a paper of Landauer's ('On the psycho-sexual genesis of stupidity') is framed in general terms and contains no clinical matter, whilst Berta Bornstein (in a paper entitled 'The psychogenesis of pseudo-imbecility') merely concludes with the conjecture that 'the solution of the problem depended on certain obscure disturbances of the oral phase'. The first analyst to assume a connection between intellectual disturbances and orality was Abraham.

In the present paper the writer gives a detailed account of the analysis of a patient aged twenty-three and a half, who suffered from conflicts in his intellectual, sexual and family life and in his work. He was manager of a provision business owned by his mother and, according to her, he 'played the idiot', only performing subordinate jobs, damaging her interests whenever he could and giving the impression of a mentally undeveloped person. With 'respectable girls' he was impotent, while with prostitutes he behaved like a masochistic pervert. He made them strike him, force him to *cunnilingus* and urinate over him. His attitude to his mother was one of perfect passivity: he constantly provoked punishments, which mortified him greatly, but he was always ready to do her a kindness, provided that she did not know it. At the same time he was full of resentment and impulses of revenge against her.

The sole method employed in training him as a child had been that of beating and intimidating; he could win the love neither of his mother, who perpetually scolded him, nor of his father, who rebuffed him. As a punishment for his 'stupidity' he was sent away from home. He had the following recollection of this period—his seventh year. He used often to watch women suckling their babies, which excited him sexually. He staged a 'urine-game', which consisted in his taking a long straw, inserting it into his penis and then putting the end to his lips, so that he drank his own urine. Here we have an indication of his later *urolagnia*.

In this patient there was a marked predominance of oral elements. He was a great eater and drinker, and always wanted something to play

with in his mouth, to chew and to suck. His motto was '*Auf den Saft kommt es an*' (The important thing is the juice). Sucking the saliva of his partner during an interchange of 'tongue-kisses' produced in him an instant erection. He hated prostitutes with a dry vagina: the *sine qua non* of his sexual enjoyment was that the woman should have a moist vulva. For this reason he had no conscious interest in the breast: 'Nothing comes out of it'. Actually, however, it was a case of repression of an original interest. The woman's genital, with its supposed penis placed below it, was by him identified with the breast: this was his way of denying her lack of a penis and sparing himself castration-anxiety. Unconsciously, he looked on his own penis also as a breast. The disturbance of ejaculation from which he frequently suffered turned out to be a revenge on the woman for the oral disappointment inflicted by her. 'Why should I give her anything? What does she give me?' he once asked after the analysis had been going on for some time. *Milk* or its equivalents was the one and only *neurotic defence* of this patient. In each and every situation he played the part of a little child who has to be constantly suckled and fed. His earnings (in a provision business!) were not regarded by him as the equivalent of work done: he maintained that he could not work at all except under his mother and whether he had to starve or not depended on her good pleasure. His logorrhœa also was orally determined.

In the writer's opinion the appearance of the patient's intellectual disturbance at the beginning of his schooldays was a typical phenomenon, regular in such cases. The explanation of it appears to be the following: Abraham shewed that the capacity to absorb the thoughts of others represents a repetition of the sucking-in of the mother's milk. When children begin to go to school, they are required to absorb knowledge—orally—and, if they happen to suffer from oral fixations, conflict is inevitable: the old, oral disappointment which they have never mastered is revived; they regress to the original, oral level and refuse to absorb anything. This mechanism becomes indissolubly linked up with the tendency to revenge themselves on the teacher.

The pseudo-imbecility of the patient in question had the following psychic significance:

1. As a result of his oral disappointment he refused to assimilate mental food.
2. Revenge on his mother (or father): his stupidity became secondarily a successful weapon of defence in his campaign of vengeance against his mother.
3. An exquisite masochistic gratification. All threats and anticipations of punishment, his anxiety lest he should be punished and the punishments actually inflicted on him became sexualized and were provoked by himself.
4. Deferred obedience to his father. After the latter's death, the sense

of guilt originating in the Œdipus complex caused the patient to fulfil his orders. (He had ordered his employees to treat his son as a fool and pay no attention to him.)

5. An attempt to woo his mother's love by rousing in her a sense of pity.

6. A reversal of his situation of being ignored by compelling the attention of others, even of an unfriendly kind.

7. A denial of sexual knowledge, of the difference between the sexes and of his castration-anxiety.

The writer discusses the complicated problem of the technique to be used in cases of pseudo-imbecility and is of opinion that the classic analytic technique cannot be adhered to *at the beginning* of the analysis; he recommends the combining of it with educational methods. The patient in question had begun an analysis with a woman analyst, but it had to be broken off because he addressed her with undue familiarity (used the pronoun *Du*), was pathologically jealous of her young baby at the breast, became more and more excitable and developed suicidal ideas. When he came to the writer, it was with a ready-made transference-situation: the physician was the punishing, castrating father, who was to fulfil the need for punishment. The patient evaded any correction of his mental attitude by adroitly conceived provocations and by shutting his ears and droning automatically for hours on end: 'I hear you but I don't know what you mean'. The analyst tried to 'circumvent' the transference-situation and to avoid it for a time until he should have established contact. He apparently ignored the stereotyped: 'I don't know what you mean' and, *for hours at a time*, told the patient about other analyses with similar resistance-situations, but it seemed as if he could not get into contact with him. The analysis was, as it were, conducted in a vacuum: the patient seemed to take no part in it. It was like telling a child fairy-tales with no 'moral'. The refrain of all these 'stories' was invariably the same: 'Sexuality is permissible'. The analyst counted on the fact that somewhere and at some time the patient must have had a positive relation with his father and he tried to captivate him with the only thing that made any impression on him—oral gratification—i.e. by kindly words (= love), the expectation of 'getting something'. Only after this had succeeded was it possible to analyse his castration-anxiety and his deep oral fixations. The attempt to 'remodel' the transference-situation had merely been a method of establishing a *modus vivendi* and creating an atmosphere in which analysis was possible at all.

As regards the possibility of treating pseudo-imbecility analytically the writer is entirely optimistic, while not denying that the difficulties are enormous.

Author's Abstract.

August Aichhorn. 'Erziehungsberatung.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, Bd. VI, 1932, S. 445-488.

Aichhorn tells about his child-guidance work in Vienna. 'It seems to be best not to expect every child to be an "interesting" psycho-analytic case, but to try to succeed with the simplest pædagogic measures'. He recommends *psycho-analytic* treatment for manifest neuroses and latent perversions; '*Verwahrlostenanalyse*' (originated by himself; analytic interpretation combined with pædagogic transference influence in order to build up a socially orientated super-ego) for manifest perversions and manifest mixed forms (of neurosis and asociality); *child guidance work* for latent or potential neuroses, for latent or potential mixed forms and potential perversions; *reformatory* or centres (*Hort*) for asociality.

Some of the cases he quotes are: apparent asocial behaviour caused by hunger; apparent night terror by bugs; apparent melancholia in a girl of eighteen by the fact that she was unable to pay the bill of the doctor who performed an abortion; 'naughtiness' as a reaction to the obsessional neurosis of the mother; to the over-indulgence of the grandfather; to sexual stimuli from the mother, etc. In one case naughtiness stopped when the mother, following Aichhorn's advice, permitted every sort of aggression over a certain period. In the case of a brother and sister having sexual relationships Aichhorn advises separation. In that of a little girl addicted to begging, financial support for the family and day-nursery for the child, etc.

Melitta Schmideberg.

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Hans Zulliger. 'Der Rorschachsche Testversuch im Dienste der Erziehungsberatung.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, Bd. VI, 1932, S. 489-495.

The Rorschachtest is based on the associations given to ink-blot (*Kliksbilder*) pictures, and is used for clinical diagnosis, diagnosis of character, ability and intelligence.

Melitta Schmideberg.

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Wilhelm Hoffer. 'Der ärztliche Berater.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, Bd. VI, 1932, S. 496-504.

Hoffer discusses diagnostic problems in cases with either organic or psychogenic disorders and therapeutic problems in cases with both organic and psychogenic disorders. For the treatment of psychoses he recommends, following a suggestion of Federn, 'inhibiting the becoming conscious of the unconscious so far as possible; in so far as it has become conscious in a delusional form teaching the patient to understand and master it'.

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Melitta Schmideberg.

A. Linares Maza. 'Investigaciones con el Psicodiagnóstico de Rorschach en niños normales Españoles.' *Archivos de Neurobiología*, 1932, Tomo xii, Núm. 5. pp. 693-738.

Rorschach's blot-test was applied to 100 children ; 50 girls and 50 boys attending the primary schools and aged from 6-15, but the majority were 10, 11, 12 and 13 years of age. In general, the number of replies was less than noted in Swiss, German and French children, whilst the reaction times were, on the whole, quicker than Rorschach found. The percentage of G. was rather higher and there were other slight modifications from non-Spanish children. Visual acuity and the stereoscopic index did not differ from other investigations. In the 100 children examined Rorschach's *abstract* response was absent. Maza calls attention to other points of difference in his material and tabulates the chief differences in the test between girls and boys as well as the differences depending upon the age groups.

M. D. Eder.

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Hosannah de Oliveira. 'O complexo de Édipo em Pediatria.' *Bahia Medica*, December 30, 1932, pp. 306-309.

In the diagnosis of children's illnesses and troubles, the recognition of the part played by the Oedipus complex, Oliveira states, often gives the clue to diagnosis and treatment. This is illustrated by the following two cases :

(1) A boy of 3, physically healthy and of healthy parents, became subject to fits which were diagnosed as epileptic. These increased, and Oliveira was consulted. He found a vivacious, intelligent child with some motor irritability. The baby was entirely breast-fed till four months and weaned completely at the thirteenth month. A sister was born when the boy was two years eight months. The boy was utterly spoiled by his mother and grandmother ; the latter would not allow him on any account to be crossed. He insisted on sharing the parental bed and would only take food from his mother and go out with her. One day, from a trivial interference, there was a scene ; he lost himself, became cyanotic, and fell down. Epilepsy was suspected ; the fits became frequent, occurring more especially when the child was crossed. The diagnosis lay between epilepsy, laryngeal spasm and respiratory emotional spasm. From the history he rejected the two former. When the required changes in the child's upbringing were carried out, the attacks gradually diminished and then ceased completely.

(2) A boy of 5 was suffering from loss of appetite, night sweats, obstinate constipation, and was very thin. The father was dead and the child was thoroughly spoilt by his mother with exuberant caresses, especially after the father's death ; the child insisted on sleeping with his mother. He was violent towards the two other children. No medical treatment was required ; the position was explained to the mother ; the child was sent to a day school and was not allowed to sleep with his mother, who was urged to pay less attention to the boy.

The writer insists that the history of the child's behaviour, the recognition of the Œdipus situation, is as important in pædiatrics as is the physical examination.

M. D. Eder.

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APPLIED

Alfred Winterstein. 'Beiträge zum Problem des Humors.' *Psychoanalytische Bewegung*, 1932, Jahrgang IV, S. 513-524.

This article continues the investigations begun by Freud on Humour. Humour is a defence against reality. The super-ego of the humourist is largely built up from the mother, and is cathected at the moment of humour with narcissistic libido which enables it to support the ego against the threatening danger. The destructive energy is at the same moment sublimated into an intellectual process (*Geist*) which disarms the hostile outer world, by not taking it seriously. In this way the paternal super-ego, represented by the danger, is destroyed. Humour is a mixed feeling oscillating between mania and depression. To look upon humour as the normal expression (*Vorbild*) of mania (Fenichel), is to neglect its melancholic traits. The pleasure of humour is economic, as it results from the saving of affect (Freud), but it is also dynamic, as the energy thus saved brings about alterations in the cathexes, which induce narcissistic pleasure. The humourist seems fixated to the mother in the first oral (sucking) stage (humour means liquid), and humour is a contribution of oral erotism to character formation. This is in correspondence with the fact that many humourists are drinkers. Abraham also relates both optimism and pessimism to the oral stage, and they both belong to humour. Kretschmer places both the humourist and one type of realist in the cyclothymic type of temperament.

I. F. Grant Duff.

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T. S. Good, H. E. Field, T. Christie, John Rickman, Edward Glover. 'The Psychology of Crime.' *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1932, Vol. XII, pp. 234-272.

In the opening paper of this symposium Dr. Good classifies criminals in three groups on a basis of intelligence tests; (1) those of subnormal intelligence whose power of instinct control is weakened; (2) those of normal intelligence with moral defects due to bad educational methods; and (3) those of supernormal intelligence but unstable character, who can evade the law more easily than others and who go into crime because they have not enough scope for their powers in civilization as it is to-day.

Dr. Field emphasizes the more radical character changes in the criminal as compared with the neurotic and considers that psychological treatment

alone may not be enough, especially as in many cases this form of treatment is not acceptable to the delinquent. Habit training and a controlled system of punishment should form part of any scheme of treatment.

Dr. Christie points out that crime, especially in young offenders, is the result of general resentment against circumstances amounting to a feeling of persecution beginning early in life. He gives examples of such cases.

Dr. Rickman shows how fixation at a sadistic stage in development added to bad home conditions may give the individual the conception that all personal relationships are brutal. In the criminal there is a split in the field of instinct discharge. He meets the violence of the world by violence and also experiences the need for punishment as a means of controlling his own aggressive impulses.

Dr. Glover concludes the symposium by focussing attention on the emotional barriers existing in the criminologist himself, which act as the main obstacle to progress in research. He advises a comprehensive investigation into the subject of human guilt as a pre-requisite to understanding penal systems.

S. L. Yates.

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C. D. Daly. 'Pre-human Psychic Evolution.' *The British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1932, Vol. XII, pp. 273-286.

This address to the Indian Psycho-analytical Society enunciates a hypothetical theory of the psychological evolution of the human species through instinct repression and socialization in response to environmental pressure. In the *pre-glacial* epoch a paradisaical environment without vital struggle for existence permitted a hard life with free instinctual gratification. The hardships of the *glacial* period caused restrictions in response to hunger and the ego's dread of starvation and of being eaten. Sexual and excretory activities were controlled, pregnancies fewer and lactation longer. The *Horde age* followed, dominated by the Primal Father, permitting father and daughter incest and restricting the sexuality of younger males through dread of being eaten by the father. Cannibalism was now associated with the sexual urge and the blood of defloration instead of with nutrition. In the early *post-glacial* epoch the rebellion of the sons and killing of the Primal Father led, it is suggested, to frequent orgies of cannibalism, aggressiveness, jealousy and lust in association with periods of heat in females, which threatened the species with destruction. This necessitated the evolution of more stabilized bands, homosexual associations, sexual taboos, incest laws, marriage customs, etc. It is suggested that restriction of copulation during heat brought about the condition of menstruation.

M. E. Franklin.

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C. G. Seligman. 'Anthropological Perspective and Psychological Theory.' *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. LXII, pp. 193-228.

Individual anthropologists have long recognized some relationship between anthropology and psycho-analysis; but this paper, coming as it does from such an authority on no less an occasion than his Huxley Memorial Lecture, may fairly be said to celebrate an official alliance, which few will henceforth venture to renounce.

In discussing the question of how much psycho-analytic knowledge is necessary to the anthropologist, Professor Seligman studies some examples of those dramatizations of desire or fear, which form the basis of sympathetic magic. He concludes from these that the gap between the conscious and the unconscious is much smaller among primitive than among cultured peoples; and that, for this reason, useful interpretations can be made by those who have 'a general knowledge and appreciation of the modes of inquiry' even if they do not satisfy Dr. Roheim's more exacting requirement (being not only themselves analysed but having practised clinical analysis before undertaking field work). He admits, however, that although the first stages in the interpretation of dramatizations are comparatively simple, he can give no very adequate explanation for the sense of relief which they bring.

The rest of the paper is an attempt to answer a number of questions, based on those proposed by Professor Evans-Pritchard to Dr. Glover. These are:

1. Can the anthropologist collect data full enough and of sufficient relevance to throw light on psycho-analytic theory?
2. Are the oral, anal, genital, and latent phases of individual development common to all races and cultures?
3. If so, are these stages universally determined by biological factors, or by social conditions?
4. Are the same symbols used by different races in similar circumstances or identical situations?
5. Do the symptom-formations of members of our Western civilization differ from those of other communities?

An adequate summary of the discussion of these questions is impossible in the space at my disposal; but the purpose of the abstract will be fulfilled if it directs the attention of those interested in the subject to Professor Seligman's extremely stimulating paper.

R. Money-Kyrle.

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Ian D. Suttie. 'Religion, Racial Character and Mental and Social Health.' *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1932, Vol. XII, pp. 289-314.

This paper embodies a tentative application of the author's modified conception of infancy and repression to the ethnological field; it is an attempt to elucidate the psychological and cultural phenomena underlying the transition from Pagan-Teuton to Catholic and feudal culture in Northern Europe. It is suggested that the fundamental differences between cultures may be ascribed to differences in the type of repression maintaining them. Teutonic culture and religion are described as 'matriarchal' in character, the product of 'endogenous' (pre-œdipal or maternal) repression, whereas Christianity is 'patriarchal', associated with paternal Œdipus repression. Transition phenomena, such as the parallel development of witch cults and Mariolatry, are to be ascribed to oscillations between the two types of repression and to the aggravation of ambivalence towards the mother by Catholicism, which at the same time weakened her efficiency as a repressing agent. The author is convinced of the possibility of an Œdipus-free culture.

M. Brierley.



Imre Hermann. 'Zum Triebleben der Primaten.' Bemerkungen zu S. Zuckerman: *Social Life of Monkeys and Apes*. *Imago*, 1933, Bd. XIX, S. 113-125.

After pointing out the manifold analogies between the sexual development of monkeys and apes, as observed by Zuckerman, and the sexual development of man, as presented by Freud's teachings, the author comments on some of the facts observed by Zuckerman.

1. *The activity of the females*, which is manifested in her 'presenting' to the males.—Accordingly the activity of the female's libido cannot be overlooked, though it shews itself in a different phase and in a different way from that of the male.

2. *The sexual nature of the relation between mother and child*.—My argument, put forward some years ago, that 'grooming' is the continuation of this relation, is here confirmed by facts recorded by Zuckerman. It being understood that grooming is efficacious in establishing social relationship, it clearly follows that the community is held together by libidinous forces, namely those originating in the relation of mother and child. On observing the affective expression of grooming more closely, I came to the conclusion that besides giving an opportunity to revive the mother-child-relation it also dramatizes in a kind of depression the loss of the mother. Accordingly, I believe that the dominance of the strongest (the overlord) can be explained with the stabilization of the loss of the mother, with a tendency towards permanent depressing renunciations. (Not only the members of a family are compelled by the power of the overlord to renounce, but each overlord too by the other families.)

3. *The fact of dominance*, which represents a kind of rule or moral law.—

The characteristic trait of the super-ego-morality—viz. the continued observance of duties in the absence as well as in the presence of authority—is not to be met with in the community of apes and monkeys. But the moral of dominance can be very well compared with that moral which I ascribed to a 'collective scheme' arising from the mother-child relation. In this moral of dominance the mother—and not the father—is being replaced by a person, and the grief felt at the separation is stabilized besides. We regard this as a by no means far-fetched analogy to the formation of the super-ego which seems to be a compromise between the removal and the introjection of the father.

4. The fact that *sexual intercourse within the family is more easily permitted to younger than to older animals*.—In this fact I have recognized a reason for the development of the latency period which from all primates is only to be met with in man.

5. The fact of *sexual fight ending most frequently with the destruction of the female round which it rages*.—This contradicts the view according to which the Œdipus-fight should end with the death or the castration of the male or males. A clinical experience supplies the missing connection. It could be observed in the sexual development of women that their envy of the penis really meant their desire for the sexually active penis, for copulation with a man. Only if this desire fails to find satisfaction do they want to grow a penis of their own. Thus their envy is but a compromise between the loss of the object and the wish to play the woman's part. Accordingly the theory might be propounded—and no clinical experience contradicts it—that the castration complex of man too contains at bottom the loss of the object (woman) and the following depreciation of his own genital organ.

Author's Abstract.

BOOK REVIEWS

Why War? An International Series of Open Letters, No. 2. Albert Einstein—Sigmund Freud. (International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Paris, 1933. Pp. 57. Price 6s.)

An expression of opinion from two such distinguished authorities on a topic of such current and fundamental importance should arouse widespread interest. The booklet is published by the League of Nations, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, and consists of an open letter from Professor Einstein to Professor Freud, with the latter's reply.

Einstein gives a very clear exposition of the problem, so much so that Freud in his reply jokingly complains that he has 'taken the wind out of his sails'. He sees clearly that a super-national tribunal could not be expected to succeed without having the power to enforce its arbitration: in other words, that might and law must go hand in hand. At this point he encounters the reluctance of nations to surrender a measure of their sovereignty and ascribes this to the political 'power hunger' of the ruling classes. They possess the power to bend the majority by their control of the Press and in other ways, but he asks a question of what latent predispositions exist in this majority to which the ruling powers can so successfully appeal. He puts the straight question to Freud: Can the latent lust for destruction be deflected into less dangerous powers than that of war?

Freud in his reply first traces the genesis of the sense of right. This began with a discovery that the many can by combining overcome the one, but he points out that there would occur only a repetition of the cycle of overcoming the ruler unless some permanent and organised union of the community was brought about. From this dates the reign of law. The inevitable inequalities of mankind, however, leads to attempts to extend this law by the impulse towards equality, so that the possibilities of peaceful solutions make steady progress—at all events within the same community. He agrees with Einstein about the connection between might and law. 'There is but one sure way of ending war and that is the establishment, by common consent, of a central control which shall have the last word in every conflict of interests. For this, two things are needed: first, the creation of such a supreme court of judicature; secondly, its investment with adequate executive force. Unless this second requirement be fulfilled, the first is unavailing' (p. 36).

The necessary union can be brought about in two ways: (a) by compulsion from above, (b) by a sufficient number of identifications. The ideals of the League of Nations employ the latter method only, but they are more than countered by the strength of nationalistic ideas, paramount

to-day in every country. 'Thus it would seem that any effort to replace brute force by the might of an ideal is, under present conditions, doomed to fail. Our logic is at fault if we ignore the fact that right is founded on brute force and even to-day needs violence to maintain it' (pp. 39, 40).

He then proceeds to discuss the nature of the impulses and expounds the blending of the erotic and the aggressive or destructive. He is of opinion that the latter set of impulses can never be eliminated, being as necessary to life as the erotic ones and he compares the results when they are directed outwards with those when they are directed inwards. 'Obviously when this internal tendency operates on too large a scale, it is no trivial matter, rather a positively morbid state of things; whereas the diversion of the destructive impulse towards the external world must have beneficial effects. Here is then the biological justification of all those vile, pernicious propensities which we are now combating. We can but own that they are really more akin to nature than this our stand against them, which, in fact, remains to be accounted for. . . . The upshot of these observations is that there is no likelihood of our being able to suppress humanity's aggressive tendencies. . . . The Bolsheviks aspire to do away with human aggressiveness by ensuring the satisfaction of material needs and enforcing equality between man and man. To me this hope seems vain. Meanwhile they busily perfect their armaments, and their hatred of outsiders is not the least of the factors of cohesion amongst themselves' (pp. 46-48).

Towards the end of his essay he raises the question, which would appear to arouse his scientific interest more than that of the elimination of war, of the psychology of pacifism. He asserts that Einstein and himself have no option but to be pacifists, since it is part of their organic nature. He considers that the process of cultural development becomes in the course of time an organic process and he makes many interesting remarks on the general significance of this process. 'On the psychological side two of the most important phenomena of culture are, firstly, a strengthening of the intellect, which tends to master our instinctive life, and, secondly, an introversion of the aggressive impulse, with all its consequent benefits and perils. Now war runs most emphatically counter to the psychic disposition imposed on us by the growth of culture; we are therefore bound to resent war, to find it utterly intolerable. With pacifists like us it is not merely an intellectual and affective repulsion, but a constitutional intolerance, an idiosyncrasy in its most drastic form. And it would seem that the æsthetic ignominies of warfare play almost as large a part in this repugnance as war's atrocities' (pp. 55, 56). Without explicitly saying so, Freud seems here to hint at his well-known Lamarckian views on heredity and to look forward to a prolonged further period of evolution in which this cultural development, with all its drawbacks (inhibitions, etc.), will

extend throughout the population and necessarily be opposed to such occurrences as war. One feels that the innateness of this process is perhaps too readily assumed, and that an analysis of the ontogenetic mechanisms composing it might modify the final conclusions. At all events the problem so interestingly stated by Freud should, as is usual with him, prove a fruitful stimulus to further research.

The booklet is moderately well translated in spite of some carelessness of style ('I would like,' 'between men,' etc.) It is a pity that no opportunity was given to a psycho-analyst to read it through, otherwise we should not have such statements as that the technical term in English for *Triebmischung* is the 'alloying of instincts'.

E. J.

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War, Sadism and Pacifism. Three Essays by Edward Glover, M.D. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1933. Pp. 148. Price 3s. 6d.)

This book consists of four chapters; the first three were read before various League of Nations Societies (one at Geneva itself).

The best of the four chapters is in my opinion the first one, which gives its title to the book. We have here an admirably clear and impressive statement of the whole problem of the psychological motivations of war, together with an interesting study of the psychology of pacifism. Among other things Dr. Glover discusses the connection between pacifist motives and the instinct of self-preservation, making the dry comment on the supposed efficiency of the latter that in no country in the world has sixpence ever been spent on studying the psychological problems obviously bound up with the causation of war; this is almost unbelievable, but it appears to be really true. The second chapter, 'A Postscript on Masochism', deals with a problem often underestimated or even overlooked, but a necessary counterpart to the study of the sadistic motivation of war. The third, the problem of prevention, makes it abundantly plain that we are still in the dark about the forces concerned, and that only an ignorant optimism imagines we know already enough about them to be able to prescribe the necessary steps to guide them into less disadvantageous directions than war. About the fourth chapter, an outline of research, I am less enthusiastic. It is an exceedingly detailed scheme for a vast systematic study of all the factors. The problem is how to impress those responsible with the need for further research. Dr. Glover has not shrunk from making a maximum claim in this respect, but one might fear that the very mass of detail and such plans as those covering a thousand years of investigation of certain points might produce a very opposite effect from that intended, by reinforcing the natural tendency to relegate such ideas to the realm of the fantastic or impossible. The gist of this chapter might perhaps have been incorporated in the previous one.

This is the only slight criticism I could make of the book. Otherwise it is altogether an admirable and weighty production. It is written with *verve* which sustains the reader's interest, and at the same time with a cool persuasiveness. Dr. Glover exercises his faculty for striking examples and illustrations, and manages to restrain any exuberance of metaphor. The book is certainly one that will redound to his credit, and one cannot imagine a book better calculated to make some impression on the thick hides of the unpsychologically minded. Any politician, indeed anyone concerned with the public weal, who does not give careful consideration to this book, is definitely evading responsibility.

E. J.

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Deuil, Nécrophilie, et Sadisme. Par Marie Bonaparte. (Les Editions Denoël et Steele, Paris, 1932. Pp. 19. Prix frs. 3.)

We are here given a foretaste of the author's forthcoming book on the American poet, Edgar Allan Poe. The suggestion is made that Poe was a repressed necrophile of the first of the two types described by Ernest Jones in his book on the nightmare and mediæval superstitions. The beloved corpse would in this case be that of Poe's mother, who died at the age of twenty-four when the poet was scarcely three years old, an event which would provide a 'biographical' source for Poe's necrophilia. The sadistic lust-murderer (Baudelaire) succeeds in making an identification with the father in the sexual act (sadistically conceived). The necrophile (Poe) leaves the responsibility for the murder (= sexual act) to another, father or father-substitute (e.g. fate), and prefers to content himself with the remains.

Burdened by his incestuous and sado-necrophile fixation to his mother, Poe was never able to attain to normal love. The Don Juan 'series' of love relationships represents not only the search for the unattainable first love, but also a desperate attempt to break free from it, an attempt which has perpetually to be renewed, since in every fresh object the original one reappears. Thus fidelity and infidelity find a compromise. This double mechanism underlay Poe's series of abortive attachments, most of which, indeed, concerned women who bore 'the attributes of disease or death which belonged to his darling mother'. Variations on this theme figure in Poe's work (e.g. Morella, Eleonora, and above all, Ligeia).

The pamphlet under review suggests a host of questions, many of which, we hope, will be dealt with in the more comprehensive work referred to above.

H. Mayor.

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The Unconscious in Life and Art. By S. Herbert, M.D., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., Associate Member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1932. Pp. 252. Price 6s. net.)

Dr. Herbert's book consists of a collection of essays. The range of the subject matter may be gauged from a survey of the outstanding title headings :—

- ' Psycho-analysis and Sex '.
- ' The Self and Society '.
- ' The Genesis of Conscience '.
- ' Symbolism '.
- ' The Romantic Spirit '.

The first essay, ' Reason and Unreason ', is an introductory one on the general theory of psycho-analysis and is intended for readers who have no knowledge of psycho-analysis, so that the subsequent essays may be understood.

The last three chapters form a separate whole and deal with the subject of art, the author here making an attempt to present an analysis of the relationship between art, science and religion with a view to the unification of higher mental attitudes to life that have generally hitherto been considered from different angles.

The author's aim is to arouse the interest of the intelligent lay person in psycho-analysis so that the science, ' instead of remaining a *bête-noire* may become a centre of intellectual interest '. One doubts whether the book will achieve the author's aim. Difficult as it is to give a popular presentation of any science, the difficulties are tenfold in the case of psycho-analysis. In the first place it can only become a centre of intellectual interest to those who have accepted its fundamental premise, viz., the fact of the unconscious mind.

Any intelligent person will to-day accept the computations made by an astronomer with regard to the distance from us of the heavenly bodies, or accept the analysis of a geologist with regard to the strata of rocks in a given district. No intelligent person will insist upon becoming qualified in order to prove these statements nor dream of declaring them to be wrong because he cannot prove them. Psycho-analytical science, like all other science, is the formulation of knowledge made by those who deal at first hand with masses of psychological data, but, more than any science, its progress in terms of acceptance by the people depends upon the slow awakening of those same people to an awareness of the fundamental truth in themselves, viz., this same fact of the ' unconscious ' upon which the science rests.

In the second place, popular presentations of psycho-analysis are apt to be an admixture of fundamental principles, superficial observations of character traits, and judgements thereon, and it is these latter which are

as apt to alienate the lay mind as much as the presentation of distasteful scientific conclusions. While we must be fearless in presenting the latter, the full sweep and significance of the science will never be indicated when our presentations are interpolated by snippets of analysis correlated with moral judgements. In any other science we are given facts, and principles are enunciated.

Dr. Herbert's essay on 'The Genesis of Conscience' is a successful attempt to convey to the lay mind the psychological processes that have as their outcome the psychic institution in the mind called 'conscience'. The author also evinces a breadth of vision that will enlist and not alienate the public for whom he writes. He points out that psycho-analysis 'solves the origin of conscience *ab initio* just as little as biology is able to solve the riddle of consciousness.'

The essays on 'Reason and Unreason', on 'Sex and Married Life' have not the same merit. The scientific facts regarding sexual development are truths it is necessary to disseminate, but one sympathises with a young man or woman in love who reads of the pitfalls into which love may lead. The case is worse still if he or she calls upon reason and judgement to help, for the first chapter will have shewn how much reliance to put upon reason! The presentation of the complexity of sexual development, the plea for sanity and tolerance based upon this knowledge, would surely be adequate for a popular book.

These chapters are marred too by examples of superficial analysis of character traits and inadequate psychological explanations. It is a pity that the examples chosen should be precisely those which have a connection with the theme of his later chapters on art. On p. 21, in the chapter on 'Reason and Unreason' Dr. Herbert says: 'Actors and singers are frequently of a vainglorious and ostentatious nature. They suffer from what is called an exhibition complex that impels them to shew off at all costs'. (Yet Dr. Herbert's hope is that psycho-analysis shall not be a *bête noire*! It will be difficult to arouse the intellectual interest of those artists who are actors and singers after they have read that 'an exhibition complex' is the mainspring of their art!) Again on p. 51 he says, 'Such sublimated activities derived from anal erotism are called 'coprophilic'. 'The playing of children with mud, their liking for dirt generally. . . . In more advanced years these pleasures may take on more elevated forms such as working in sand or modelling in clay. Even such high artistic pursuits as painting or sculpturing may have their psychological root in this self-same anal-erotic tendency'.

The light of truth in these remarks is as effectual in understanding human psychology as a rush-light would be to give one knowledge of a forest at midnight. Better trust to one's senses of sound and touch and smell if these have not been totally atrophied during the process of civilisa-

tion. Dr. Herbert cannot hope to make an adequate unification of higher mental attitudes to life, to find the relationship between religion, science, and art until he sees more deeply into the motivation underlying science, art and religion in the individual. An 'exhibition complex' is not a worthy reason to offer the lay mind as an explanation of the age-long art of miming and acting! Who calls Michael Angelo's art 'coprophilic'? Do we explain Van Gogh by saying his pictures are the sublimation of an anal-erotic tendency?

The macrocosm is the microcosm writ large and to understand world movements in art, science and religion one must first grasp the dynamic sources motivating individual activity.

No useful purpose is served by the author's adoption of Jung's terms of introvert and extravert. While he admits the falsities into which such a classification leads, he nevertheless perforce falls into them himself. For example, while he claims the romantic as an introvert in contradistinction to Jung who speaks of the romantic as an extravert he goes on to say: 'The Romanticist immersed in his inner self remains personal. He is unable, or unwilling to purge his work from this extreme subjectivity even in its complete artistic form'. Yet Dr. Herbert calls Shakespeare 'a Romantic through and through'! Surely no man's work is freer from subjectivity? It follows that the scientist is an extravert. What name then is to be given to that sudden flash of insight when the scientist seizes upon a universal truth that emerges from his masses of data?

The present reviewer would query a remark of Dr. Herbert's with regard to romantic and classical movements in art. Can one speak of progress in artistic fields? That classical periods consolidate the gains won through a fresh victory of romanticism seems valid enough, and that a prolonged classical period brings stultification is likewise true, but a fresh outburst of art activity does not represent progress in art in the sense of *better* art. One can only think of it as a fresh upwelling of the 'will to form' which is in its initial stages organic or living however it may subsidize the traditional forms in a new unity.

There is a great vista for the student of psycho-analysis. Dr. Herbert is surely right in predicating a possibility of finding a unification of these diverse activities. But at present our knowledge is too circumscribed. We need countless more detailed analyses of the most profound type, and to understand any outstanding figure in science, art, or religion there must be some correlation with the historical features of the period in which he lived. Only so can we hope to discover the dynamics motivating an individual or a movement.

Ella Freeman Sharpe.

Psycho-Analysis and its Derivatives. By H. Crichton Miller, M.A., M.D. (Thornton Butterworth Ltd., London, 1932. Pp. 249. Price 2s. 6d.)

This pretentious book attempts the non-angelic task of evaluating psycho-analysis and the branches of psychology that have developed in reaction to it, a task it is not usual to undertake without making the necessary study beforehand. The book includes therefore a criticism of the work of Freud, Adler, Jung and—Prinzhorn (!). The following quotation indicates the author's conclusions, on which we will only comment that he would appear to be more interested in the question of which ideas will 'appeal' to various workers than in the question of which of them is nearer the truth.

'If we attempt to appraise the relative merits of these systems of psychology we may safely begin by saying that Freud's is the most intricate, Jung's the most profound, Adler's the most practical, and Prinzhorn's the broadest. Adler's system will always be useful and popular, and is therefore bound to extend its vogue. It is the one that offers the least challenge to man's innate narcissism. Freud will always be popular with a limited section of mankind because of the objective approach which evades subjective difficulties. It will attract, as it always has done, extraverts, Jews and purely rational types. Jung's system will never appeal to more than a very limited group, partly because of its complexity and partly because it has never spread except from personal contact with Jung himself. It will appeal to a few introverts, Teutons and mystics. Prinzhorn's system is bound to make a strong appeal to philosophical minds of all types, for they will find in it basic principles that correspond to the intuitive needs of mankind and a ruthless unmasking of the partiality of other systems. Neither Jung nor Prinzhorn can be expected to make a special appeal to the medical profession; Adler and Freud will no doubt continue to divide interest from that quarter, despite the fact that each of them has, in his own way, failed to give due prominence to somatic ætiology. Adler's system will always be the safest, if for no other reason than that it is the most superficial. Nevertheless, psycho-analysis itself has an inherent factor of safety which must not be overlooked: the institutional, one might almost say liturgical, qualities of the system; the inelastic concepts; the pervading, if illusory, objectivity of the technique; the strict training of the psycho-analyst, comparable to the training of Roman Catholic priests; and, finally, the repetitive and even mediocre qualities which constitute the personal endowment of many psycho-analysts—all these points make for a certain element of safety. On the other hand, Jung, and still more Prinzhorn, leave in the hands of the psychotherapist much greater freedom of action and interpretation and thereby sacrifice a certain element of safety. Indeed, Prinzhorn's con-

ception of the psychotherapist's function is such as to leave us wondering whether the human race is capable of producing worthy exponents of such a lofty mission, except in minimal numbers or even as infrequent prodigies. Theoretically, Prinzhorn's picture of a messianic psychotherapist may be valid, but it is quite clear that in practice Freud's "mantle of objectivity" serves to cover a multitude of personal inadequacies on the part of the analyst, as it is calculated to save him from numerous dangers.

'Those who are interested in heredity and in questions of transmitted qualities and tendencies, will find Freud unsatisfactory and Adler still more so. In this connection Prinzhorn writes: "In recent years it has been possible, in the face of all biological investigation of the facts, for an Alfred Adler, with a whole party of followers, to put forth the dogma that the hitherto customary views on heredity are fundamentally false, that man is born as a *tabula rasa* whereon his environment makes impressions which, by means of education, one can direct at will, and, according to capacity, towards any desired goal. According to Adler, there is no such thing as inborn talent or traits of disposition". Jung, as we have seen, lays great stress on inherited psychic qualities, but he makes no attempt to correlate these with physical characteristics. It is only Prinzhorn who unreservedly stresses the genetic factors in the psycho-somatic unity, and on this basis—if on no other—his work has a quality of completeness that cannot be claimed by any of the others.

'The sociologist is likely to make his choice between Adler and Prinzhorn. To him the extremely individual emphasis of psycho-analysis may well act as a deterrent. For, though Freud uses phrases such as "what is most valuable in human culture" we find that this emerges from a "restless striving towards perfection" which "is easily explicable as the result of an expression of instinct". A social philosophy which, independent of valuation, is ultimately reducible to instinctive motivation, can never command the complete approval of the more reflective critics. Jung's analytical psychology provides a picture of social adaptation which, though it differs entirely from the cold detachment of Freudian doctrine, nevertheless suggests *ἀνάγκη* rather than *ἔρως παιδαγωγός*. In Adler the less critical sociologist will encounter a satisfying—if somewhat naïf—gospel of social contribution; a gospel that breathes co-operation and goodwill on a basis of rational purpose, all simplified to the last degree. In Prinzhorn the sociologist will meet with the familiar and basic problems of social philosophy, set forth in no spirit of easy optimism, nor yet treated as unimportant incidentals to the main purpose of psychotherapy. He will find the eternal problem of individual inheritance and social requirement set forth in convincing terms that stress, rather than evade, the limitations of psychological treatment.'

E. J.

Forty Years of Psychiatry. By William A. White, A.M., M.D., Sc.D. (Nervous and Mental Diseases Publishing Company, New York and Washington, 1933. Pp. 154. Price \$3.)

Dr. White is indefatigable. This is his twenty-third book and it is well worth while, for all the great developments in psychiatry have occurred during the last forty years, and Dr. White has outlined them as he has observed them during that period. He disclaims that the book is intended in any sense to be an autobiography, although he gives some details of his early life; the first personal pronoun occurs several times on every page and no less than 22 pages are excerpts from his own writings. It is natural that he writes almost exclusively of American psychology and many American psychiatrists. He mentions several German ones, but only two Englishmen, viz.: Dr. Connolly, of Hanwell, who is really outside the specified period, and Dr. Ernest Jones, when he was resident in America.

It would appear that, forty years ago, the conditions in American and German asylums were more primitive than in our English ones, for the older forms of mechanical restraint were still in vogue, and in some States continued until quite recently—and there was no trained nursing staff. Now, however, some of their mental establishments are more in the nature of a hospital, and some of them seem to have progressed farther than most of ours.

Dr. White first mentions the humanitarian improvements, goes on to the introduction of scientific investigations and the influence of Kraepelin, and finally leads up to the recognition, owing to the writings of Freud, of the dynamic nature of mentation and the realization that mental symptoms have a deeper meaning than their superficial manifestations supply. We get the impression that the modern systematic development of graduated occupational therapy has not received so much attention in America as it has here. In this connection, however, Dr. White makes the useful suggestion that, instead of using primitive methods of manufacture in order to keep patients employed, modern methods of mass production might be installed in mental hospitals and the produce sold in the open market so as to make these institutions more self-supporting.

There are also chapters on the administration of mental hospitals and the future of psychiatry. We are told, *inter alia*, that it has been calculated that in 1970 there will be 950,000 inmates of the mental hospitals in the United States, or about 1 in 158 of the then population. Incidentally, Dr. White is of the opinion that it would be economically and otherwise advantageous if these establishments were built to accommodate not less than 5,000 patients each. At a low per capita rate it would then be possible to pay for a large staff of specialists, including psycho-analysts for suitable patients.

We began by saying that this book was worth while writing and we conclude by saying that it is well worth while reading.

W. H. B. Stoddart.

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Functional Disturbances of the Heart. By Harlow Brooks, M.D. (J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia and London, 1932. Pp. 266. Price \$5.00.)

This volume is one of the Everyday Practice Series planned to furnish the general practitioner with usable authoritative monographs on various subjects. Here this purpose is only partly successful. The long clinical experience of an eminent internist affords a satisfactory factual basis, but the modern interpretation of such facts is lacking. For, in the future, the physician should no longer be content when a diagnosis has been made that the heart is structurally sound but is functioning abnormally. Nor will he be able to mask his futility under complicated but vague concepts of vegetative or endocrine unbalance. It will be his major task to determine what the cardiac condition is trying to express, and that problem is not answered in terms of any mechanistic formula.

Dr. Brooks assumes the practitioner to be a working psychologist as well as a psychiatrist, but declares an intimate knowledge of either science is unessential. Mere knowledge of the human *animal* is entirely adequate according to his viewpoint. His attitude, which the reader is encouraged to take, can best be illustrated by the theories the author advances to explain 'true' cardiac neuroses as distinguished from such symptom complexes as paroxysmal tachycardia or anxiety angina. 'There is a considerable element of imitation in their evolution, they furnish a means for the evasion of duties, they appear to be the result of pure egotism'. One might almost suppose that nothing had been written in the past thirty years about dynamic factors which are not visible on the psychic surface. It is a pity that Dr. Brooks did not study further the implications of the report of Major Goddard which is cited in the discussion of war-time sufferers from neuro-circulatory asthenia. This observer found these men to have had no sex experience. A considerable percentage presented definite perversions or inversion, and these findings have been confirmed since the war period in women with this syndrome.

Such clinical studies as this are not solid enough without a correlation of the manifestations of disturbed cardiac function with the underlying psychic conflict. A modern book that pretends to treat of function must have as a basis all the work that has been done in the interpretation of the neuroses in general and anxiety conditions in particular. It cannot afford to ignore psycho-analysis completely. However valuable it may be for the practitioner to recognize that innumerable disorders of the heart exist

without organic pathology, it is more important that he should understand them and know how to approach them. In this sense, this volume represents a rare missed opportunity.

Leonard Rothschild.

★

Crimes and Criminals. By William A. White, M.D. (Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1933. Pp. 272. Price \$2.50.)

This volume is meant for the intelligent lay person who wants to learn what modern psychology has to offer in the scientific aspects of asocial or anti-social behaviour. It has been written from the author's rich background of forty years in the practice of psychiatry and an extensive experience as an expert witness in some of the most celebrated American criminal cases. This important viewpoint is made available to lawyers and judges who still think in terms of the legalistic formulæ of another day, and also to a confused public which is taught that 'putting more teeth' in the law by legislative enactment prevents crime.

The book gives the impression of having been hastily written, with much repetition becoming apparent in the second half. It offers nothing new for the psycho-analytically schooled reader. About a hundred pages are devoted to an adequate formulation of the fundamental mental mechanisms necessary for any but the most superficial understanding of criminals and crime. The emotional rather than the intellectual basis of offences against society is emphasized. Free will with its accompanying doctrine of responsibility is labelled a metaphysical as well as a legal fiction. It is demonstrated that conduct cannot be arbitrarily divided into normal and abnormal. Abnormal conduct is postulated as conduct that has escaped the control of the individual as an action out of place in time. Each one of us is a potential criminal given the proper circumstances. Failure or frustration is apt to produce regressive conduct which is primitive, infantile, even archaic. The social organization has to be on guard against destructive behaviour, and has come to consider punishment of the perpetrator as an essential protective necessity.

Crime is defined as an abstract concept having no material existence—only criminals exist. What any particular man does in any set of circumstances depends on the nature of his instinctual drives and the degree to which he controls or sublimates them. Punishment has always aimed to make the prisoner suffer. The underlying purpose is vengeance and retaliation. It is based on another legal fiction—'Mens rea'—the guilty mind, i.e. the individual committing the act knows what he does and therefore is responsible. Society has always aimed to exact a *quid pro quo* on the basis of the *Lex talionis*. This severity has not the merit of working, for even capital punishment has no definitely proven preventive value. Especially in the United States, as at present administered, the death

penalty is sporadic, uncertain, bearing heavily on the inefficient and becoming a mere vicarious satisfaction of blood lust. Modern penology must be based on attempted rehabilitation. Essentially the typical criminal is weak and not vicious. The underlying problem of crime is conflict. It cannot be solved by repression.

Dr. White makes these suggestions for improvement: (1) Prisons should be divided into a group of institutions of varying function centered about a psychiatrically controlled reception ward; (2) the definitive sentence is an absurdity; (3) there should be some degree of reparation in the punishment; (4) the purpose should be to fit the prisoner, wherever possible, for life in the community; (5) those found unfit for community life should be permanently segregated. It is to be hoped that the weight of Dr. White's authority will have influence on many minds, for this book illuminates many dark places in a most complex social problem. Future progress in this allied field can only be accelerated and maintained insofar as the fundamental discoveries of a dynamic psychology are applied not only to intrapsychic conflict, but to the conflict between man and man, and man with society.

Leonard Rothschild.



Integrative Psychology. A Story of Unit Response. By William M. Marston, C. Daly King, and Elizabeth H. Marston. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1931. Pp. 558. Price 21s. net.)

This volume embodies a very ambitious attempt to systematise the facts of descriptive psychology. The point of view of the authors is expressed in the Foreword, as follows:—

'In the first place, it has seemed to me that psychology, to be practical, must have its own, elementary units of human behaviour. Psychology's units, or primary elements, should be discoverable in fact, according to available methods of experimentation, and objective, clinical observation. They should not be hidden in the genes of the germplasm like instincts, nor should they be artefacts of another science, like the conditioned reflex. The present volume takes its point of departure from a critical examination of various psychological, and semi-psychological attempts to classify fundamental, human activities; and thereafter attempts to postulate elementary behaviour units which may serve psychology precisely as the atom, the electron, and the proton have served chemistry. Regardless of whether these concepts are metaphysically ultimate, there are essential chemical facts which correspond to protons and electrons, and there are, I believe, essential psychological facts which correspond to the four elementary types of unit response postulated in this book.

' In the second place, I cannot avoid the conclusion that consciousness is real ; and if it is, then, consciousness is the one important problem which psychology, and no other science, is called upon to solve. I believe that attaining consciousness of the right sort is, broadly speaking, the chief purpose of all normal human strivings. If psychology could teach its students, objectively, the nature of consciousness, and how various sorts of consciousness are produced, it seems certain that this field of knowledge would become immediately the most humanly useful of the sciences. The present volume attempts to deal with consciousness in this way ' (pp. xiii. and xiv.).

Any such new and comprehensive attempt to systematise all the known facts of human mental life and behaviour must obviously stand or fall by the extent to which it can fit these facts into its own particular system fully and adequately, without distortion or omission. A precondition of this will be accurate understanding of the facts with which the system-maker purports to deal. And in this connection, I need do no more for readers of this Journal than quote the authors' account of certain of Freud's discoveries, and of the process of psycho-analysis itself : ' The libido, according to Freud, is entirely " sexual." It is dynamic, sexual energy, constantly striving for expression. It therefore acts upon the brain and body, in some manner undetermined, to drive man and woman toward " sexual " ends. There are six types of sexual behaviour, *all abnormal*,¹ toward which this hidden libido tends to drive human beings according to Freud. They are : autosexual craving (that is, erotic excitement over one's self) ; homosexual craving (erotic excitement over persons of the same sex) ; incestuous craving (erotic excitement evoked by persons of opposite sex in the same family) ; sadistic craving (erotic wish to inflict painful subjection upon other persons of opposite sex) ; masochistic craving (erotic longing to be painfully subjected by other people of opposite sex) ; and exhibitionistic craving (erotic wish to display one's own body or genital organs to persons of opposite sex). The fact that Freud regards all the natural, or innate expression tendencies of the libido as abnormal, is extremely significant. It makes the Freudian doctrine very similar to the older type of religious theory which maintained that all human beings are " born in sin ", and can only be redeemed by changing their nature through accepting the religious precepts offered ' (p. 229). The authors then, however, rally to the defence of Freud : ' Freudian and psycho-analytical theories have been ridiculed and discounted by many critics on the ground that the " libido ", " endopsychic censor ", etc., are all imaginary, mystical creatures of theory and not of fact. But the truth remains that study of thousands of cases of mental abnormalities has yielded much clinical data indicating that the erotic (" sex ") motive, and its suppression

¹ Reviewer's italics. The author reiterates this notion in other passages.

are among the most important motivations of human behaviour even if they are not the sole motivation' (p. 230).

The actual process of analysis is described as follows :—

'The principal device whereby hidden information about himself is sought from the patient is the method of "free association"'. The patient is asked to relate his dreams to the analyst. Then the central object or word in a dream is selected by the analyst, and the patient is told to give all the words and ideas which occur to him in connection with this object or word; i.e. all his "free" associations with the stimulus word. In this way the patient is dominated by the analyst, in that he is compelled to reveal certain otherwise concealed brain connections, or associations between various objects, ideas, and thoughts, without in the least realizing that he is doing so. Thus the "unconscious" or "subconscious" resistance of the patient is overcome, and his mind and emotions are forced open, as it were, to the analyst's inspection and analysis. By superior skill and knowledge, the analyst attempts gradually to dominate the patient completely, insofar as the patient resists revealing his innermost feelings and secret strivings.

'Put in its simplest terms, the situation is just this. A patient, suffering from some hidden emotional conflict, comes to a physician. The doctor must motivate the patient in some way, to reveal the hidden emotions from which he is suffering. The patient's most primitive and uncontrollable dominance reactions are evoked by each direct question which touches the secret and repressed complexes. But the physician to effect a cure, must compel the patient to reveal the very emotions he is trying to conceal. Which is to say that the analyst must first dominate the patient completely and evoke from him complete compliance in his most secret and personal emotions. By the free association method, already mentioned, and by analysis of dreams, where there is much less emotional inhibition than in waking life, the analyst cleverly spies upon the inner emotional workings of his patient, until he is satisfied that he knows all he needs to know. Then he tells his patient what he has learned, and compels him to acknowledge as true the hidden emotions discovered. It is just as if a defective concealed himself behind the curtains of a bedroom, and then suddenly stepped out face to face with the occupant at precisely the moment when the latter had removed all his clothes. The person spied upon is suddenly forced to realize that he is being compelled to reveal himself just as he is.

'The shock produced upon the patient by this procedure was considered, by G. Stanley Hall, the most important result of psycho-analysis. It constitutes an extremely ingenious method of establishing a fundamentally compliant attitude in the patient toward the analyst. The doctor is regarded, unconsciously, as a superior antagonist from that time on,

and all his commands or questions tend to become dominant stimuli capable of evoking compliant responses from the patient. The patient, in short, is thenceforth motivated in his reactions to the analyst, by unit response motives of compliance.

'The doctor then takes the next step, which is to use the patient's compliant attitude to evoke Submission responses. To do this, the analyst changes his own attitude from Dominance to Inducement. He adds persuasion and personal charm to his treatments of the patient, talking kindly and intimately about the patient's life and innermost emotions. Presently the patient begins to find these personal talks with the doctor increasingly pleasant. He (or more likely she) begins to look forward to the daily hour of psycho-analysis, and enjoys the feeling of being mastered and directed by the physician. At this point the patient has begun to submit. It is as though the bedroom occupant, once having been caught nude, finds that the intruder takes a friendly and intimate interest in improving his personal appearance, and so begins to enjoy revealing himself at command, without restraint. Once the nude person has been completely mastered, he feels he has no more to lose and begins to enjoy the new relationship to another human being of superior but kindly strength. Henceforth, the patient is motivated by unit response motives of Submission as well as Compliance.

'At last comes a time (perhaps after many months or even years of psycho-analytical treatment) when the analyst's attitude towards his patient becomes still more personal and intimate. The physician is genuinely absorbed and personally interested in his patient. The submissive stimulus offered by the analyst evokes a wish on the patient's part to hold the doctor's attention and interest. The patient begins not only to submit to the physician's wishes, but also to offer himself spontaneously, and volunteer facts and submissive acts to the doctor, in the hope of intensifying the latter's personal interest in himself. This constitutes a unit response of passive Inducement on the patient's part, which combines naturally with the active Submission response already evoked to produce passive love, or Passion response, by the patient toward the analyst. When this final motivation has been established, the "transfer" is said to be complete. The physician has made himself a captivating stimulus to his patient, and thenceforth can evoke Passion responses from the patient at will. By means of these Passion responses, the patient can be made to reorganize and change his entire personality, and to adopt totally new types of behaviour at the psycho-analyst's dictation. This is the Freudian method of motivating patients to effect the personality readjustments considered necessary for a cure, and it has proved amazingly successful in a large number of cases. These cases, therefore, may properly be regarded as clinical experiments in human motivation.

'Summarizing the patient's motivation, we may say he is first made to acknowledge the physician as his master, and comply with him. Then he is made to regard the doctor as his friend, and to submit to him. Finally, he is made to feel the captivation of the analyst's personality, and responds with Passion. When thus motivated, the patient can be made to do almost anything the psycho-analyst directs. The final state of motivation, with a completely compliant individual responding also with Passion, probably represents the strongest possible control which one human being can exercise over another. It is the control which a fascinating woman exercises over her lover or husband, and, when coupled with a wish to reform the man's character, constitutes the well-known "influence of woman" in regenerating a man's character' (pp. 235-238).

Finally, I may quote the following paragraph, in which a piece of genuine psychological sense is rendered futile through the incredibly naïve ignorance of the authors as to psycho-analytic researches into the structure of the ego :—

'We may think of compliance motive as virtually identical with the "censor" mechanisms emphasized by Freudian types of psycho-analytical theories. The censor, or suppressive influence of environment, is the great anti-erotic, or anti-libido motive demanding disguise and distortion of natural "sexual" or erotic drives. It is absurd to try to think of this self-repressive behaviour as unmotivated, while its opposite, erotic behaviour, is motivated by the libido. Unless there were some motive intrinsic in the nature of the organism which causes the organism to repress and alter part of itself to suit its environment, we should have to regard the self-repressive reactions as purely mechanical, and not spontaneous or voluntary. Such would be contrary to fact. We shrink from fire spontaneously "to avoid pain," as we say. That action, then, has its *motive*, a spontaneous effort of the organism to protect itself. After the baby's hand has been burned in reaching for the candle, he positively inhibits or represses his dominant reaching and grasping movements at sight of the candle flame, just as adult human beings inhibit or repress both dominant and erotic actions when threatened by an antagonistic environment which they have learned has the power to hurt them. Their *motive* in thus inhibiting or repressing parts of their spontaneous activities is *Compliance*' (p. 242).

Susan Isaacs.



The Psychology of Consciousness. By C. Daly King, M.A., with an introduction by Dr. William M. Marston. (Kegan Paul, London, 1932. Pp. xv + 256. Price 12s. 6d.)

Conceiving of consciousness as the only real 'value', Mr. Daly King asks the question whether it is possible to enhance our conscious 'I' in

such a way that we may discover the means of attaining a higher degree of consciousness, which will stand in somewhat the same relation to our ordinary waking consciousness, as this does to dreaming or sleeping consciousness. All human effort ultimately aims at this, but without any clear recognition of the goal, hence our efforts mostly go astray; the Eastern mystic too often mistakes the symptom for the state (as when he attaches an exaggerated importance to certain ways of breathing, which may be only the *accompaniments* of a more awakened consciousness), while Western man—even more deluded—thinks the end can be attained by the use of mechanical apparatus to make good the deficiencies of the human mind and body. The real method, the author thinks, lies in the substitution of an active for a passive 'I', and the most likely means of achieving this is through intensive observation of the bodily states and conditions—a suggestion with regard to which he acknowledges his indebtedness to M. Gurdjieff. Our progress in such observation can be checked by experimental methods. For instance, we can begin by training ourselves in discrimination, and our decreasing thresholds can be measured in the usual way. We can then proceed to practise ourselves in the 'simultaneous awareness of different sensory impressions', and ultimately 'our ability to discriminate should be carried to the point where our error as to amount, as subjectively felt and as objectively measured, is reduced to the ordinary error . . . which is present, for example, in the dial readings which occur in many physical experiments'.

Such a procedure, the author admits, is difficult, but the realization of the humiliating fact that at present "I" am bound to an automatic body, that this body is the sole instrument of my very existence and that it is unpredictably out of control, is a shock which may, and frequently does, release the energy necessary for the prosecution of the attempt to win more consciousness'. Exactly how we are to become 'active' and more controlling, instead of being at the mercy of our bodies, is not very clear to the present reviewer, and as the matter is treated in this book, it suggests at first sight that this is merely another attempt to deal with the Narcissistic injury caused by a realization of the strength of the argument for determinism. The author claims, however, that his statements are based on fairly extensive experimentation, though 'these data unfortunately, have not yet been reduced to presentable conclusions'. Since we have not the data, and the author has, all we can safely do at present is to await their publication, though we may perhaps be allowed to suggest that, especially in view of the far-reaching claims put forward, it would have been better to have followed the usual scientific procedure of presenting the data before publishing the conclusions to which the author thinks they point. Mr. Daly King's criticism of psycho-analysis (p. 221) might very well be brought against himself. He says 'there is no scientific proof for any part

of psycho-analytic theory, so far as we know'. Psycho-analysts have at any rate filled many books and journals with their data, which are therefore open to inspection. These data may or may not prove the psycho-analysts' conclusions, and it is open to Mr. Daly King, as it is to others, to shew when these conclusions are wrong or are unproved. But what are we to do in the case of Mr. Daly King who presents us with no data at all? Clearly we must wait with such patience and tolerance as we can command. But meanwhile there is the risk that the more hasty among us will brush the work aside entirely.

That his results may be of real interest to the psychologist is indicated for instance by his statement that 'self observation' according to his technique is independent of ordinary attention and 'does not interfere in any way' with the simultaneous exercise of this latter. If 'self observation' takes the form of threshold discrimination, etc., as he suggests, this result would appear to be in striking contradiction to the findings of most other investigators in this field.

The above account perhaps scarcely does justice to the general interest of this book, which contains some interesting comments on behaviourism, Gestalt, psycho-analysis (the author is not always as critical as he is in the above-mentioned passage), and, above all, on Marston's 'Integrative Psychology'. The author is much concerned also with the 'psychonic theory', according to which consciousness is a function of the energization of the synapse, though he scarcely does justice to previous upholders of this theory, notably McDougall. He gives a brief account of some experiments of his own which attempted to put this theory to the test. According to his account (pp. 162-163) these experiments failed, though the reviewer is completely at a loss to understand his reasoning as to the statistical significance of the correlations found (that '.5 represents only a 50-50 chance of relationship between the elements correlated').

When a fuller account of Mr. Daly King's work appears, it may be possible to form a better estimate of its value. At present the most that we can say is that it is 'suggestive'—though readers may vary greatly as to the value they attach to the suggestions given.

J. C. F.



Individual Psychology and Social Problems. By Drs. Alfred Adler, W. Béran Wolfe, C. L. C. Burns and J. C. Young. (Individual Psychology Publications, No. 5. C. W. Daniel Company, London, 1932. Pp. 64. Price 2s. 6d.)

In a series of short essays Adler and some of his followers review various social problems in the light of the teachings of Individual Psychology. The two essays by Adler would seem to lead one to the conclusion that all social problems are to be ascribed to the non-co-operation of persons who as

children were pampered and dependent, and that their solution is to be found in educating the child to be socially co-operative.

In his very clever analysis of 'The Paradoxical Jew', Béran Wolfe examines the past of the Jewish race as a physician looking at a case history. Unfortunately he overstrains the phylogenetic parallelism, being too dogmatic in his simplifications, concluding that 'Judaism is a product of the childhood of the Jew, an eponymous myth, a rationalization, a guiding fiction'. With an extraordinary display of casuistry Dr. Burns in another essay makes an apologia for Catholicism on the strength of the theories of Individual Psychology.

S. L. Yates.

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Individual Psychology and Organic Disease. By various authors. (Individual Psychology Publications. C. W. Daniel Company, London, 1932. Pp. 74. Price 2s. 6d.)

The aim of this pamphlet is to supply to the general practitioner the attitude of Individual Psychology towards organic disease so that he can learn in a simplified way the basis of Alfred Adler's teaching.

Apart from a very sound lecture given by O. A. Woodcock on the Development of Individual Psychology, the authors have tended to out-Grodder Grodder. An example will shew the whole trend of these lectures. 'Phthisis always has its origin in discouragement' (p. 53).

It is to be noted that Individual Psychology seems to boost itself by running down psycho-analysis, a practice, as in politics, to be deplored.

S. L. Yates.

★

The Children We Teach: Seven to Eleven Years. By Susan Isaacs, M.A., D.Sc. (University of London Press Ltd., 1932. Pp. xi + 174. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

In the brief foreword to this small book, so happily entitled, the author writes, 'Its aim is to shew children, neither as merely illustrating a series of abstract psychological laws, nor as mere creatures-to-be-taught, but as living individuals'. No reader of the volume can fail to agree that this aim has been well and truly achieved. Those familiar with the previous work of Mrs. Isaacs will look again for the essential qualities they have already observed, nor will they be disappointed; here in small compass we find the same characteristic directness of thought, lucidity of expression, balanced outlook, and a very human and sympathetic approach to her subject.

Though a short book, developed out of a series of articles which appeared originally in *The Teacher's World*, it goes far in its searchings, reveals in all discussion fundamental psychological principles, and throughout suggests a close understanding of the point of view of the teacher as well

as of the child. The book consists of four sections. Section I includes two very useful 'Introductory' chapters, and is followed by three sections dealing respectively with 'Individual Differences' (Chapter II), 'Social Development' (Chapter III) and 'Intellectual Development' (Chapter IV), in all of which we find admirably lucid exposition of material which is the product of wide knowledge combined with first-hand practical experience.

Though psycho-analytical theory as such is not expounded, nor any technical terms employed, psycho-analysts will find the context throughout is based upon psycho-analytical findings, and the intelligent 'lay' reader will realize, almost without knowing it, that he is touching upon deeper problems than may appear at first reading.

A good example of practical knowledge expressed with a simplicity which renders it understandable to all, yet suggesting wider issues, is to be found in the Introductory Section under the sub-title, 'And one man in his time plays many parts'. Here the author comes right into the schoolroom, dealing with the pressing problems in the education of the five- and six-year-old child, and yet never losing sight of the fundamental principles involved. When she speaks (p. 18 *et seq.*) of the danger of the too abrupt change involved in passing from infant or nursery school to the lower classes of the next department, she makes us feel that this difficulty has been actually experienced by herself, and at the same time she emphasizes another side of the problem which her insight has made known to her, namely, the child's spontaneous demand, at this very stage, for different treatment. She writes: 'At anything over five and a half years, both boys and girls will begin to hanker for what they call a "proper school", where they are "made to work", have definite tasks and much expected of them in the way of self-control. The child of this age in the kindergarten or infants' school begins to feel envious of his somewhat older brother, who is treated as more responsible and more grown-up.'

'A certain hardening in our demands, a certain stiffening in organization and in the standard of work, at the change-over from the infants' to the primary school, undoubtedly finds response in children's own feelings. But . . . the work and the ways of the new life should link onto the old'. (Introductory, pp. 19 and 20.)

Analysis and all analysts can give complete confirmation to this view.

In Chapter II ('Individual Differences') we get a very sound, and at the same time an easily grasped, description of what is really involved in differences of temperament. An intelligent teacher, even without any previous psychological study, could not but be interested, nor fail to enjoy the vivid well-chosen illustrations. What emerges so strikingly from this chapter—and it is a matter of utmost importance to the teacher—is the ever-present need for elasticity of approach and method in teaching, whatever be its scope. Perhaps the most interesting sections in this

chapter are numbers five, six, and seven, in which special individual problems are handled, such as backwardness in reading and arithmetic, involving important principles of mental and emotional development. In the section entitled, 'How we Measure the Differences between Children' (Section 2), we are given a very clear explanation of the use of intelligence tests, their value and their possible dangers, which must surely open the eyes of teachers to the importance of finding ways by which to gauge the child's mental capacity, and the latter's relationship to the personality as a whole. This in itself is of utmost value, yet in dealing with this particular method for discovering the child's abilities, it would seem that the author negates to some degree her own very important conclusions concerning temperamental factors. One or two quotations may help to illustrate my point.

'What can be said is that these differences of temperament are as real and as significant as intellectual differences, and that they must be taken into account by the teacher. They confirm the need for elastic methods in the school, and for individual treatment of children' ('Individual Differences', Section 5, p. 54).

Again, in dealing with backwardness in arithmetic (Section 7, p. 67), we read: 'Children may get held back from emotional causes as well as from inherent intellectual defects. Some recent investigators, indeed, doubt whether these latter have any importance to speak of'.

And finally, closing the chapter on Individual Differences, occurs this significant passage: 'In these differences we touch upon the most profound problem of the mental life, that of the relation between understanding and purpose, between the activity of knowing and those of wishing and feeling' (p. 70). With all that is expressed in these three passages, every psychoanalyst will be in complete agreement, but it is difficult to see how such a view can be reconciled with the author's whole-hearted support of mental tests as the most reliable and most effective avenue to a grasp of the individual's ability. She quotes appreciatively Dr. P. B. Ballard's enthusiastic encomium on mental tests for use in the school (from *Group Tests of Intelligence*, by Dr. P. B. Ballard), and herself writes: 'All things considered, it seems clear that the most useful primary classification in the primary school years would be according to mental ratio' (p. 45).

The mental test runs counter to the principles which Mrs. Isaacs has so eloquently set out. It must be completely *standardized*, it functions *mechanically* (i.e. under one set of conditions only), it operates in a purely *artificial* situation (however great the skill of the tester, nothing can remove from it the specific test or examination-nature of the work, an affair done deliberately by the children for the teacher—a tester), and it deals with *one* aspect only of the child—its so-called 'intellectual' capacity. Yet already in the pages of this book we have met with the strangest possible demand—

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a demand based on incontestable psychological facts—for *elasticity* of method and approach, for the use of the child's *spontaneous* activity, and for the handling of the human creature as a *whole*. The problem of maintaining at one and the same moment two so strangely divergent attitudes seems impossible of solution !

One other somewhat strange view is expressed in this same chapter, otherwise full of wise and helpful suggestion. 'The children of roughly average ability tend to find their educational level under any system of classification. . . . Our methods of teaching and general school conditions are well adapted to the needs of the average mass' (Individual Differences, Section 4, p. 45).

The phrase 'average mass' in itself sounds strangely inconsistent in a chapter which stresses so emphatically the individual differences between human beings and the essential need of individual approach to each personality. Moreover, there are, one would think, only too many indications, both in private and social life, as we know it to-day, of the failure of education to deal with the 'needs of the average mass'. Was it not one of our best-known educational experts of to-day who said bitterly that if a child were defective or diseased mentally or physically, or both, he could be sure of obtaining the most careful skilled individual treatment ; whereas if he were only one of the average mass he would be lucky if he received recognition as a *person* once throughout his career from infant school to the top standard. Indeed, an education which leaves such large numbers of the 'mass' unable to make use of their own powers, shut out from the wonders of the world in which they exist, incapable of constructive activity, can hardly claim to be 'well adapted to the needs' of any body of human beings, average or otherwise.

Chapter III, on 'Social Development,' is full of interest. Very simply, but very cogently, a number of the most significant psychological principles underlying the individual's evolution into a social being are explained. The author has the happy gift of taking facts supposed to be quite familiar and of presenting them in such a manner that the reader's attention is at once arrested as though by something heard for the first time. Take, for instance, the section dealing with the young child's need of bodily activity—a familiar theme to educators. 'The first great duty of the educator is thus to create such conditions as will allow the freest possible and the most ample bodily *movement*. When we ask children *not* to move, we should have excellent reasons for doing so. *It is stillness we have to justify, not movement*' (Chapter III, 'Social Development', Section I, p. 74). (The italics of the last sentence are mine, in order to emphasize the striking way in which the plea for bodily activity is re-stated.)

In Sections 3 and 4 of the same chapter, entitled respectively, 'Children's Ideals and Notions of Punishment', and 'Loving and Hating', we are

given very interesting illustrations of the young child's rigorous criticism of his mates in the home and in school and his attempts to dominate over them. Very skilfully the underlying significance of this is explained, in a way which is likely to prove acceptable to the teacher, yet without any loss of essentials. In this connection Section 4 (pp. 95-97) is especially valuable, shewing the development of the love and hate in the young child, with its characteristic ambivalence, into later group activities, and the transference of loyalties from the individual. In the following Section (No. 5), also, on 'Chums and Heroes', much is to be learnt of the inner life of the child between the ages of seven and eleven, the rapid growth of the sense of reality in this phase (does not Mrs. Isaacs, however, discount a little too much the phantasy life which, though less obviously influential, is surely still functioning with energy?), resulting in a new attitude towards the parents and other grown-ups. In Chapter IV, 'Intellectual Development', two themes dominate in interest: the deep emotional need of the child *to feel safe* in the world in which he must live and grow, and, arising out of this need, his *need for understanding* the things and people of that world. As Mrs. Isaacs puts it: 'He must know and master the world to make it feel *safe*' (Chapter IV, p. 114). This, she contends (and rightly so), is the child's main problem between the years of seven and eleven, and once this fact is grasped by our educators, very radical changes will follow. Education will not be a process of 'learning from' the teacher, about material 'supplied by' the teacher, in the form of a traditional curriculum, served up in little morsels of the teacher's choosing—the 'timetable'. It will be a question of solving, or attempting to solve, the child's problem—his need to understand his life and the world in which he lives as a whole. The school will become 'a place where the child learns how to live' (p. 122). This section is probably the one which deals with deepest interests and will make appeal not only to teachers but to all who care to consider humanity and its varying achievements.

The three last sections (4, 5, 6) of the chapter deal with Children's Thinking, Children's Errors, and The Beginnings of Reason (pp. 138-167), containing some discussion on children's modes of thought which is particularly interesting, and illustrated by excellent (and often very entertaining) examples mainly collected from Mrs. Isaacs' experience in her own school at Cambridge, with additional matter based upon Piaget's findings. One of the most important deductions given in this section is that which establishes the ability of the quite young child (of infant-school stage) to reason, argue, and draw conclusions—a deduction still more firmly established by psycho-analytic research. And equally important, the presence of phantastic thinking, side by side with logical thinking, is demonstrated by vivid examples, as well as the evolution of the latter out of the former.

In the brief concluding passage of the book, Mrs. Isaacs writes: 'If I have succeeded in stirring the interest of my readers in the practical working-out of all these broad psychological truths, I shall feel that this little book has achieved its main purpose'. One can hardly imagine a book more fitted to fulfil the author's hopes.

Barbara Low.



Child Upbringing and the New Psychology. By Richard Amaral Howden. With a Foreword by William Brown, M.D. (Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, London, 1933. Pp. 105. Price 2s. 6d.)

Dr. William Brown writes a Foreword to this little book in which he says: 'I have read the book through with interest and with general agreement, and can confidently recommend it to the non-medical public for whom it is intended' (pp. vii-viii).

On turning to the pages on psycho-analysis we read that "'Psycho-analysis'" is not only a method of treatment devised and employed by Freud and his followers, but the name also stands for a very definite school of psychology whose adherents demand complete infallibility' (p. 14). This completely silly utterance, which we hope is to be excepted from Dr. Brown's approval, does not instil respect for the author's balance of judgement. Nevertheless, in moments when he is less dominated by the uprush of unknown influences he has much that is sensible to say on the main theme of the book.

E. J.



Adolescent Girlhood. By Mary Chadwick. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1932. Pp. 303. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

A passage from the author's own preface expresses in concise form the purpose of this volume: 'The aim of the present book is to put before the reader a general view of the more everyday problems of the girl at home and at school', and a glance through the contents page reveals a very full and wide treatment of such problems in relation to the adolescent girl both of the past and of to-day. It is indeed a matter for some regret that Miss Chadwick has attempted to cover quite so wide a field. For most of her readers Parts II and III, entitled respectively 'Home Life', 'School Days and Later', are of more immediate and absorbing interest than Part I, entitled 'Historical', in which an attempt is made to show the adolescent girl and her development among the primitive races, in myth and fairy tale, and in the earlier historical epochs. Interesting as such an investigation undoubtedly is, one feels that it is too compressed, too rapid a survey

to bring much conviction except to those who have already a good deal of knowledge in these directions, while it takes away from the two succeeding sections already referred to some opportunities for fuller illustration.

Probably the most important section of the book, as regards fundamental psychological principles, is to be found in Part II, 'Home Life', and in this section one of the most interesting chapters is Chapter II, which deals with the attitude of the adolescent girl to the changes going on within her, physically and mentally. Here Miss Chadwick shows in a vivid and interesting manner the fantasies which are expressed, generally in a highly disguised manner, by the various emotional conflicts familiar to the adolescent state. The reader cannot fail to realize, at least to some extent, how profound and often how remote from what we call the 'reality' situation of adolescence are these conflicts generated in this phase of development. As a result we find the adolescent deeply concerned with the need for secrecy and concealment: as Miss Chadwick writes: 'It is usually characteristic of adolescent phantasies particularly that they are kept jealously guarded, and treasured as private property, simply because they deal with that part of the life of the girl about which she is most sensitive . . . this tendency on the part of the girl to hide or disguise her feelings, during adolescence, and to adopt one type of behaviour in order that no one may suspect that she is wanting to do exactly the reverse, leads to a great deal of misunderstanding and suspicion between the girl and the older generation' (Part II, p. 141, *et seq.*). Any light on the problem of the relationship between adult and adolescent must be welcome, and Miss Chadwick has done a useful piece of work in investigating at length some of the inevitable conflicts between the generations and in emphasizing the truth which we are all so unwilling to recognize, namely, that the gulf between is inevitable. Most of this chapter, as also Chapter III ('Emotional Conflicts of Adolescence'), deals with the more or less universal phantasies and fears of the adolescent, and the explanation of these as repetitions of the guilty wishes and resulting fears of early childhood. Chapter III deals more specifically with the inner emotional conflicts of this stage, a conflict which is quite inexplicable unless we have some understanding of the phantasy life, an understanding which will prevent the very superficial view that with adolescence the individual suddenly changes into a new personality different henceforth in character, point of view, and modes of action. In this chapter one feels perhaps that more space devoted to the processes involved in the adolescent stage, the significant part played by menstruation and by the guilt complex, and less to various familiar manifestations and to generalizations, would have proved of greater value. In this connection readers are advised to consult the sections on adolescence in Dr. Ernest Jones's *Papers in Psycho-Analysis*, where he deals much more specifically with these same problems. In the last pages of Chapter III,

which is concerned with the adolescent tendency to express, and at the same time relieve, the inner conflict by the channels of religion and art, one would wish for a less scanty exposition. Possibly owing to the brevity of these sections Miss Chadwick appears to emphasize overmuch the value and influence of external conditions. For example, in dealing with masturbation, she suggests that if the adolescent girl is 'fortunate enough to meet with someone who can give her a wise assurance that after all this is a natural phase and that it frequently happens at this time and usually passes off again into the background when her adolescence becomes more firmly established, it will be an enormous gain . . . her mind might then be set at rest and a great deal of harm avoided for the future' (p. 166). None will know better than Miss Chadwick how little the external assurance, be it never so wise, can serve to influence the inner situation where a certain degree of conflict prevails; when external assurance is sufficient, then we may say the conflict is of the smallest and can solve itself.

In Chapter IV ('Conflicts Concerning the Home'), we have quite an interesting summary of different aspects of the home and its traditions in our own day and in earlier times, but surely Miss Chadwick's description of the home and its traditions in the past suffers from the modernist delusion! We read: 'Not so very long ago, in the time of our mothers and grandmothers, the idea of a girl being brought up to earn her living was unthinkable, and only if she had lost her father or some similar catastrophe had befallen the family which made it necessary. . . . Mediocrity was considered the hall-mark of respectability in those days . . . the girl may have gone on with a little music or painting which she had learned at school, taken up embroidery or parish work, but even then it was not considered very nice for her to work too hard at any of these accomplishments for fear people might think she wanted to use them professionally'. Does the author really think that the women of two generations back were less educated, in any true sense of that word, less intelligent, and less individual than those of to-day who go through the standardized mill of the School, the University, and the Professions? The latter portion of this chapter (pp. 180-182) dealing with the departure of the adolescent girl from the parental home, especially in relation to the separation between mother and daughter, is perhaps the most interesting portion, and one wishes it had been developed further at the expense of some of the well-known generalities which occupy so much of the middle part of the chapter.

In Chapter VI, Section B ('The Adolescent Girl among Brothers and Sisters', pp. 236-243), makes very interesting reading, illustrating the various effects resulting from the adolescent girl's position in relation to brothers and sisters; that is, her place as older or younger member or as an only child, and pp. 212 and 213 reveal a very acute understanding of the violently opposed alternations of feelings in the adolescent girl, the love

and hate impulses towards her family, of the desire for society, yet the fear of strangers, and of the intense wish to be the woman she is becoming, coupled with a flight to childhood again and again.

Part III, entitled ' School Days and Later ', deals with the better known manifestations of friendships and passionate love relations between the adolescent and a contemporary of her own sex, or between herself and a mature woman. The various factors at work, the phantasies involved, and the disguises employed, are carefully investigated and valuable application is made to the educational situation where the relationship between teacher and pupil affords so good an opportunity for the manifold manifestations of adolescence. In the concluding chapter of the book (Part III, Chapter IV, ' How we may Help or Hinder the Adolescent ') Miss Chadwick gives some practical advice to those who work, whether in the capacity of parents or educators or friends, among adolescent youth. Some of this advice is undoubtedly useful, or would be if we knew how to carry it out, but in some passages it seems that Miss Chadwick is almost asking for the adult to approximate to the ideals of the adolescent even though she has shown earlier that these ideals are based on phantasies belonging to childhood. But without question certain suggestions put forward in this chapter have the utmost value ; for instance, that we adults can give real help by our willingness ' to put ourselves and our ears at the adolescent's disposal. . . . To listen to her sympathetically. . . . Not to offer her unasked-for advice or criticism. . . . To believe her to be a sensible person, capable of reasoning out a problem if she is only given the time and opportunity to do so. . . . To put opportunities for new experiences in her way. . . . To give her the delight of discovery '.

This is well and truly said, as is also the advice to the adult in the same section : ' We grow old when we can no longer assimilate fresh ideas . . . directly we cease to take any interest in things that are new and strange '.

For the educator, both in the wider and the more specialist sense of the term, there are many suggestions in this book which will prove helpful, and an excellent bibliography adds to its usefulness.

Barbara Low.

★

The Biological Tragedy of Woman. By Anton Nemilov. Translated from the Russian by Stephanie Offental. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1932. Pp. 220. Price 7s. 6d.)

This book is written by a member of Soviet Russia, and is a lament on the tragedy of *homo sapiens* and his sexual instinct.

The standpoint taken by the author is akin to that expressed by certain scientists who theoretically link the origin of the death of the individual (protozoa) with nature's adoption of conjugation as a means of propagation. It is also expressed in the philosophy of Schopenhauer, whose genius in the

sphere of abstract thought left no room for the mastery of concrete reality.

The author says, 'Man's whole tragedy rests in the realization that he is but the cheated victim of the race instinct, and yet powerless to resist the lure, whereas the animal dies in illusion that its efforts and sacrifices had been expended solely for self-gratification' (p. 23). Again, 'Due to the excessive growth of his higher brain centres and of his endocrine apparatus, to which man owes his self-consciousness and his individuality, he values and treasures this side of his being, which attains as it were the significance of a completely autonomous self-sufficiency' (p. 27). 'Perhaps the further man will travel from his ape-like forbears, the more will he suffer from this "sex tragedy"' (p. 38).

The author realizes that the sexual instinct cannot be denied, and points out its far-reaching influence on all man's activities. 'The sexual function overspreads man's entire being, and the more deeply science probes into the problem of sex the more convinced it becomes of the infinitely vital significance of this function for all processes active in the human body' (p. 23).

The downfall of man is brought about by the sexual instinct in the act of copulation. 'Thus despite his exalted consciousness, man, when snared in the net, performs the act which in reality is alien to him, and in the delusion brings forth out of non-existence the future generation which in turn will take his place, and in time will repeat the cycle' (p. 21).

The main theme of the book is the suffering imposed on woman by the part she has to play in reproduction. The pleasures that woman may experience in motherhood are illusory. She is merely an incubator during pregnancy. Breast feeding is sacrificial and the secretion of milk is physiological altruism.

A book written on the physical manifestations of man's sexual instinct without reference to his psycho-sexual life is as illuminating as an account of the circulation of the blood which ignores the function of the heart.

The author's biological approach stops short when man assumes the upright position. He perceives that nature has made possible developments such as the special use of the upper extremity by this change of posture. He does not realize that the modifications in sexuality which occur play an important rôle in the development of the mind. Hence the reader is brought face to face on every page of the book with the futility of approaching a human problem without a knowledge of dynamic psychology and the part played in man's life by the unconscious mind.

Unfortunately criticism cannot be confined to this omission, as the statement of facts made by the author on woman's health and sexual life are inexact and prejudiced. His view of woman's delicacy and the suffering she must experience in her sexual life is out of touch with reality. In the

first place woman has a longer span of life than man, female infants are easier to rear than male, little girls are not more delicate than little boys. The majority of women are not incapacitated by menstruation or the climacteric. The results of an investigation on the menstrual life of 1,000 women published recently by the Federation of Medical Women confirm this statement. The pain of childbirth varies greatly. In a certain number of cases it is negligible. In the majority of cases it is severe, and there is every reason for the cause of this suffering to be investigated from all points of view.

While it is established that the suffering of woman in the performance of her sexual function is not universal, it is undeniable that a minority do exhibit pathological symptoms. Psycho-analysis has already demonstrated that dysmenorrhœa is usually psychogenic in origin. Minor disturbances at the menstrual period and climacteric reactions have their main roots in disturbances in the psycho-sexual development. The repression of unmastered infantile anxiety situations associated with the aggressive and sexual instincts results in the inhibition and disturbance of the woman's sexual life. The little girl's aggressive impulses have less opportunity for sublimation than those of the little boy. Femininity is identified too readily with passivity and masculinity with activity. The turning in on the self of the aggressive impulses results in physical and mental suffering.

The extreme view taken by the author on the subject of woman's suffering may be dictated solely by subjective psychological factors well known to the psycho-analyst.

If, however, the Russian woman is suffering to the extent suggested, it is permissible to speculate on the influence of revolution on woman's aggressive instinct.

Sachs drew attention to the fact that in revolutionary movements woman is wont to exhibit more unbridled aggression than man, when once the revolution has been set in motion. It is possible that a reaction to the aggression of the early years of the Soviet administration might be followed by an increase in the Russian woman's difficulty in dealing with her aggressive impulses.

S. M. Payne.

★

A Guide to Birth Control Literature. By Norman E. Himes. (Noel Douglas, London, 1931. Pp. 46. Price 3s. 6d.)

This short bibliography, to quote the introduction, 'makes no pretence to being exhaustive', 'usefulness to others' having been 'the chief criterion of selection'. It is divided into three sections on 'Technique', 'Social Aspects' and 'Continental Literature' respectively, and contains brief notes concerning some of the items, which will doubtless increase its

utility. A selected bibliography is inevitably open to criticism; but perhaps it is justifiable to query the wisdom of omitting reference to the writings of Havelock Ellis, H. G. Wells, Bertrand Russell, Dean Inge and Lord Dawson of Penn—to name a few of those who are not mentioned in these pages.

J. C. F.



History, Psychology and Culture. By Alexander Goldenweiser. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., London, 1933. Pp. xii + 475. Price 18s.)

The eminent American anthropologist offers in this book a series of essays published during the last ten years. Although he complains of a lack of unity in his book, the reader will observe that the leading idea is method, that stress is laid rather on the methodological aspect of problems than on their solutions.

The space at our disposal will not permit us to discuss all the papers, some of them very interesting (cf. especially p. 59, 'Psychology and Culture'); but a few words ought to be said about two papers, since they are fairly representative of the well-informed anthropologist's attitude towards psycho-analysis. The paper on Freud's theories (p. 201) is a review of *Totem and Taboo*. Goldenweiser as an anthropologist is of course justified in applying the critical method of anthropology to the great vistas set forth in *Totem and Taboo*, but I think a reader of this book should be able to understand the difference in the view-point of the anthropological specialist and of the psychologist. What Freud is really trying to explain is not totemism as defined by certain anthropological authorities (viz. clan system, etc.), but totemic phenomena: that is, animal symbolism, specific forms of sacrifice, taboo and exogamy. As regards sacrifice, for instance, the important point is not in how many cases sacrifices of the communion type are actually associated with clan totemism, but the sheer existence of this type of sacrifice in which the god, ancestor or deified animal is revered, killed and eaten at the same time. This sacrifice contains ample proof of the ambivalent attitude regarding a mythical representative of the father-imago, and this is what Freud is concerned with. In his ardour to refute the theory of the Cyclopean horde the author as anthropologist is sometimes wrong about his facts. He tells us that we do not hear of the eating of relatives; this is rather astonishing to the reviewer, as some of his personal friends (Pitchentara) have been doing so.¹ Besides I should have thought that Steinmetz' paper² could not have escaped the notice of such an eminent anthropologist. It is easy to say

¹ Róheim: 'Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types', this JOURNAL, XIII, p. 80.

² Steinmetz: 'Endokannibalismus', *Mitt. d. Wiener. Anthr. Ges.*, XXVI.

that the 'idea of the Cyclopean family was discredited by latter zoologists', but the latest and most reliable publication on this subject contains a mass of well-observed data that bear out, if not the details, at least the outlines of Freud's reconstruction.³ The explanation of magic as 'mistaking an ideal connection for a real one' is due to Tylor (*Primitive Culture*, 1903, II, 116) and not to Freud. On the other hand, I think Goldenweiser is justified in objecting to the theory of a racial unconscious, and in an unpublished work I have attempted to shew how we could manage without this assumption.

Another short paper is entitled: 'Is Freud a Psychologist?' and begins with the sentence: 'To ask whether Freud is a psychologist seems, at first blush, a presumption. As well one might ask whether Darwin was a biologist or Kant a philosopher' (p. 425). Well, the self-diagnosis is absolutely correct. It continues to be a presumption even after the explanation. Goldenweiser proceeds to set forth, evidently for the average reader, what psycho-analysis is. And here we notice that the author is again liable to errors, this time as a psychologist. For instance, we shall be astonished to learn from the author that the Œdipus complex commences only with the puberty period (p. 428). He seems to regard free association as distinct from dream analysis (p. 429). But let us come to the point. After admitting the importance and validity of Freud's discoveries the author at last tells us why Freud is not a psychologist. Because he has given us only one volume of psychology and we have still to wait for the second. 'Sensations, perceptions, the mechanisms of vision or the other sensory organs, including illusions such as after images, or even the processes of memory or association, the psychic mechanisms of learning, the nature of creativeness, the analysis, finally of such traits as kindness, meanness, temper, magnanimity, courage—none of these topics, or subjects like them, have ever formed part of Freud's subject-matter or figured in his theoretical workshop' (p. 431). As for the first half of this sentence it is true that these questions still remain largely the domain of experimental psychology, although psycho-analysis has had some important things to say on the influence of unconscious mechanisms in the sphere of perception. But as for the association of ideas and character formation it is strange indeed to read this statement, considering that one of these is the very basis of psycho-analytic method while a very essential part of the studies of Freud and his followers deals with the second. How is it possible to go so far astray, not in opinions, but in stating facts? Perhaps what Goldenweiser really notices is that psycho-analysis has not discussed these questions in the old style and somehow he fails to recognize them in their new form. Another great mistake of his is that the mechanisms

³ L. Zuckerman, *Social Life of Monkeys and Apes*, 1932.

discovered by Freud function typically in the neurotic mind. Probably he does not know that many normal individuals have been analysed (didactic and character analysis) and that the same fundamental contents and mechanisms have been found in these cases. Many other objections might be put forward. Thus when the author asks us to prove the primary nature of the sexual as distinguished from the secondary nature of religious or æsthetic functions we must answer, first, that in topics of this kind proof in the mathematical sense of the word is hardly obtainable. But at any rate psycho-analysis in clinical experience comes nearer a strictly experimental proof than all other *humaniora*. The next way he proves that Freud is not a psychologist is rather interesting. We are told that psychologists have at length learnt to resist the tendency towards simplification, and since Freud has not learnt to resist this tendency he is not a psychologist. Another way of putting it would be that psychologists simply cannot explain anything, and since Freud can explain some things he is not a psychologist. Finally, although on p. 433 he warns others against identifying the psychic and the conscious, he proceeds to explain that Freud cannot be a psychologist because his unconscious does not function on the psychic (i.e. conscious) level. We are to be told exactly what a psychologist may and what he may not find—otherwise, anathema.

All these misunderstandings—and others, for instance: 'the unconscious knows no conflicts'—are so universal that one can hardly reproach the author for having made them. In reading papers of this kind we again realize the fundamental importance and the novelty of psycho-analytical findings. If our new orientation meant less it would certainly be easier to accept and understand.

G. Róheim.



At Home with the Savage. By I. H. Driberg. (Routledge, London, 1932. Pp. ix + 257. Price 7s. 6d.)

A book which, although taking nearly no account of psycho-analytical anthropology, the analyst *qua* layman in the realm of anthropology may read with advantage. The author is in full touch with the methods and aims of modern anthropology, has an intimate first-hand knowledge of primitive man and a lively literary style. I much prefer the anthropologist, if he has no real knowledge of psycho-analysis, to omit the subject than to commit some of the gross errors that are usual in this connection. As it is he seems to think he can dispose of Freud's primal horde theory by a casual reference to the 'fantastic picture of an Œdipus-ridden menage' (p. 78). He deals with the importance of the psychological point of view in anthropology in the right spirit (p. 10), although it seems that by psychology he really means an intuitive knowledge of 'savage' ways. He is himself a good psychologist in this sense, and one can heartily appreciate his remark

about savage languages and the number of words used in common talk, since members of the white race from Sydney to Budapest seem to have got hold of the notion that savages can manage with a few words. 'We in our civilization find that some 800 words satisfy our daily needs, just because all our sciences and arts are in the hands of specialists who employ their own jargon. . . . At a rough estimate the savage finds that he requires nearer 2,000 words to express himself because all branches of science are common to the whole community' (p. 44). His remarks regarding the cultural and practical (colonial) importance of anthropology should not be overlooked. Although emphasizing the fallacy of regarding non-European races as primitive he points out that anthropology and sociology are practically identical and that in anthropology we have the only approach to anything that can be called social biology (p. 17). But when it comes to the question of the *basic motives* actuating primitive people or special cultures our author must fail us, for by what we know of the structure of the human psyche such basic motives are necessarily unconscious. This is just what I have tried to point out in my last publication in this JOURNAL, viz. the leading formula of a specific culture (neurosis). For the same reason (lack of psycho-analytic insight) the chapters on the individual and on religion are apt to be disappointing. The author's *forte* is description of what he knows personally and the criticism of some curious views that have been put forward by others. 'Environment . . . is not operative in itself but only in response to a cultural need or as offering an opportunity for cultural development' (p. 47). He stresses the absurdity of Lévy-Bruhl's view on the radically different psychical structure of primitive people (p. 38). Although he is quite right when he points out that a real understanding of primitive mankind can only be gained through first-hand experience in the field, yet it seems to me that the ironical description of works written in the study is a little unkind and ungrateful when we think of *Primitive Culture* and the *Golden Bough*. Again, he rather over-states his case when he declares that the past or the evolution of marriage 'is not really of the least importance' (p. 79). He is hard on generalizations; a trained observer, he thinks, ought not to use the word 'totemism' (p. 29). Well, are we to speak of knanindja among the Aranda, of manua in Normanby Island, and so on? I fail to see the advantage of such a complicated nomenclature. Moreover, may I point out to him that he himself has hardly overcome the universally human tendency towards hasty generalizations and that these generalizations are naturally tinged by his own field experience, by what happens to be the case among his personal friends? In a savage community men and women behave very much like our peasants (p. 55): quite so, in an agricultural, i.e. a peasant, community. He describes how among the Lango the institution of polygyny is upheld by the women

because the new wives share the work and also because, if a man had only one wife, people would think she must be a shrew who will not tolerate any co-wives (p. 81). But in Central-Australia the situation is very different and polygyny is, as we should expect, essentially a male and gerontocratic institution. Because in certain well-known instances conception is attributed to a supernatural agency we are not justified in stating that 'in all *primitive tribes*' (italics are mine) 'we find that childbirth is looked upon both as an ordinary physical process and as a special interposition of providence' (p. 72). From anthropological text-books these generalizations find their way into psycho-analytical and other theories, often with surprising results.

G. Róheim.



An Egyptian Childhood: The Autobiography of Taha Hussein. By E. H. Paxton. (Routledge, London, 1933. Pp. vii + 168. Price 6s.)

We know very little about the childhood of non-European races. This justifies the interest of the psycho-analyst and the anthropologist in a book on 'Egyptian Childhood'. However, from our point of view the book is rather disappointing. The author of the autobiography is a leader of the Liberal movement in Egypt and he is blind since his early childhood. Both these circumstances mar the value of the book as an account of Egyptian childhood. It is not the story of a typical child and the *milieu* we are placed in is middle-class. We get some information about the terrors and phantasies of childhood (p. 6), about an oral trauma which leads to oral asceticism and to knowledge as a substitute for food (p. 18), about magic (p. 108), but this is not what we desire. An anonymous and therefore more outspoken autobiography of an Egyptian childhood would be more to our liking.

G. Róheim.

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY

ANNA FREUD, GENERAL SECRETARY

I. REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS OF SOCIETIES

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1933

January 18, 1933. Short Communications:

(1) Dr. Melitta Schmideberg: 'Some Notes on the Technique of early Psycho-Analysis'.

(2) Dr. Adrian Stephen: 'A Dream Series'.

(3) Dr. Flugel: 'Sense, Function and Perversion: a recent Criticism'.

February 1, 1933. Miss Grant Duff: 'Queen Elizabeth: Virgin'.

February 15, 1933. Short Communications:

(1) Miss Sharpe: 'An Alcoholic Phase'.

(2) Miss Searl: 'Symbolism and Early Intelligence'.

(3) Dr. Melitta Schmideberg: 'Some Factors in Early Development'.

March 1, 1933. Dr. Eder: 'A Clinical Case'.

March 15, 1933. Dr. Ernest Jones: 'The Belief in the Occult'.

Edward Glover,

Scientific Secretary.

THE CHICAGO PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY.

Fourth Quarter, 1932

October 5, 1932. The first meeting of the Society was held at the Chicago Institute for Psycho-Analysis.

Dr. Franz Alexander described the plan for the functioning of the Institute, and invited the members of the Chicago Psycho-Analytical Society to participate in the activities of the former.

Dr. Helen McLean was appointed supervisor of the library.

Dr. Menninger proposed that a resolution expressing the feeling of sorrow of the members for the death of Dr. Stewart B. Sniffen be incorporated in the minutes.

October 23, 1932. (Detroit, Michigan.) Dr. Blitzsten: 'The Relation of Psycho-Analysis to Psychiatry'.

November 9, 1932. Dr. Alexander: 'The Relationship of Structural to Instinctual Conflicts'. (Read before the Congress, September, 1932.)

November 23, 1932. Dr. A. Brill (New York): 'The God of Spinoza'. Dr. Brill pointed out the similarity between some of Spinoza's views and psycho-analytic thought, showing how Spinoza recognized the importance of instinctual needs. He also drew an analogy between Spinoza's attitude toward the universe and Freud's concept of 'oceanic feeling'.

December 7, 1932. Dr. Harry S. Sullivan (New York): A *résumé* of work done by the speaker on schizophrenia, giving an account of the phenomenology of the schizophrenic processes, the problems encountered in treatment, and a plan for the management of incipient schizophrenics, which includes preparations for a psycho-analytic approach in carefully selected cases.

Edwin R. Eisler,

Secretary.

First Quarter, 1933.

January 14, 1933. (1) Dr. H. A. Murray (Boston): 'The relationship of Experimental Psychology to Psycho-Analysis'. Methods used in the study of artificially induced compulsive symptoms developing under controlled conditions involving need-tension and various states of emotional stress.

(2) Drs. Blitzsten and Finlayson gave reports of the meeting of the American Psycho-Analytical Association in New York City, December 24, 1932.

(3) *Business Meeting.* Proposed revision of the Constitution and By-Laws to conform with the amended Constitution and By-Laws of the American Psycho-Analytical Association was discussed.

January 28, 1933. Dr. Fritz Wittels (New York): 'The Psychology of Bisexuality'.

February 15, 1933. (1) *Business Meeting*: Dr. Blitzsten presiding.

(a) Reports of committees on Membership and Education, Programme and By-Laws.

(b) Upon recommendation of the Committee on Membership and Education, the names of Drs. Catherine Bacon and Margaret Gerard were proposed for election to active membership and the names of Drs. Lucia Tower and David Brunswick proposed for associate membership. These recommendations were accepted by unanimous vote.

(c) Dr. Alexander proposed that occasional evenings be devoted to small contributions of clinical interest.

(2) Dr. Thomas M. French: 'Some tentative Conclusions concerning the Dynamic factor in the Reality Principle'.

March 4, 1933. Dr. Franz Alexander presented a preliminary report of the research work now being conducted by members of the Institute staff on the psycho-analysis of gastro-intestinal disturbances.

March 18, 1933. (1) Dr. Leon Saul: 'Studies of electro-physiological Changes in the Brain'. The technique used in detecting and recording action-currents.

(2) *Business Meeting.* Motion adopted to accept the Constitution and By-Laws as prepared by the Committee on By-Laws.

Edwin R. Eisler,

Secretary.

FRENCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1933

January 23, 1933. Seventh Annual Conference of French-Speaking Psycho-Analysts. A Report on 'Obsessions' was presented to the Conference by Dr. A. Borel and Dr. M. Génac.

February 22. Election of Officers for 1933: *President*, Dr. A. Borel; *Vice-President*, Dr. Ch. Odier; *Secretary*, Dr. S. Nacht; *Treasurer*, Dr. Sophie Morgenstern.

It was decided that the Eighth Conference of French-Speaking Psycho-Analysts would take place at the end of September, 1933, at Lausanne, under the presidency of Dr. Flournoy. Drs. Répond (Malévoz) and Leuba (Paris) will act as secretaries. A report will be presented by Dr. R. de Saussure and Professor Piaget on the psychological development of the child.

March 21, 1933. Dr. Loewenstein: 'A New Conception of the Oedipus Complex'. The author surveys the most recent work done on this subject.

S. Nacht.

GERMAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1933

January 10, 1933. Short Communications: (a) Dr. Barbara Lantos-Schneider: 'Notes on persistence of libido in persons of advanced age'.

(b) Dr. Boehm: 'A psychic determinant of passive homosexuality in men'.

(c) Dr. Fenichel: 'New determinants of two familiar neurotic attitudes'.

January 21, 1933. Dr. Reich: 'The Technique of Character-Analysis' (illustrated by examples from practice).

January 31, 1933. Continuation of the discussion on Dr. Reich's paper of January 21. Citation of a further case by Dr. W. Reich.

February 7, 1933. Dr. Jakobsohn: (a) 'The pre-oedipal origin and development of the woman's wish for a child'.

(b) 'On constant head-banging in small children'.

February 18, 1933. Dr. Fenichel: 'Further Observations on the Pre-Oedipal Phase in Girls'.

March 7, 1933. Dr. Misch-Frankl (guest of the Society): 'The Somatic Genesis of Anxiety: a contribution to the theory of the libido'.

March 18, 1933. (a) Dr. Gerö (guest of the Society): Max Hartmann's recent conclusions on the subject of sexuality and impregnation.

(b) Dr. Fliess (guest of the Society): 'Notes from the Analysis of a case of Anxiety Hysteria' (a clinical contribution to psycho-analytical prognosis).

March 28, 1933. (1) Gertrud Göbel (guest of the Society) : ' A case of unusually strong Penis-Envy in a Woman '.

(2) *Business Meeting. Election of Associate Members* : Dr. Käte Misch-Frankl and Dr. Robert Fliess.

HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1933

January 13, 1933. Dr. F. K. Hann : ' Notes on cases at the Polyclinic '.

January 27, 1933. Dr. Gy. Szüts : ' The Psycho-Analysis of a Depressive Psychosis '.

February 10, 1933. Dr. I. Hermann : ' The Unconscious and the Instincts viewed in the light of the Vortex-theory '.

March 10, 1933. Frau Dr. L. G. Hajdu (guest of the Society) : ' The Case-History of a Female Schizophrenic '.

March 24, 1933. Frau Dr. F. K. Hann : Review of Reik's work : *Der unbekannte Mörder*.

Change of Address : Dr. L. Révész. Budapest VIII., Vas. u. 15/a.

Dr. Imre Hermann.

THE INDIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

April 11, 1933. The Eleventh Annual General Meeting.

Before the meeting proceeded to transact its ordinary business the following resolution was passed :

(1) That the meeting places on record its satisfaction at the recovery of its President from a serious burning accident.

The following resolutions were passed :

(2) That the Annual Report for 1932 be adopted.

(3) That the present staff of office-bearers be asked to continue for 1933, as follows :

Dr. G. Bose, *President* ; Mr. H. P. Maiti, Dr. S. C. Mitra, *Members of the Council* ; Mr. M. N. Banerji, *Secretary* ; Dr. S. C. Mitra, *Librarian* ; Mr. M. N. Bamanta, *Assistant Librarian* ; Mr. S. K. Bose, *Assistant Secretary*.

(4) That the following be elected *Associate Members* :

(a) Dr. Bhupati Mohan Ghosh, M.Sc., M.B., 15 Bipradas Street, Calcutta.

(b) Mr. M. V. Amrith, B.A., 1 Lasa Major Road, Egmore, Madras.

(c) Mr. Ativar Rahaman, 41-42 Canning Street, Calcutta.

The Secretary put before the meeting a letter from the Librarian making a proposal for the appointment of a part-time assistant librarian, and suggesting the location of the library at a more suitable place. After a discussion it was resolved :

(5) That in the present financial condition of the Society it is not possible to meet the liabilities entailed in the proposal.

(6) That the Librarian be empowered to engage a part-time peon to facilitate prompt delivery of books from the lending library to members and associates and that the question of the location of the library be postponed for the present.

SWISS PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1933

January 21, 1933. Hans Zulliger (Ittigen): 'Avoidance of Anxiety by means of Trashy Literature'.

February 11, 1933. Dr. Schultz (Zürich): 'Sexual Symbolism'.

February 25, 1933. *Annual Meeting*:

1. Frau G. Behn-Eschenburg (Zürich): 'Observations bearing on the Castration Complex of Little Girls'.

2. *Business Meeting*: Annual Reports of the President, Treasurer and Librarian. Re-election of the Council and the Training Committee. Annual subscription as in 1932.

Dr. Steiner offered a tribute to the memory of the late Director Dr. H. Tobler, Landerziehungsheim, Kaltbrunn-Utznach.

Election to Membership: Dr. Ch. Schultz.

An application for membership by Dr. med. Boss, Zürich, was recommended for acceptance.

Changes in Membership:

Number on January 1, 1932	33
Resignations	3
Deceased: Dr. med. Hrch. Nunberg and Director Tobler	2
Erased: Dr. F. Allende	1
	6
	—
Number of members on January 1, 1933 .	27

March 11, 1933. At Koenigsfelden. Dir. Dr. Kielholz (Koenigsfelden): 'Woe to him Who Lies' (on *pseudologia phantastica*).

Hans Zulliger,
Secretary.

On February 23, 1933, Pfarrer Dr. Pfister completed his sixtieth year. At the meeting of the Swiss Psycho-Analytical Society on February 25, 1933, the President congratulated him on the occasion in an address expressing his own and the Society's admiration and appreciation of Dr. Pfister's long loyalty and devotion to Professor Freud and to psycho-analysis and his untiring energies in working for the cause.

Sarasin,
President.

VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Supplement to Second Quarter, 1932

June 1, 1933. Dr. Edmund Bergler : ' Plagiarism : a description and attempt to formulate the Psycho-genesis of certain Special Forms '.

June 15, 1933. Dr. Anny Angel : ' Psycho-analytic Remarks on Optimism '.

June 29, 1933. 1. Dorothy Burlingham : ' Child-analysis and the Mother '.

2. *Business Meeting. Election to Membership* : Dr. E. Bergler, Dr. Anny Angel. *Election to Associate Membership* : Frau Dorothy Burlingham, Dr. Felix Schottländer.

First Quarter, 1933

January 11, 1933. 1. Frl. Anna Freud : ' Infantile Methods of Overcoming Anxiety '.

2. *Business Meeting. Election to Membership* : Frau Dr. S. Gutmann, Dr. Ernst Kris.

January 25, 1933. 1. Dr. S. Bernfeld : Review of Melanie Klein's *Psycho-Analysis of Children*.

2. *Business Meeting. Election to Membership* : Dr. Otto Sperling.

February 8, 1933. Dr. Th. Reik (Berlin, guest of the Society) : ' The Personality of Anton Bruckner '.

February 22, 1933. 1. Dr. E. Bergler : ' Unconscious Motives in Napoleon's Behaviour to Talleyrand '.

2. *Business Meeting. Election to Membership* : Erik Homburger.

March 8, 1933. Dr. Helene Deutsch : ' The Forms of Defence in Manic States '.

Anna Freud,
Secretary.

THE WASHINGTON-BALTIMORE PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1933

January 21, 1933. *Annual Meeting*. 1. Dr. Ernest E. Hadley : ' The Black Mass '. 2. *Election of Officers* : President, Dr. Lucile Dooley ; Vice-President, Dr. Eleanora B. Saunders ; Secretary-Treasurer, Dr. William V. Silverberg ; Council Member for three-year term, Dr. William V. Silverberg ; Council Member for two-year term to fill vacancy on Council, Dr. Loren B. T. Johnson ; Representative to serve three years on the Executive Council of the American Psycho-Analytical Association, Dr. Ernest E. Hadley. *Elected to Membership* : Dr. Bernard S. Robbins, Dr. Joseph O. Chassell, Dr. Gregory Stragnell ; to *Associate Membership*, Dr. T. P. Wolfe.

February 27, 1933. Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan : ' Psychiatry and Psycho-Analysis as a Tributary to the Social Sciences '.

March 25, 1933. 1. Dr. Nolan D. C. Lewis : ' The Analysis of a case of Paranoia '. 2. The Council reported favourably on a list of amendments to the Constitution and By-laws. A seminar on Freud's Case-Histories begun under the leadership of Dr. Silverberg on January 25, 1933, was well attended. The Training Committee announced other courses for the spring.

William V. Silverberg,
Secretary-Treasurer.

II. REPORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COMMISSION BERLIN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL INSTITUTE

First Quarter, 1933

(a) Lecture Courses

1. Dr. Carl Müller-Braunschweig : Introduction to Psycho-Analysis. Part II. : General Theory of the Neuroses. Seven lectures. (Attendance 33.)
2. Dr. Wilhelm Reich : Theory of Instinct. Five lectures. (Attendance 22.)
3. Dr. Jenö Harnik : Theory of the Specific Neuroses. Part II. Five lectures. (Attendance 10.)
4. Dr. Ernst Simmel : Psycho-Analytic Technique. Part II. Five lectures. (Attendance 15.)

(b) Seminars. Practical Exercises. Discussions

5. Dr. Jeanne Lampl-de Groot : Seminar on the works of Freud : case-histories. Part I. (Seven seminars of two hours each. Attendance 20.)
6. Dr. Otto Fenichel : Seminar on the works of Freud : writings on theory. Part II. (Seven seminars of two hours each. Attendance 24.)
7. Dr. Ernst Simmel : Seminar on technique. (For training candidates only.) (Attendance 16.)
8. Dr. Eitingon and others : Practical therapeutic exercises. (Control-analyses.) (For training candidates only.)
9. Dr. Fenichel and Dr. Reik : Discussion of recent publications in psycho-analysis and allied subjects. (Attendance 31.)
10. Dr. Müller-Braunschweig : Discussion of cases of child-analysis. (For analysts practising child-analysis and training candidates only.) (Attendance 7.)

(c) Seminar for Educationists

11. Steff Bornstein. (For beginners.) (Seven sessions. Attendance 30.)
12. Dr. Lampl-de Groot and Bornstein. (For advanced students.) (Alternate weeks. Attendance 36.)

CHICAGO INSTITUTE FOR PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

On October 3, 1932, an Institute for Psycho-Analysis was inaugurated at 43 East Ohio Street, Chicago, Illinois. The Institute was empowered by the State authorities to open a Clinic and to conduct training. The President of the Board of Trustees is Dr. Alfred K. Stern. Dr. Franz Alexander and Dr. Karen Horney have been permanently appointed Director and Associate-Director respectively. In addition the teaching staff includes three analysts who work half-time (Dr. Thomas M. French, Dr. Helen McLean, Dr. Catherine L. Bacon) and also Dr. Leon J. Saul (permanently appointed). Two other medical men (Dr. Karl Menninger and Dr. Lionel N. Blitzsten) give courses of lectures. The work of the Institute is directed primarily to research and training. Research work at the present time consists in the investigation of organ-neuroses (gastric, intestinal, and gynæcological cases). Work is also being done on the problem of neurotically conditioned criminality.

At present 36 cases are being analysed : 10 of these are training analyses and 26 therapeutic analyses, of which 7 are being studied theoretically. Besides the candidates who are still in training, 8 analysts are receiving control.

Fourth Quarter, 1932

I. For candidates and practising analysts :

Dr. Horney : Technical Seminar. (Attendance 14.)

Dr. French : Lectures on Theory of the Neuroses. (Attendance 7.)

Dr. Alexander : Seminar on psycho-analytical Literature. (Attendance 21.)

II. For Medical practitioners :

Dr. Alexander : Lectures on Psycho-Analysis and Medicine. (Attendance 27.)

Dr. Menninger : Lectures on Psycho-Analysis and Psychiatry. (Attendance 15.)

III. Sociological Discussions :

Dr. Alexander. (Attendance 22.)

First Quarter, 1933

I. For candidates and practising analysts :

Dr. Alexander : Technical Seminar. (Attendance 16.)

Dr. Horney : Technique of Psycho-Analysis. (Attendance 17.)

Dr. Alexander : Seminar on Psycho-analytical literature. (Attendance 22.)

Dr. Blitzsten : Seminar on Dream-Interpretation. (Attendance 8.)

II. For medical practitioners :

Dr. Menninger : Lectures on Psycho-Analysis and Psychiatry. (Attendance 17.)

Dr. Alexander : Evenings for medical discussion. (Attendance 15.)

III. For social workers and educationists :

Dr. Alexander and Dr. Horney : The Social Worker and the Teacher.
(Attendance 613.)

Dr. Horney : Seminar on pedagogical questions. (Attendance 19.)

IV. Sociological Discussions :

Dr. Alexander. (Attendance 20.)

TRAINING INSTITUTE OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1933

(a) Lecture Courses

1. Dr. Gy. Szüts : Introduction to Psycho-Analysis. (Four lectures.
Attendance 40.)

2. Frau Dr. L. K. Rotter : The Interpretation of Dreams. (Four lectures.
Attendance 30.)

3. Dr. I. Hollós : Psycho-Analytic Psychiatry. (Five lectures. Attendance 30.)

(b) Seminars (for Training Candidates)

4. Frau V. Kóvacs : Seminars on technique. (Six sessions. Attendance 10.)

5. Dr. I. Hermann : Seminars on theory. (Three sessions. Attendance 15.)

6. Dr. M. Bálint : Psycho-Analytical Literature. (Four Sessions. Attendance 10.)

7. Dr. L. Révész : General and Special Pathology. (For non-medical training candidates.) (Twelve sessions. Attendance 14.)

Dr. Imre Hermann.

VIENNA TRAINING INSTITUTE

First Quarter, 1933

(a) Lecture Courses

Dr. R. Sterba : Sexual Pathology. (Four lectures. Attendance 50.)

Dr. S. Bernfeld : Psycho-Analysis for Teachers and Social Workers. (Ten lectures. Attendance 200.)

Dr. M. Steiner : Impotence in Men. (Three lectures. Attendance 10.)

(b) Seminars

Dr. E. Bibring : Freud's writings on theory of the neuroses. (Attendance 20.)

Drs. E. Bibring and E. Hitschmann : Seminar on psycho-analytic therapy. (Alternate weeks. Attendance 25.)

Dr. L. Jekels : Readings and discussions of selected works of Freud. (For members of the Academic Union for Medical Psychology.)

(c) Study Groups

Dr. Helene Deutsch and Dr. H. Nunberg : Control-analysis in groups.
(Weekly. Attendance 20.)

Anna Freud : Technique of child-analysis. (Weekly. Attendance 25.)

Dr. R. Mack-Brunswick : Psycho-analysis of the psychoses. (Attendance
15.)

(d) Pedagogy

A. Aichhorn : Introduction to psycho-analysis for educationists and social
workers. (Fortnightly. Attendance 65.)

A. Aichhorn : Practical talks on the upbringing of children. (Fortnightly.
Attendance 20.)

A. Aichhorn : Seminar on the upbringing of children.

Dr. W. Hoffer : Seminar for educationists. (Monthly. Attendance 20.)

Dr. S. Bernfeld : Study group for educationists.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

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PART 4

OBITUARY

SANDOR FERENCZI, 1873-1933

BY

ERNEST JONES¹

It is my painful duty to announce to you the death of one of our most distinguished and well-beloved colleagues. After a long and distressing illness, Sandor Ferenczi died on May 22nd, shortly before the celebration of his sixtieth birthday. With him we lose one of the leading pioneers of psycho-analysis, an inspiring personality and a trusty friend.

Younger colleagues have perhaps seen Ferenczi through a tinted glass, his personality impaired by chronic illness and his later work not readily to be understood or appreciated. It is therefore not easy for me to convey to them the tremendous significance that Ferenczi had in the earlier development of psycho-analysis, both as a branch of science and as an organization of our common work. Let me relate a few of the actual facts of his life in this connection. He had practised for ten years in Budapest as a neurologist and psychiatrist before seriously working at psycho-analysis. In these years he became familiar with both the powers and the limitations of the hypnotic method. On reading the *Traumdeutung* on its appearance he had not been able to assimilate its teachings, and it was only on recurring later to the *Studien über Hysterie*, a book he had casually read years before, that he was impressed by the new perspective there opened out; the *Studien* remained his favourite among Freud's writings, and he could point out in them the most astonishing hints of Freud's later ideas. One may date his real contact with psycho-analytical work to 1907, the year he first met Freud. From then he remained for many years in the closest friendship, scientific and

¹ Spoken before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, June 13, 1933.